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SUMMARY
This is a comparative study of industrial relations between
f1) (2)NTT^ and the telecommunications side of the P.O.- R.P, Dore 
made point-by-point comparisons on industrial relations between 
Japan and Britain taking two private firms, i.e. HITACHI and 
English Electric and characterises the differences as ‘organisation' 
oriented’ Japanese system and ’market-oriented’ British system.
The aim of this study is to make clear not only the differences 
between HTT and the P.O. but also the differences between the 
public and private sectors by fitting NTT and the P.O. onto the 
scale showing the differences Dore found between HITACHI and 
English Electric, However it is not possible to give a total 
picture of industrial relations in NTT and the P.O. as Dore did 
because this study is concentrated on institutional and material 
differences.
Firstly, the organisation of telecommunications in Japan and 
Britain is taken up and five important features which will be 
relevant in the later discussions are extracted. They are
(a) scale, (b) monopoly position^ (c) technological uniformity and 
changes, (d) government control and (e) centralisation.
Then the industrial relations of NTT and the P.O. are compared 
on five aspects, i.e. (a) employment system, (b) wages and other 
conditions of work, (c) union structure and membership,
(1) NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation) deals 
with the inland telecommunications services in Japan.
(2) R.P. Dore, British Factory - Japanese Factory; the origin of 
national diversity in industrial relations. George Allen & 
Unwin, 1973.
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(d) management organisation for industrial relations and (e) 
collective bargaining structure. In order to show the differences 
not only between NTT and the P.O. but also between the public and 
private sectors, a four point spectrum for each of the thirteen 
most important features on five aspects mentioned above is 
created and given explanations as follows:
(1) fore contrasted the low mobility of HITACHI workers 
to the high mobility of English Electric workers. Although the 
P.O. workers show higher mobility than NTT workers, the turnover 
rates of NTT and the P.O. workers are lower even than those of 
HITACHI workers,
(2) Dore found that while there is not a clear-cut difference 
in status between staff and manual workers in HITACHI, there are 
considerable differences between them in English Electric,
However, there is not a clear-cut difference between them in both 
NTT and the P.O.
(5) Dore contrasted systematic recruitment of HITACHI to 
less systematic recruitment of English Electric. Recruitment of 
NTT is more formal and systematic than that of HITACHI but that 
of the P.O. is, like English Electric, less systematic than that 
of the Japanese firms,
(4) Dore found that while HITACHI provides to its employees 
continuous in-service training at its own vocational training 
schools, English Electric does not. However, both NTT and the 
P.O. provide more continuous in-service training at their own 
vocational training schools.
y(5) According to Dore main factors in determining wages of 
HITACHI is the comparability with other firms in the same business 
but those of English Electric are the same as market rules. However, 
both NTT and the P.Q, attach great importance to comparabi1ity with 
the private sector, although the latter takes some market factors 
into account,
(6) Dore found that while principles governing the distribution 
of wage/salary bill in HITACHI have no relation to market situations, 
wages and salary are distributed on differentials in English Electric, 
Those of NTT is more Japanese-like than those of HITACHI excluding 
sex and merit and those of the P.O. move to some extent towards 
Japanese ones because of the incremental scales.
(7) Dore contrasted indirect and multiform monetary incentives 
to indirect ones of English Electric under piecerate system.
However, monetary incentives in both NTT and the P.O. are only 
through promotion.
(8) Dore found that while HITACHI provides to its employees 
all-embracing welfare services, English Electric does not. Welfare 
services offered by NTT are better than those of HITACHI but the 
only significant welfare service of the P.O. is pensions.
(9) Dore found that while HITACHI Union is an 'enterprise’ 
union, there are several fragmented unions in English Electric 
which have members beyond the boundary of the firms. NTT union 
is also an enterprise union. Although there are several unions 
according to job grades in the P.O., most of them are organised 
within the P.O.
VI.
(10) Dore contrasted centralised organisation of HITACHI Union 
to fragmented organisation of English Electric unions. However the 
unions organised in both HTT and the P.O. are very much centralised.
(11) Dore found that membership subscription of HITACHI Union 
is considerably higher than that of English Electric unions. This 
contrast also holds true between HTT union and the P.O. unions.
(12) Dore found that while the time of wage bargaining of 
HITACHI is periodical, that of English Electric is unpredictable.
The time of wage bargaining in both NTT and the P.O. is periodical 
although the pay review dates of the P.O. are fragmented throughout 
the year according to unions.
(13) Dore contrasted the centralised collective bargaining 
structure of HITACHI to fragmented structure of English Electric. 
Collective bargaining structure of both NTT and the P.O. are 
centralised although the P.O. negotiates separately according to 
unions.
From these it is clear that while the industrial relations 
system of NTT shares the features of the Japanese system and in 
certain respects it embodies the Japanese features in more extreme 
patterns than that of HITACHI, that of the P.O. approaches to 
some extent towards the Japanese system although it obviously 
still has some features of the British industrial relations 
system. This is largely due to the five fea.tures pointed out 
earlier.
VII
Apart from the points mentioned above, NTT and the P.O. 
share such important features as (a) positive union attitudes 
towards rationalisation, (b) - established consultative machinery 
and (c) government control on pay bargaining all of which can 
be explained by the same five features.
Through these discussions the important role of technology 
and the form of management, i.e. public or private, in the 
formation of industrial relations system can be clearly understood,
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CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction; Origin and Object of the S'trudy
This study arose out of the author’s background in NTT and an
interest in the comparative structure and culture of NTT when compared
the
with the firms engaged in/telecommunications business in European and 
American countries. In particular, the author is interested in 
whether the relationship between NTT and ZENDENTSU (All Japan 
Telecommunications Workers Union), virtually the only union in NTT, 
is unique or is reflected to any significant extent in other countries, 
However, some further explanation is necessary. As is fairly common 
among many Japanese youths, the author had a sense of yearning 
towards the life in European and American countries and when the 
author was told at the beginning of August, 1974? that he was lucky 
enough to pass the examination to select staff to be sent to Britain 
'under the Japanese government scholarship programme which entitles 
officials from various government departments for two years of 
postgraduate study at British Universities, he was overjoyed.
This raised the issue as to what should be studied in Britain,
Although it might sound strange to some people, it was really a 
great problem to be solved.
As will be explained later, it is a tacit understanding ofthe 
Japanese employment system that once one takes up a job (strictly 
speaking, begins to work) in a particular firm one will continue to 
work for the firm until one reaches normal retirement age of 55- 
The author himself began to work for NTT in April, 1970 just after 
graduating from a university, in accordance with the practice of
so-called life-long employment. After the period of training for the 
first three years, the author was appointed to a post of KAKARICHO 
(sub-section chief) at one of the telegraph and telephone offices.
The opportunity of postgraduate study in Britain was offered 
after serving at the post for two years. Although there was no 
instruction from NTT and the author wan told that he was quite free 
to choose the subject of the study of his own will, the logic of the 
situation suggested a subject which would be of great help in working 
for NTT for the rest of his working life.
During the period of initial training, the author has had an 
opportunity to be trained in the Personnel Bureau of the Head Office 
of NTT which deals with industrial relations matters. That experience 
gave the author great interest in, and some understanding of, 
industrial relations especially the comparative study of industrial 
relations system between Japan and European and American countries, . 
As will be mentioned in the following chapters, the management of 
NTT has been facing an annual spring demand for pay increases 
together with better working conditions from ZENDENTSU, This claim 
for a pay increase constitutes a part of the pay settlement process 
called SHUNTO (Spring Labour Offensive), SENDENTSU, which is one 
of the leading members of KOROKÏQ (Government Enterprises and Public 
Corporations Workers Unions Joint Committee) formed by Unions 
organised in Government Enterprises and Public Corporations, has 
played a significant role in SHUNTO,
Through the high-rate growth period since the 1960s, unions 
have come to demand higher and higher wages every year. One of the 
main slogans of ZENDENTSÜ is the acquisition of pay and working
conditions which are as good as European and American levels. The
Union argues that this claim is based on the fact that NTO? has grown
through successive five year plans into one of the largest firms in 
the
the woiTd in/ telecommunications field and the technological level 
of NTT can be said to be one of the most advanced in the world. It 
is not easy for NTT to deal with this kind of claim from SENDENTSU 
not only because it has not got in its possession enough data concerning 
pay and working conditions in other countries but also because the 
Japanese industrial relations system is greatly different from the 
system in other countries. Therefore it is necessary to have some 
knowledge of the comparative study of industrial relations to deal 
with this kind of claim.
This is one of the reasons why the author has come to have an 
interest in comparative study of industrial relations and it is the 
author’s hope to reconsider the relationship between NTT and ZENDENTSU 
in the light of the relationship found in the telecommunications 
field in other countries.
Although it is certain that the author shall be transferred from 
job to job every two or three years, all jobs would have a kind of 
industrial relations element. It is hoped that this study would be 
of some help in performing jobs in the future. The opportunity of a 
period of study in Britain meant that the author could choose a 
subject of his study that would satisfy both his own interest and 
his obligation as a manager of NTT.
the
As the British P,0o deals with hotypostal and telecommunications 
businesses, it might not be appropriate to make a comparative study 
between NTT and the P.O. But as will be shown later the two 
businesses are run fairly independently from each other in the P.O. 
Therefore it will not cause any fatal short-coming even if the 
comparative study is made between NTT and the telecommunications 
side of the P.O. assigning the latter as a quasi-independent 
firm.
5.
B. Framework and Methodology; Major Objective to Compare and Contrast 
NTT and the P.O.
1. The scale drawn from R.P. Bore’s study.
In.doing research, of course, one needs perspectives and hypotheses 
to be used as a framework of the study. R.P. Bore's "British Factory - 
Japanese Factory"provides such a framework for the study (a) because 
of the comparative framework it gives of the tv;o private firms (or. at 
least representative firms) and then the opportunity to compare two 
similar firms in the public sector, and (b) because it also provides a 
methodological framework. Although Bore took up only two firms, i.e., 
HITACHI and English Electric in one sector, i.e., engineering industry, 
his point-by-point comparisons between the two firms succeeded in 
exploring real differences between Japanese and British industrial 
relations systems. The scale showing the main differences Bore found 
betvæen them is provided below.
(l) George Allen & Unwin, 1973»
HITACHI English Electric
I. The Worker
(1) mobility
(2) status differences 
between staff and 
workers
(3) recruitment
range of intelligence 
distribution
method
work roles for which 
recruited
(4) training 
in-service training 
vocational training school 
cost of in-service training 
method
aim
II. Wage System
(1) main factor in 
determining wages
(2) principles governing the
distribution of wage/salary 
bill
life-long
employment
no clear- 
cut
difference
upper
relatively high 
mobility
considerable
differences
whole
systematic less systematic
general range quite specific
continuous no
has no
firm
more bookish
public authority 
more practical
to impart 
attitude and 
moral principle
comparability 
with other 
firms in the 
same business 
in Japan
* educational 
level
* age
* sex
^merit as rated 
by superiors
* family 
responsibility
# function currently 
performed in the 
firm
to heighten working 
competence
market situation
* demand for labour
* intrinsic complexity 
of jobs
«-cost in time and 
money of training
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(5) monetary incentives ^identical for 
every type of 
employee 
«indirect 
«of longer term 
«quite 
consequential 
«multiform with 
assessment
III. Union organisation and bargaining structure 
(l) Unions
membership
white collar workers
grass roots organisation
subscription
organisation
(2) wage bargaining 
time
sectional interest 
individual pay
(3) work shop conflict 
frequency 
regulation
« salaried managers 
promotion 
merit increase 
« wage worker 
direct (piecework)
employees of 
HITACHI
highly
organised and 
belong to the 
same union as 
blue collar
branches based 
on workshop
more and 
higher
formal and 
bureaucratic
periodical 
(tspring labour 
(offensive 
(^ summer bonus 
■^winter bonus
younger/older
work performance 
and supervisors' 
subjective 
assessment
seldom
detailed
contract
fragmented
less organised 
and belong to 
different union
dual
(residential branch 
(informal workshop unit
less
custom and practice
less frequent and 
less predictable
skilled/unskilled 
wage drift
very often 
less formal
(4) relation between 
management and 
the union
IV. The Enterprise as Community
(l) welfare
sick pay
retirement pension/ 
gratuities
services
membership 
personal issues
union attitude
(2) management attitude 
towardsthe morale of 
employees
(3) employees' family
(4) employees' attitude 
towar<? a firm
V. Authority, Function and Status
(1) management organisation
directors
greater degree 
of consensus
little consensus
better
better
«housing 
«educational' 
loans for 
workers' 
children 
«medical services 
* transport 
subsidies 
«sport and social 
facilities
automatic
work superior
no
no
no
voluntary
informal assistance 
of workmates or 
specialised welfare 
officer
positive towarc^  indifferent 
material benefits
greatly
concerned
not concerned
peripheral 
members of the 
enterprise family
sense of 
identity
no relation
no identity
elder of a
corporate
community
specialist in 
management
9.
organisation
responsibility
principle
(2) foremen 
function
role
sociability with the 
subordinate outside 
work situation
(3) work disciplines
work effort
work prescription
attitude toward^work
attitude toward^ 
managerial authority
pyramidal 
arrangement of 
team
assigned to 
groups
co-operation
between
managers
leader of the 
team
«less specific 
«more diffusely 
extending
frequent
more flexible
individual
clarification of 
responsibility, 
performance checks 
and sanction on 
individual
supervisory
more specific
less frequent
rules reinforced rules reinforced by
by exhortation formal sanction
designed to
recall workers to
the path of their
original virtue
more disciplined less disciplined 
and sustained
minute and 
formal
pride in work
less minute and 
formal
to regard as a system 
of exploitation
acceptance with resistance 
willingness
10.
It is clear that these represent two different patterns of industrial 
relations. Partial objective of this study is to fit NTT and the P.O. 
onto this scale as well as to evaluate structural and other qualitative 
differences between the two. Before going into the comparison between 
NTT and the P.O. it will be helpful to summarise Bore’s findings and to 
examine v/hether HITACHI and English Electric are reasonably representative 
of the differences in industrial relations systems between Japan and 
Britain because, as stated above, they will be used as a framework of 
comparison in this study®
2. Summary of Bore’s findings.
The main aspects on which Bore made comparisons can be summarised 
under five headlines, i.e. (a) the worker, (b) wage system, (c) union 
organisation and bargaining structure, (d) enterprise as community and
(e) authority, function and status.
(a) The vmrker.-
The first main context under which Bore made comparisons is ’the 
worker’, where he found differences in four aspects. First of these 
is the difference in mobility, 'while Japanese workers are less oriented 
toward® job-changes under the shelter of life-long employment system, 
British workers change their jobs relatively frequently in order to 
better themselves.
Secondly, he found a difference in the status of employees. V/hereas 
there is not a clear-cut difference in status between staff and workers 
in Japan, there are considerable differences in status between staff and 
workers in Britain.
11.
Thirdly, he found the difference in recruitment as follows; 
while, in Japan, employees are recruited from upper range of intelligence 
distribution through systematic selection for a more general range of 
work, in Britain, they are recruited from the whole range of intelligence 
distribution through less systematic selection and the recruitment is for 
quite specific work roles.
Fourthly, he found differences in training, V/hereas the Japanese 
firm provides continuous in-service training at its ovai vocational training 
schools and, therefore, public authority contributes less towards the 
cost of in-service training, the British firm does not have its o\m 
vocational training school and eventually provides less in-service training 
and the cost of in-service training is borne by the public authority. 
Furthermore, while the curricula of training in Japan are more bookish 
and aim to impart attitude and moral principles desirable to the firm, 
British training is more practical and aims only to heighten working 
competence,
(b) V/age system.
The second main context under which Bore made comparisons is wage 
system, where three differences were pointed out. Firstly main factor 
in determining wages in Japan is the comparability with other firms in 
the same business, but wages in Britain are determined by a ’market 
situation’, i.e. labour market more or less determines a price for a 
particular skill.
Secondly, while not all of the principles governing the distribution 
of wage bill in Japan are directly derived from market rules, British
12.
principles are the same as market rules. In Japan such factors as 
educational level, age, sex, merit as rated by superiors, family 
responsibility and function currently performed in the firm are taken into 
account. In Britain the relative levels of demand for labour, the 
relative intrinsic complexity of different jobs and cost in time and money 
of training are main factors.
Lastly, while Japanese monetary incentives are (l) identical for 
every type of employee, (2) almost exclusively contingent rather than 
direct, (3) of longer term, (4) quite consequential and (5) multiform 
with assessments by superiors, those of the British are in two forms.
For salaried managers promotion and merit increase work as incentives 
and for workers there is a direct incentive under a piecework system.
(c) Union organisation and bargaining structure.
The next context Bore is concerned with is union organisation and 
bargaining structure. First of all union organisation is different in 
five points. The first point is that Japanese union membership is 
limited to only the permanent employees' of a firm and there is generally 
only one union per firm, but British unions are organised beyond firms’ 
boundaries and there are many fragmented unions within a firm according 
to crafts. Secondly, Japanese white collar workers are highly organised 
and normally belong to the same union as blue collar workers, but 
British white collar workers are less organised and even when they are 
organised they generally belong to different unions from blue collar 
workers. Thirdly, the grass roots basis of Japanese unions are formal 
union branches based on workshop in contrast to British unions characterised 
by dual structure formed by official union branches based on residential
13.
areas and informal workshop organisation represented by shop stewards. 
Fourthly, Japanese unions have greater financial resources than British 
unions because they collect more and higher subscriptions than British 
unions. Finally, v/hereas the organisation of Japanese un.ions is 
considerably formal and bureaucratic, that of British unions is flexible 
and many things are left to ’custom and practice'.
Then, there are three differences in bargaining structure. Firstly, 
the time of wage bargaining in Japan is quite periodical, that is, 
basically they negotiate three times a year concerning annual base-up 
in Spring, Summer and Winter bonuses, but bargaining in Britain is less 
frequent and less predictable. Secondly, sectional interests to be 
reconciled in wage demand in Japan are between younger and older, but they 
are between skilled and unskilled in Britain. Thirdly, in Japan 
individual pay is determined by such factors as work performance and 
superiors’ subjective assessment, but, in Britain, it is determined through 
a complicated process called v/age drift.
Furthermore, workshop conflicts are different in their frequency 
and regulation. In Japan they are very rare and regulated through 
detailed contractual regulations. In Britain, on the contrary, they break 
up very often and there is no detailed regulation concerning the settlement 
of conflicts.
Finally, there is a marked difference in the relationship between 
management and union. Whereas there is a greater degree of consensus 
between Japanese management and union, the consensus between them is less 
common in Britain,
14.
(d) The Enterprise as Community.
The fourth context is explained under the headline ’the enterprise 
as community’. Firstly, Japanese firms provide all-emhracing welfare 
services to their employees hut the welfare services provided by British 
firms are insignificant. Some of the other differences found about welfare 
services are as follows; (l) Japanese firms offer better retirement 
pension and gratuities than British firms, (2) Japanese firms provide such 
wide-range services as housing, educational loans for workers’ children, 
medical services, transport subsidies and sport and social facilities, 
but British firms do not and the burden is. borne by the state, (5) 
membership to these welfare services in Japan is automatically acquired 
with entry to the firm, but it is voluntary in Britain even where some 
services are offered, (4) personal issues in Japan are dealt with by 
superiors, but, in Britain, they are dealt with by informal assistance of 
workers or a specialised welfare officer, (5) while Japanese union 
attitude toward?welfare services provided by the firm is positive in the 
sense that unions are interested in material benefits, British unions are 
indifferent to the welfare services provided by firms.
4 Secondly, Japanese management is greatly concerned with the morale of
employees, but British management shows little concern.
Thirdly, while an employee's family is considered as a peripheral 
member of the enterprise family in Japan, the British counterpart has 
no relation to the firm.
Fourthly, Japanese employees have a sense of commitment toward^their
firm, but British employees frequently have no such sense.
15.
(e) Authority, Function and Status,
The last context of the differences is mentioned under the heading 
'authority, function and status'. Firstly, Dore took up management 
organisation and found the following differences; (l) while many of the 
directors of Japanese firms are elders of a corporate community, British 
directors are mainly specialists in management, (2) the organisation of 
Japanese firms is characterised by pyramidal arrangement of teams but that 
of the British is more flexible, (3) in Japan responsibility is normally 
assigned to groups but in Britain it is assigned to individuals, (4) 
whereas the principle concerning management organisation in Japan is 
co-operation between managers, in Britain, clarification of responsibilities, 
performance checks and sanctions on individuals are functioning as 
organisational principles.
Secondly, Dore found three differences about foremen; (l) the 
function of Japanese foremen is mainly as leaders of the team and, therefore, 
they take a direct part in the team's work, but that of foremen in Britain 
is as supervisors, (2) the role of foremen in Japan is less specific 
and more diffusely extending but that of British foremen is very much 
more specific, (3) sociability with the subordinates outside the work 
situation is very frequent in Japan, but less frequent in Britain,
Lastly, Dore found some differences in work disciplines. Firstly, 
while the basis of work disciplines in Japan is rules reinforced by 
exhortation designed to recall workers to the path of thali’ original virtue, 
in Britain, it is rules reinforced by formal sanctions. Secondly, work 
effort is more disciplined and sustained in Japan than in Britain.
16,
Thirdly, work prescription in Japan is minute and formal but it is less 
minute and formal in Britain. Fourthly, while Japanese workers have a 
pride in work, British workers tend to regard it as a system of 
exploitation. Finally, Japanese workers accept managerial authority with 
willingness, but British workers often resist it,
3. Explanation of the differences*
On the basis of these detailed comparisons, Bore characterises the 
differences as 'organisation-oriented' Japanese system and 'market-oriented' 
British system. Then he explained these differences partly by cultural 
differences between Japan and Britain, The main cultural differences
(2)given by Bore are as follows:-^ '
(2) R.P. Bore, op.cit., pp. 297-298,
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Cultural Differences between Japan and Britain.
JAPANESE BRITISH
less individualists, more inclined 
to submerge their identity in some 
large group to which they belong, 
and more likely to be obsessed by a 
sense of duty
less self-confident and more 
neurotically preoccupied with 
relating the good opinion of others
more selfish, more 
irresponsible, more inclined 
to tell Jack that they 
personally are all right
more apt to be dogmatic 
and aggressive, less 
sensitive to the feelings 
of others
more introverted less hesitant about imposing 
their views and feelings on 
others
less men of principle than the 
British
imitative
less willing to forgo the 
pleasures of self-assertion 
in the interests of social 
harmony
complacently fail to take 
opportunities to learn 
from others
more ambitious have less concern with 
self-improvement
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JAPANESE BRITISH
more submissive to superiors more inclined to resent 
authority by virtue of 
its existence and 
irrespective of its 
functional necessity
more slavishly diligent more afraid of hard work
care less about vhat happens outside 
their own group, and have less sense 
of social responsibility to correct 
abuses in their own society
more given to busybodying, 
less willing to live and 
let live
more childishly naive more suspicious and 
cynical, less good humoured 
and cheerful
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Dore claims that these differences in attitudes and values clearly 
had something to do with the differences in industrial relations system.
On top of this, 'late development effect'^ ' worked to diversify the 
Japanese industrial relations system from that of the British. As Japan 
began its industrialisation at the time when Britain had fully completed 
its own industrialisation, Japan was faced with different structure of 
economic opportunities and constraints and this led to the formation of 
the industrial relations system which is greatly different from the 
British one.
Although Dore did not try to made clear which of these tvjo factors 
played a dominant role in. forming the Japanese industrial relations 
system, it is clearly a great leap forward from the conventional wisdoms 
which gave too much importance to cultural differences and virtually 
ignored the difference in stages of the development of world economy under 
which each country began its industrialisation. However, it is not the 
aim of this study to evaluate the factors having contributed to the 
forming of different industrial relations systems in different countries,
4. Are HITACHI and English Electric representative of the differences in 
industrial relations between Japan and Britain?
As Dore noted, the features which ma.ke up the so-called Japanese
f4)employment system are generally shared only by Japanese large firms.
Many economists characterise the Japanese econon%r as a 'dual' economy in 
which a number of small firms do exist as subcontractors or subsidiaries
(3) R.P. Dore, op.cit., pp.375**420«-
(4) Ibid., p. 301.
20.
of a fairly limited number of large firms. This dual economy under which
large firms have been able to adjust flexibly to the general economic
situation in spite of the life-long employment system has surely been a
key contributing factor in the high-rate growth of the Japanese economy.
From the industrial relations noint of view, there are quite a large
(5)' 'number of differences between largo and small firms,
But as Bore duly claims the importance of the 'system' is to be 
measured not only by the large firms' gradual absorption of a large 
proportion of the Japanese labour force, but also by the influence they 
have as a normative model for the rest of s o c i e t y , i t  will not be 
improper to understand the features of industrial relations in large firms 
as characteristic of the Japanese industrial relations.
Furthermore, fortunately, the two firms the author is going to take 
up, i.e. NTT and the P.O. belong to the largest group of larger firms. 
Again, this makes it appropriate to use Bore's findings as a framework of 
this study.
Nevertheless, some people might doubt if Bore's conclusion carries 
general validity because his study is based on only two firms in one 
sector of national economy. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
positions of the tv/o firms in the whole system of industrial relations of 
both Japan and Britain.
As far as the Japanese side is concerned, as Bore duly proved, it
(7)is appropriate to consider HITACHI as a typical Japanese enterprise,^ '
(5) R.P, Bore, op.cit., p. 302,
(6) Ibid., p. 305,
(7) Ibid., pp. 301-337.
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In the case of English Electric, it can he said that it shares the 
features of the British industrial relations system with other firms. 
According to the Report of the Royal Commission on Trade UnionSand 
Employers' Associations, the British industrial relations system is 
characterised hy its dual structure,that is, there are both formal and 
informal systems. The formal system is composed of official institutions 
of employers' associations and trade unions. Typically, there exists 
industry-wide collective agreements as to pay, hours of work and other 
conditions of work. But recently the role of informal system has become 
increasingly important. For example, there is a wide difference between 
actual earnings and the rates laid down in official agreements because of 
piecework or incentive earnings, company or factory addition to basic 
rates and overtime. These are all decided on workshop basis through 
the negotiations between managers and shop stewards. Official trade 
unions and employers' associations have no real control over the 
bargainings at grass roots level. As a result, pay structure has become 
'chaotic'. On the other hand, most matters are left to custom and practice 
at grass roots level. This is one of the reasons why workshop conflicts 
have increased. Furthermore, so-called multi-unionism gives other sources 
of conflicts especially on demarcation problems.
This is the picture of British industrial relations system the Report 
gave. Of course it is true that the power of the employers' association 
in the engineering industry has been traditionally strong and industry-wide 
agreements still hold some validity. But on the other hand new development 
such as productivity agreements and incomes policy has emerged in the last
(8) Cmnd. 3625, I968, pp. 12-37,
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decade. Therefore, it is more appropriate to consider English Electric as 
a reasonable example of the industrial relations system of large British 
manufacturing companies.
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5. The positions of NTT and the P.O. on the scale drav/n from
Bore's study.
Accepting that HITACHI is a typical Japanese large firm and 
English Electric is a reasonable example of British industrial 
relations system, it will be appropriate to use the findings of 
Bore's study as a framework of this study.
However, the t*wo firms the author is going to study are 
both public corporations. There could be differences between 
them conditioned by the differences in the national industrial 
relations system, but differences between the public and private 
sectors are also to be expected.
Although basic aims of firms are the same in the sense that 
they are designed to provide goods and services, there are many 
differences between the private and public sectors. One of the 
main features of the public sector is that its range of activities 
are legally determined and the day-to-day management is more or 
less under government control simply because they are publicly 
ov/nedo Even industrial relations cannot be free from this control. 
For example, as will be described in detail later, the management 
side of NTT has no real power in determining wages of its employees 
because its budget including pay must be approved by both Houses 
of Parliament. This kind of government control tends to give 
impact on both management and union and will lead to the different 
kind of industrial relations system from that found in the private 
sector.
the
The second feature of/public sector is that companies are
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normally considerably larger than private companies in size and 
often have a ’monopolistic* power. The need to manage large 
corporations universally throughout a country will lead to both 
centralisation and formalisation of their organisation. This 
will again influence the industrial relations system in the 
public sector and help to make it different from that in the 
private sector.
Thirdly the public sector is normally not profit-oriented in 
contrast to the private sector which is run on a commercial 
basis. The main role of the public sector is to provide goods or 
services efficiently to the people, in some cases regardless of 
the cost involved. This tends to demoralise both management 
and union and the attitudes of management and union in the public 
sector might be different from those found in the private 
sector.
Because of these three factors, the industrial relations 
system in the public sector might be different from that in the 
private sector. On the other hand, owing to the common features as 
public corporations, the industrial relations system of NTT and the 
P.O. might have some common characteristics. Furthermore, some 
common features based on the character of telecommunications with 
which both NTT and the P.O. are concerned would be found. Some of 
these common features might be out of the range of the scale draim 
from Bore's study. It is hoped that by fitting NTT and the P.O. on 
to the scale drawn from Bore's findings not only the differences 
between NTT and the P.O. but also the differences between the 
public and private sectors will be made clear and the hypothesis
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is that on many aspects the firms concerned would he fitted on 
to the spectrum as shown in Chart 1-1.
Chart 1-1; Expected positions on the spectrum
NTT HITACHI the P.O. ENGLISH ELECTRIC
But some of the differences shared by NTT and the P.O. would be 
out of the scope of the spectrum. Following chapters will see 
if this is true or not.
Although Dore made his comparisons on almost all aspects of 
industrial relations, this dissertation will concentrate on a 
limited number of features. This study will not be able to give 
a total picture of industrial relations in the two firms as Bore 
did. Only institutional and material differences will be taken 
up.
6, Basis of Information and Method of Research.
Now that the framework and object of the study have been given, 
the actual method of the research must be explained. As stated earlier, 
the author has been working for NTT for some years and has been involved 
in a job which is closely related to industrial relations matters. In 
addition to his direct experience, the author has been able to obtain 
specific information and documents from NTT for the research.
Therefore, as far as NTT is concerned, what was needed was an analysis 
of this material in the light of the framework given earlier in this 
section.
However, the author knew little about the British P.O. when he 
started this study. Therefore, it was indispensable to arrange 
several interviews with the management and unions of the P.O. in 
order to collect information and documents. Firstly, the author had 
an interview with the Head of the Industrial Relations Division of 
the Telecommunications Headquarters of the P.O. who was kind enough 
to give the author some explanations on the industrial relations in 
the P.O. and to supply him with various information. The interview 
was carried out on the basis of the framework of this study and the 
list of questions that the author had drawn up prior to the interview.
Secondly, the author had a similar kind of interview with the 
Research Officer of POEÜ who was also so kind as to provide the 
author with detailed explanations of the Union activities and various 
information and documents. This interview was also based on the 
framework of the study and a list of questions prepared in advance.
c- I «
These interviews and information and documents obtained as a result 
of these were the main sources of the research on industrial relations. 
However, in the course of the study, many questions on the information 
and documents supplied were naturally raised and it was necessary to 
get some further information. Therefore the author was involved in 
continuous communication with both the management and unions of the 
P.O.
As the time available for this study made it impossible to 
consider detailed interviews with the management at local level and 
rank and file union members, this study is open to the criticism that 
it does not take into account the detailed working of the employment 
and industrial relations systems. However, because this study will 
be concentrated on institutional and material differences it is 
hoped that this will not prove a fatal shortcoming.
The author hopes that he will be able to do more extensive 
research including the study of actual attitudes of average workers 
in the near future. This would make the study of comparative 
analysis of industrial relations in the telecommunications field 
more complete.
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C., Outline of Other Chapters.
This study is made up of seven other chapters. The aim of chapter 
2 is to provide a general comparison of the two organisations studied, 
i.e. NTT and the telecommunications side of the P.O. and to find out the 
features which would give explanations to the differences in the 
industrial relations system. First of all some figures including operating 
statistics, productivity indices and financial records will be given.
It is hoped that they will give some help in understanding the scale, 
monopoly positions and technological features of the two organisations which 
surely form a background basis for the industrial relations system.
Then the history and development of the two organisations will be described 
respectively. Here, two points should be stressed. Firstly, the
technological changes in the telecommunications industry have been very
rapid. Secondly, both NTT and the P.O. were formerly one of the government 
departments and although both of them were later reorganised into public 
corporations, they are still under the tight government control. As for 
the present organisation, it is interesting that the organisation of both 
NTT and the P.O. is characterised by high centralisation and pyramidal 
shape of their substructure with the headquarters at the top. This fact 
that NTT and the P.O. are very much similar as far as organisational 
structure is concerned would be important in making comparisons with the 
private sector.
The next two chapters are concerned with the labour economic side 
of the study. Chapter 5 will deal with employment systems. Such matters
as mobility, status, job grades, recruitment and training will be
taken up. As for mobility, it will be made clear that the employment
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system of NTT is an extreme pattern of the life-long employment system, 
and that the workers of the P.O. show less propensity to leave their 
employment comparing those in the British private sector.
In the case of status and job grades, two points will be made clear. 
Firstly, there is not such a clear-cut difference in status among the 
employees of both NTT and the P.O. as in the British private sector. 
Secondly, although the job grades system of the P.O. is not so systematic 
as that of NTT, it is working effectively as a basis for determining 
wages in contrast to the system of NTT which has become a mere formality.
As for recruitment, it will be made clear that NTT adopts more 
formal and systematic ways than the P.O. (even than HITACHI). The fact 
that NTT uses open examination for recruitment purposes illustrates this.
Finally, in the case of training, three points will be mentioned. 
Firstly, both NTT and the P.O. provide their employees with continuous 
in-service training at vocational training schools. Secondly, the P.O. 
still has a kind of apprenticeship system. Thirdly, NTT attaches more 
importance to general education and morale than the P.O.
In chapter 4 wages and other conditions of work will be compared. 
Firstly, the approach to wage determination will be taken up and tliree 
points should be stressed; (l) both NTT and the P.O. attach great 
importance to the comparison with the private sector, (2) in 
distributing wage/salary bills, NTT excludes the elements of sex and merit 
which play significant roles in HITACHI, and the P.O. attaches considerable 
importance to age by applying incremental scales, (3) the only effective 
monetary incentive is through promotion in both NTT and the P.O.
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Secondly, the wage system of NTT and the P.O. will he taken up 
respectively. Here, one of the important points is that while the wage 
system of NTT is a typical seniority wage system, that of the P.O. is 
basically a job-related system, although it adopts incremental scales 
based on age. The other point to be mentioned is that, while NTT offers 
various allowances based on the special situation of its employees, the 
allowances paid in the P.O. are based on the differences in duties and 
responsibilities. Then the conditions of work other than pay will be 
compared and two points will be made clear. Firstly, while NTT regulates 
the conditions of work uniformly to all its employees regardless of job 
grades, the P.O. has separate provisions according to job grades. 
Secondly, while NTT provides its employees with all-embracing welfare 
services, the PO does not.
The next three chapters are concerned with industrial relations 
side of the study. Chapter 5 will be focused on union structure and 
membership. Firstly, the history and development of ESNDSNTSU and 
POEU and other unions in the P.O. will be described respectively. Then 
the outline of membership and present organisation will be given. Here, 
it will be made clear that while EENDENTSU has developed as an enterprise 
union, POEU and other unions in the P.O. have been organised along the 
jobs and some of the clerical unions are organised largely outside the 
P.O. and have members across the Civil Service, On the other hand, a 
common feature in the sense that union organisations in both NTT and the
P.O. are highly centralised will also be pointed out.
Then, union finance will be examined and a major difference here is
that 0ENUENTSÛ collects more and higher subscriptions than POEU.
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The third point to he examined is goals of unions and their 
political attitudes. Here, the main difference is that although both 
EEHDENTSU and POEU have strong linlcs with political parties, the political 
activities of EENUEHTSU are directly aimed at the reformation of the 
society, and those of POEU are to supplement industrial actions.
As for attitudes toward^rationalisation, both of them seem to be 
co-operative with management. Here, the role of technological changes in 
telecommunications will be stressed.
Chapter 6 will take up management organisation for industrial 
relations. Here, the main emphasis will be put on the similarity found 
between NTT and the P.O. Management organisation of both NTT and the P.O. 
is highly centralised and bureaucratically organised.
Chapter 7 is concerned with collective bargaining structure.
Firstly, one common feature and one difference will be presented. 
Negotiations concerning pay and other conditions of work are highly 
centralisedboth ppp and the P.O. But while bargainings in NTT are 
quite periodical because they negotiate mainly three times a year, i.e. 
spring, summer and at the end of the year, those of the P.O. are 
scattered throughout the year according to unions.
Furthermore, the extent of government control will also be taken up. 
In the case of NTT, the legal constraint on the pay settlement of NTT is 
very strict and, as a result, pay settlement is tlirough a third party 
called KORÜ-I (Government Enterprises and Public Corporations Labour 
Relations Commission), In the case of the P.O., the influence of incomes 
policy will be taken up.
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In the final Chapter (Chapter 8), firstly, the main points of the 
findings will he fitted onto the spectrum drav/n from Bore's study and 
the hypothesis put forward in the last section will he examined. 
Explanations will he given mainly on the basis of such factors as scale, 
centralisation, monopoly positions,government control and rapid 
technological changes.
Secondly, prospective changes in the future will be taken up. Here, 
the main points to be mentioned are the right to strike, the review of 
the P.O. and industrial democracy.
CHAPTER 2 ORGANISATION OF TELECQ?iMUNICATIONS IN JAPAN AND BRITAIN
A. General Comparison between NTT and the P.O.
The telecommunications business in which NTT and the P.O. are 
engaged is one of the fastest-growing industries of the contemporary 
age. Since telegraph and telephone services appeared towarcP the end 
of last century these services, especially the telephone service, 
have grown rapidly in both quantity and quality through successive 
technological innovations. Furthermore with the development of 
electronics and the reduction of real costs, new telecommunications 
services such as data communications, facsimile, picture communica­
tions have become possible. Many people envisage telecommunications 
as one of the leading industries in the 'information-oriented society'.
The outbreak of the war in the Middle East in 1973 brought 
so-called 'oil crisis' and created a new awareness of limited natural 
resources and energy in the world. Many people began to advocate the 
encouragement of energy saving industries based on knowledge and 
information giving a further boost to telecommunications.
In the telecommunications field both NTT and the P.O. are among 
the leading firms in the world and the scale of their organisation 
deserves the word 'huge'. As shown in Table 2-1, they are ajuongst 
the largest firms in the world. Taking such factors as number of 
employees, fixed assets, income, investment, it is clear that they 
have no equal in their respective private sectors, although NTT is 
bigger than the P.O. reflecting the difference in size between Japan 
and Britain, The characteristic of sheer size is one of the
important background factors in this study,
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Table 2-1 The Two Corporations 
as of 31.3.1975
N.T.T. the PoOo
Transformed into public 
corporation 1952 1969
Employees 310,000 247,000
Fixed assets
(1)
4,513,442 ^ m(8,680£m) 4,439 £m
Fixed assets per employee 14.6 ¥m(28 £000) 18,0 £0(
Income 18,820,00OYm(3,6l9£m) 1,589 £m
Expenditure 20,573,0O0Ym(%956 £m) 1,583
Loss 175,300 ¥m( 337 £m) 195 £m
Exchange connections 28,870°°° 12,689°°°
Exchange connections per 
100 population 26.1 22.7
Construction investment 1,540,5001^ (2,578 £m) 788 £m
Sources: Denshim Denwa Jigyd Hokokusho 1974-5, NTT
Post Office Report and Accounts 1974-5, the P.O.
(l) Throughout this study, Yen is converted into pound at the 
rate' available at the time of writing, i.e. ¥520 = £1.
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The second fact to be noted is that both NTT and the PoO, are 
legally given the monopoly positions. TUSENDENKitSUSHIN-HO (Wire 
Telecommunications Law) 1953 provides the monopoly of inland 
telecommunications by NTT and Section 24 of the P.O. Act I969 gives 
the P.O. 'exclusive privilege' with respect to telecommunications. 
Thus they offer very much similar services. However there are 
two minor differences. One is that while the P.O. is engaged in 
both inland and international telecommunication services, the field 
of activity of NTT is restricted to only inland telecommunications.
In Japan international telecommunications service is offered by a 
separate private company called KOKÜSAI DENSHIN DENT/A Go, Ltd.
NTT holds about twenty per cent of its shares. The other difference 
is that while the P.O. is mainly concentrated on the telegra^ i^ and 
telephone services, NTT is making considerable efforts in data 
communications services. It is now operating more than thirty 
systems including the National Banking System.
The third point to be mentioned is the technological features of 
the telecommunications industry. As the telecommunications network 
covers the whole of each country, the technology utilised in the 
industry must be uniform and integrated. For example, telephone 
exchanges in both Japan and Britain are very much standardised. 
Therefore, employees working in different offices are equipped 
with similar skills. This makes an important contrast to many of 
the other sectors, where even products are different according to 
factories.
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Furthermore,/telecoîiunTinications industry is characterised as 
a capital intensive industry, where investment in equipment rather 
than manpower plays a dominant role* Therefore, with the rapid 
technological innovations, the productivity in NTT and the P.O. has 
risen very much as shown in figure 2-1, although NTT surpasses the 
P.O. in productivity as is clear from table 2-2. The technological 
uniformity and integration and the constant rise in productivity 
are also amongst the background factors of this study.
Figures 2-1 ; number of telephones per employee
140 NTT
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20
1965 65 67 69 71 75 74
the P.O
Source: Denshin Denwa Jigyo Hokokusho 1974-5, NTT
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Table 2-2; productivity indices
NTT the P.O.
exchange connections per employee 95.1 51*4
n . X r r-fiooo r-r „£oooincome per employee 116.7 56.2
Sources: Denshin Denwa Jigyo Hokokusho 1974-5, NTT
Post Office Report and Accounts 1974-5, the P.O.
The financial record of NTT and the P.O. which reflects the 
extent of government control is given in Table 2-5» Although both 
NTT and the P.O. formerly showed fairly good performance reflecting 
rapid technological innovations, they recorded losses in recent 
years because of severe inflation in both countries which exceeded 
the improvement in productivity. The P.O. recorded losses in the 
financial years from 1973 to 1975 which were mainly due to the 
price-restraint imposed by the government. The P.O. succeeded in 
having several increases in tariffs approved in 1975 and produced 
considerable profit in the financial year ending March, 1976 and 
is likely to record larger profit in the following years. In the 
case of NTT the bill to increase charges for telegraph and 
telephone services scraped through both Houses of Parliament in 
1976 after having been presented several times. The problem of 
government control will be taken up in the following sections.
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B, Historv and Beveloument s BTT
(2)1, History of the telecommunications service in Japan. ^
The wire telegraph invented hy Morse was first introduced to 
Japan by Perry in 1854. In 1868 the newly formed MEIJI Government 
decided to construct a nationwide telegraph network as one of the 
ways to modernise and industrialise Japan, The main inland 
telegraph network had been completed by 1881 as one of the state 
businesses*
The first telephone service was introduced for the government 
and police in three cities including Tokyo in I878. With the 
adoption of the cabinet system in I885, TEISHIH-SHÔ (Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications )was established and the postal and 
telegraph services were offered by the same body. The ministry 
opened telephone exchanges in Tokyo and Yokohama as the first 
stage of the Japanese telephone service in I89O*
With the development of the Japanese economy after the Sino- 
Japanese War of 1894 the demand fo3^\elegraph and telephone services 
increased rapidly. Accordingly, the government made several expansion 
plans and the services were considerably expanded, but many applica­
tions for telephone installation were unfilled.
Because of World War II, the telecommunications network were 
badly damaged. At the end of 1945, the number of subscribers 
decreased to 540 thousand, about half of the pre-war peak. Therefore,
(2) This section ow.es very much to HIHON BENSHÏH DENWA KOSMNO GAIYO. 
1974, NTT.
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the first step after the war was to reconstruct the network. The 
number of subscribers recovered the pre-war level in 1949 and 
reached 25 million at the end of 1975*
The period which followed the reconstruction has been that of 
rapid technological changes. Through successive five year plans 
beginning in 1955, the telegraph and telephone network has been 
very much modernised. The automating of telephone exchanges has 
been almost completed, NTT is now introducing electronic exchanges 
to replace cross-bar exchanges. To deal with growing traffic 
large-capacity transmission devices such as co-axial cable were 
introduced. The services offered were also diversified. New 
types of telephones such as push-button telephones and small size 
key telephones (home telephones) have emerged. Various new services 
including data communications and facsimile were also introduced. 
This rapid technological development should be noted as one of the 
background factors of this study,
2, The formation of NTT
During World War II most of the telecommunications facilities 
and factories producing telecommunications equipment were destroyed. 
Following the instruction of the GHQ, of the Occupation Force 
TEISHIN-IN (TEISHIN-SHO from July 1946) set out to reconstruct 
the telecommunications system. As will be shown in Chapter 5 the 
Japanese labour movement was extremely militant after the liberation 
of the movement by the GHQ.
41.
Although the general strike of 1st February 1947 was banned 
by General MacArthur, the public sector unions again planned a 
nation-wide strike in March 1948* Again, the GHQ suppressed the 
strike. Throughout this period ZENTEI (All Posts and TeleconmiunicationE 
Union) played an important role together with National Railway Union 
and other public sector unions. In July 1948 following the letter 
of General MacArthur, the government issued an ordinance No, 201 
and the employees of government enterprises and public corporations 
were deprived of their right to strike*' '
At the same time TEISHIN-SHO was divided into two separate 
ministries, i.e. YUSEI-SHO (Ministry of Posts) and DENKITSUSHI-SHÔ 
(Ministry of Telecommunications). Although the officially publicised 
aim of this was to improve the efficiency of servie es, the real
intention behind this to weaken the powerful ZEbPTEI, which had 
played a significant part in the labour movement during the 
immediate pre-war period, by dividing the organisation into two.
In 1949 both Houses of Parliament passed a resolution regarding 
the reconstruction and promotion of the telecommunications service.
Following this resolution, the government set up an investigating
the
committee for the reconstruction of/telegraph and telephone service, 
which recommended in March 1950 the transformation of DENKITSUSHIN-SHÔ 
into a public corporation to introduce some of the advantages of 
private company structures.
(3) Since then, the recovery of the right to strike has been one 
of the main objects of the Unions concerned.
HIn April 1950 the House of Representatives resolved that 
DENK.ITSUSHIN-SHO should he transformed into a public corporation 
and in May of the same year the government decided the transformation 
and asked for the approval of the GHQ, But the plan failed to get 
the approval of the GHQ because of the outbreak of the Korean War,
In August 1951, the Government Ordinance Committee which was 
due to examine the laws and orders issued under the occupation 
advised that telecommunications service should be offered by a 
public corporation. In April 1952, the Cabinet decided to transform 
DENKITSÜSHIH-SHO into a public corporation. In July NIHON BENSHIN DENV/A 
KOSHA-HO (NTT Act) passed through both Houses of Parliament, NTT 
was established on 1st August 1952 succeeding DEMITSUSHIN-SHO,
There were three main aims of this transformations (a) to 
establish a rational and efficient management, (b) to promote the 
construction of^^elecomraunicationsfacilities, (c) to promote the 
public welfare through the telecommunications service.
At the time of vesting, the organisation of NTT followed that 
of BENKITSUSHIN-SHO and little was changed. On 1st November of that 
year, NTT was reorganised to make the management more efficient and 
to integrate the service at local level. The organisation of NTT 
thus formed has been changed little since then.
Although NTT was reorganised into a public corporation, it has 
been under tight government control. The services and tariffs for 
them are stipulated in KCJsHU BENKI TSÏÏSHIN-HO (Public Telecommunications 
Law). V/hen NTT wants to introduce a new service, the amendment to 
the law is required. As will be explained later, the budget of NTT 
must get the approval of both Houses of Parliament. This fact that
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NTT is still under strict governiïient control is also one of the 
important factors to explain the differences in industrial relations.
4. Present organisation
Present organisation of NTT is characterised by a four-tier 
system as chart 2-1 shows. Under the Head Office there are eleven 
Telecommunications Bureaus to cover each of eleven regions in Japan, 
Under each Telecommunications Bureau, there are several Tele­
communications Divisions, Urban Telecommunications Division®j Area 
Telecommunications Division^ Carried Communications Divisions and 
Radio Communications Divisions. There are forty-nine Telecommunications 
Divisions in total and most of these correspond with prefectur<^ 
i.e. areas of Japanese local governments. There is an Urban 
Telecommunications Division in each of eight large cities other 
than Tokyo and Osaka, There are twelve Area Telecommunications 
Divisions in Tokyo and Osaica, There are a Oarrii^ Comm'unications 
Division and a Radio Comnunications Division under each of the eleven 
TelecommunicationsBureaus except Tokyo to deal with trunk lines and 
radio network respectively.
There are Telegraph and Telephone Offices and other local 
offices under Telecommunication Divisions, Urban Telecommunications 
Divisions and Area Telecommunicatior^ Divisions
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(5)Board members^  ^who are in charge of day-to-day management are 
made up of a president, a vice president, from five to ten managing 
directors and two auditors* The president and vice president are 
appointed by the Cabinet after obtaining the approval of management 
committee. Managing directors are appointed by the president and 
auditors by the management committee*
Chart 2-2 Organisation of Head Office: NTT
-President’s Office 
Secretariat Section 
Documents Section 
Public Relations Division•Senior Managing 
Directors
-Chief Engineer
Management! Fpresident | Executive
Commit teej j Vice 
I President
IAuditor£
-Management Research Office *
. Engineering Bureau 
"Audit Bureau 
_Personnel Bureau 
-Welfare Bureau 
-Commercial Bureau 
-Services Administration Bureau 
-Planning Bureau 
— Plant Engineering Bureau 
— Contraction and Installation Bure
—  Maintenance Bureau
— Accounts and Finance Bureau 
— Supply Bureau
—  Building Engineering Bureau
—  Microwave Division
—  Supply and Equipment Inspection I
—  International Affairs Bureau
— TSKUBA Construction Engrg.Office
—  Research and Development Bureau 
— MUSASHINO Telecommunications Lab, 
_Y)KO.SUKA » »
_IBARAKI " "
. Data Coimnunications Bureau 
Auditor’s Office
(5) Section 19-2? of KTT Act,
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The main job of the Head Office is that of general policy making 
affecting HTT as a whole. Such matters as pay,conditions of work, 
tariffs and budgets are exclusively decided at the Head Office,
Under.the Head Office, Telecommunications Bureaus are in charge 
of co-ordination between Telecommunications Divisions etc, and the 
adjustment of the policy set by the Head Office to the individual 
conditions of regions. Recently there has been an effort to make 
Telecommunications Bureaus as semi-independent management units.
The main function of Telecommunications Divisions etc. is the 
co-ordination between Telegraph and Telephone Offices, Telegraph 
and Telephone Offices are first-line organisations offering services 
to subscribers.
Although there has been an effort to delegate authorities to 
lower levels of the organisation, the organisation of NTT is very 
much centralised, which is one of the important background factors 
in this study.
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C, History and Development ; the P.O.
1, History of the telecommunications service in Britain^
The national telegraph system in Britain was expanded alongside 
the railwa.ys in the 1840*s and 1650's. In February, I87O the telegraph 
service was talcen over by the P.O. and the Engineering Department 
of the P.O. was founded. Following the takeover, reorganisation 
of the telegraph service was carried out to separate it from the 
railway operations.
Telephone services in Britain began in 1877 when trumpet notes 
were relayed from Southampton to Queen Victoria at Osborne House on 
the Isle of Vi/ight, When Bell and Edison took out British patent 
rights and many telephone compard.es began to be established, the 
P.O. thought it as a threat to its telegraph service. In December 
1880, following the High Court's decision that telephone conversations 
were telegrams, telephone companies accepted an arrangement with the 
P.O. The P.O. granted licence to operate and the companies paid 
the P.O. ten per cent of all gross receipts as a royalty.
When the National Telephone Co. was founded in I889 t).irough 
amalgamations of several large telephone companies, basic national 
telephone network had been completed. At this stage the P.O. 
controlled trunk lines and local lines in the countryside and 
London and private companies, the largest of which was National 
Telephone Co., offered the service to other large cities.
(6) This section owes very much to F. Bealey's 'The Post Office 
Engineering Union' , Bach.iman & Turner, 197^
the
But the growth X5f/ private telephone services was checked because 
of the confusion caused by the I884 Act which regulated that all 
licences should expire at the end of I9II and the P.O. would take 
over the licences’s facilities in I89O, 1897 or I904. In I9I2 
the entire telephone service was put under the control of the P.O. 
and both/^&^egraph and telephone services began to be offered by a 
single organisation.
Although the telephone system was not expanded for several 
years after the takeover because of VIorld War I, it was developed 
rapidly after the War being helped by post-war boom. The technological 
progress in the field of telecommunications wa,s remarkable, but 
automating of exchanges was little promoted. The P.O. was much 
criticised for its inefficiency and conservative attitude towards 
expansion.
Reorganisation of the P.O. was carried out following Bridgeman 
Report of 1952 to cope with the problem and the telephone service 
began to show steady expansion and automatic exchange system was' 
expanded. Again this development was hampered by World War II.
After the war it was an urgent necessity to renew the equipment 
damaged by the war. But capital investment vra,s restricted by the 
balance of payment crisis in 1947»
The automating of exchanges became stagnant and the number 
of people on the waiting list for telephones increased rapidly by 
the mid-1950's.
Following the white paper of 1955 on Post Office Development and
(7)Finance^ , the P.O. got more freedom on its investment and the 
telephone service was expanded rapidly, STD (Subscribers Trunk 
Dialling) service was also expanded. Although the investment was 
not steady because of the government's stop and go policies and 
price controls, the telephone service continued to develop 
considerably and the telephone has become familiar with many people. 
Automating of exchanges was completed by 197& and the introduction 
of all-electronic exchanges has begun in large scale.
Thus the rapid technological development which characterises 
the Japanese telecommunications service, especially during the 
post-war period is also found to be one of the important background 
factors in Britain.
2. Reorganisation of the P.O.
With the introduction of the Post Office Act I969, the 
P.O. has become a public corporation on 1st October, 19&9* Before 
that the P.O. was one of the government departments.
The aim of the transformation was to operate the business of 
the P.O. more efficiently on the commercial lines. The proposal to 
change along this line went back to the Bridgeman Report in 1932.
In this report transformation into a public corporation was denied 
but limited reorganisation was proposed. There were two main points, 
One was to limit the control of the Treasury over the finance of the
(7) Cmnd 9576, Report on Post Office Development and Finance, 1955»
P.O. The other was the delegation of authority to local organisations 
to he established. Following the Report, the government allowed the 
P.O. to use its profit freely for the improvement of its service after 
paying a certain amount to the Trea,sury. T^is system worked from I955 
to 1940» but with the outbreak of World War II it was stopped. On 
the other hand eight provincial regions were established and the 
Directors of the provincial regions were in charge of both the postal 
and telecommunications businesses. Only in London there were 
separate provincial regions for posts and telecommunications.
In 1955) the government published the white paper on Post 
Office Development and Finance and the idea that the P.O. may use 
its profit freely after paying a, certain amount to the Treasury was 
reintroduced. Furthermore it was the responsibility of the P.O. to 
balance its own income and expenditure since then.
By the Post Office Act I96I, the finance of the P.O. was 
separated from the Treasury and the financial disciplines similar 
to those of the nationalised industries began to be applied. But 
the P.O. was still a government organisation and the minister in 
charge of the P.O. had to answer to Parliament for its day-to-day 
operations.
On 5rd August, I966, the Postmaster General announced the decision 
that the P.O. should be transformed into a public corporation. On 
the other hanc^ p^ ostal and telecommunications businesses were 
separated and placed under separate administration in 1967*
Accordingly TelecommunicationsRegions were set up in the tele­
communications business.
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After the report of the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries on the P.O. in February 19^7^^^ the transformation 
was confirmed finally by the white paper on Post Office Reorganisa­
tion.^^^ The P.O. act 19^9 received the Royal Assent on 25th 
July, 1969, Following the Act, the P.O. became a public 
corporation from 1st October, 19&9 and was placed under the 
administration of the Department of Telecommunications. In 
April, 1974; the Department of Telecommunications was abolished 
and its business was transferred to the Department of Industry 
and the Home Office,
In spite of these reorganisations, the P.O. is still under 
tight government control, especially on its finance. It must malce 
to the Minister concerned an annual report on the exercise and 
performance by it of its functions. It is also necessary to 
have its investment programmes approved by the government. Further­
more it has been necessary to get government approval on tariff 
increases. For example, from 1972 the Conservative Government 
restricted public sector prices if necessary below economic levels 
as part of its counter-inflation policies and the P.O. suffered 
losses in the fiscal years from 1973 to 1975. T^is kind of tight 
government control is also one of the main background factors 
in this study,
(8) First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries,19^ 7
(9) Cmnd 5233) Reorganisation of the Post Office, 19&7
3• Present organisation
Present organisation of the P.O. is, as shown in chart 2-5, 
characterised by a three-tier system. Under the Telecommunications 
Headquarters there are ten TelecommunicationsRegions and there are 
sixty-one Telephone Areas under Telecommunications Regions. Thus 
the organisation of the P.O. is simpler than that of NTT,
Chart 2-3 P,0. Telecormnunications
Organisation
Chairman - P.O. Board
Telecommunications 
HQ
Telecommunicati one 
Region
Data
Processing
Central
HQ
Postal
HQ
GIRO
Telephone Area
The organisation of Telecommunications HQ is given in Chart 2-*4« 
Supreme decision-making machinery of the P.O. is the Post Office Board 
which is made up of the chairman and six to twelve other members.
At present there are nine members (6 full-time and 3 part-time).
One of the part-time members is the representative of unions outside 
the P.O. but the representatives of the Unions organised in the P.O. 
shall not be the member. The Chairman is appointed by the Minister 
and the other members are appointed by the Minister after consultation 
with the Chairman,
(10) Section (6) of the Post Office Act, 19^ 9
Chart 2-4. the P.O. Telecommunications 
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Telecommunications HQ, is in charge of general policy-making 
and such matters as pay, conditions of employment and tariffs are 
the responsibility of the HQ, Regional Directors have authority 
and responsibility for all matters except such ones as mentioned 
above * Area managers are responsible for day-to-day business 
except finance and capital scheme within the general control of the 
budget. They are responsible for such matters as maintenance 
standards, construction and subcontracting, and expansion. This 
system is called 'Reserve Power’ in the P.O. It would appear 
that Area managers have more power than the Managers of Telegraph 
and Telephone offices of NTT reflecting the lack of the counterpart 
of Telecommunications Divisions in the P.O.
However, generally speaking, the organisation of the P.O. 
is also very much centralised, which is one of the background 
factors to explain the differences in industrial relations.
One thing to be noted about the P.O. organisation when compared
 ^i 1 ^
with NTT is the existence of the P.O. Users' Council.^  ^ There 
are the National Council and three country councils for Scotland, 
Wales and Monmouthshire and Northern Ireland, The National Council 
consists of (a) a chairman appointed by the minister; (b) the 
chairman of the Countcy Councils; (c) such other members, not 
exceeding twenty-six, as the Minister may appoint after consultation 
with such bodies as appear to him to be representative of the 
interests of persons likely to be concerned with the matters 
within the competence of the Council; (d) such other members,
(1 1) Section I4 of the Post Office Act I969
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not exceeding three, as the Minister may appoint without any such 
consultation. Each of the country councils consists of a chairman 
appointed by the Minister and such other members, not exceeding 
twenty-four, as the Mnister may appoint after consultation with 
the chairman and such bodies in the part of the United Kingdom 
for which the Council is to be or is established as appear to 
him to be representatives of the interests of persons likely to 
be concerned with matters within the competence of the council.
The Minister and the P.O. may each refer to the National Council 
any matters relating to the services provided by the P.O. and to 
the Country Councils any matter of local concern. In recent 
years tariff increases have been much discussed by the Councils.
In summarising this chapter, it would be clear that five 
important features which will be relevant in the later discussions 
of industrial relations were found. They are (1) Scale, (2) Monopoly 
positions, (5) Technological uniformity and changes, (4) Government 
control and (5) Centralisation, The discussions in later chapters 
will be mainly based on these five background factors shared by 
NTT and the P.O.
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CHAPTER 3 EÎ.ÎPLQY1'.1C1IT SYSTEMS
A. Mobility
1. Life-long employment in extreme: NTT
Many v/riters on the Japanese employment system find one of its 
peculiarities in SIIÜ5HIN-K0Y0 (life-long commitment of the worker to only 
one firm), Hubert Brochier describes it as follows; 'VRien the new 
employee, be he labourer, engineer, or salaried employee, enters the 
service of a firm, he is committing himself to that firm for his whole 
working life. He knows that the company will not dismiss him, even 
temporarily, unless he has committed a particularly serious error or under 
the pressure of exceptional circumstances. He, on the other hand, will 
not try to leave the company in search of higher pay, for example.
Indeed, such an ambition is totally foreign to him and the very idea that 
he could better his own situation by going from one to another is 
presently inconceivable to the average Japanese e m p l o y e e P o r e  found 
the same feature in HITACHI. This life-long employment system takes an 
extreme pattern in NTT.
Almost all new entrants to NTT are recruited from new school-leavers 
as from April of each year. Only a negligible number of people among 
them will quit NTT before retirement. Average a,ge and length of service 
of the employees of NTT are given in Table 5-1. As most of the new 
entrants to NTT are recruited at eighteen years of age just after 
graduating from high schools, the fact that the difference between average 
age and years of service is about eighteen means that only a few employees
(l) Jon Livingston et al (eds); The Japan Reader 2 Postwar Japan; 1945 
to the present. Penguin, 19?6, p. 460.
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of HTT quit NTT before retirement regardless of sex. This is clearly 
reflected in the separation rates given in Table $"2. NTT's record of 
1.3 percent is by far lower than others, Fui'thermore, most of those who 
quit NTT are those who have decided to retire.
Table 3-1° Average age and length of service,
HITACHI
men women womenmen
20.8average age
average years 
of service
Sources: Denshin-Denwa-Koshano Gaiyo, NTT, 1974
RoP. Dore, op.cit., p. 31*
Table 3-2. Separation Rate(2)
NTT 1.5^ ^
HITACHI 10.9
( T (men /manual >{ women
English Electric (Bradford) |
( .( men >non-manual)( ( women
20-25
50
10
25-30
(total
the P.O.(telephone operators' grades 
(others
8.1
21.0
4,6
Sources: Denshin Denwa Jigyo Hoicokusho, NTT 1974
R.P, Dore, op.cit., p. 34 
Personnel Statistics 74/75» the P.O.
(2) Separation rate is calculated as the number of leavers as 
a proportion of the labour force at the beginning of the 
period.
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There are four reasons for this. Firstly, the employees of NTT 
are given legal protection against dismissal. Section 51 of the NTT 
Act stipulates that any employee of NTT shall not be dismissed or demoted 
against his will except in a few cases like ill-health or decline in the 
amount of business. Furthermore there is an agreement between NTT and 
ZENDENTSÜ that workers shall not be dismissed as a result of rationalisation. 
Therefore the employees of NTT are in practice free from dismissal.
Secondly, men and women are treated eopally in NTT. V/liile many of 
the private firms in Japan have de facto rules to ask for women to retire 
when they get married, because women had played a significant part as 
telephone operators before the automating of telephone exchanges,
NTT has not only treated them equally with men but also provided facilities 
to make it easier for them to continue their work. Such systems as 
leaves for nursing and part-time work for those v/ho have younger children 
are by far superior to most Japanese standards.
Thirdly, there is not a custom to employ temporary workers for 
permanent jobs as Dore found in HITACHI, Although there are subcontractors 
engaged in construction work and odd jobs such as cleaning, it is a 
general principle in NTT to use only its own employees for day-to-day 
works.
Fourthly, there is no official retirement age in NTT, Although 
some people are advised to retire after reaching a certain age and those 
Y/ho are over sixty years of age are not given annual periodical pay 
increases, the employees of NTT may continue to work as long as they v.msh.
Thus the employment system of NTT is an extreme pattern of Japanese 
life-long employment system. As far as the telecommunications business
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has continued to grow, this kind of employment pattern has caused no 
serious problems. But as the rate of growth slows down necessarily with 
the expansion of the telephone service, it is certain that some problems 
like overmanning will appear.
2. Fairly stable employment: the P.O.
As Bore pointed out, the British employment system is characterised 
by considerable mobility. It is very natural for British workers to try 
to better their situations by changing jobs. But the employees of the 
P.O. show a different pattern of behaviour. As shown in Table 5-2 the 
separation rate of the employees of the P.O. is lower not only than that 
of English Electric workers but also than that of HITACHI workers. If
we exclude telephone operators' grades which show fairly high separation
rate (twenty-one percent) the rest of the employees show only 4*6 
percent, which is more than three times as high as that of the employees 
of HTT but less than half that of HITACHI workers.
There are several reasons to account for this. First of these is
the special nature of the telecommunications business. As shovn in 
Chapter 2, the telecommunications business has grown constantly, 
especially after World War II. As a result, there has been little 
possibility of redundancy which is fairly common among British private 
firms depending on the economic situation.
Secondly, for the employees of the P.O. the opportunity of employment 
in outside industries is very limited because of the uniqueness of the 
telecommunications technology. This is especially true in the case of 
engineering grades v/hich recorded a very low separating rate of two
60,
Chart 5"’l» Propensity to Leave by Age
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20
Source: Personnel Statistics 74/75» the P,0,
Chart 3-2. Length of Service of Leavers
Technicians IIA
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Source: Personnel Statistics 74/75» the P.O.
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percent. Their skill is peculiar to the telecommunications industry.
Even if they are highly skilled in the field of telecommunications 
technology, for example in electronic exchanges, outside industries would 
rarely accept them as skilled workers. This is one of the reasons which 
prevent them from changing jobs.
On top of these there are some factors which make it more favourable 
for them to continue to work for the P.O.
One of these is the fairly large prospect of career promotion and 
the wage system. Many of them would find their way up to certain grades 
wide open as their skills improve with experience. If their abilities 
and performances are proved to be good enough, they have a good chance 
of further promotion, which will bring better wages. Furthermore, their 
wages will be increased annualy up to maxima of grades even if they stay
on one grade because of the incremental scale the P.O. uses. This
again makes it advantageous to stay on. This incentive to stay longer 
is clearly understood from chart 3-*l and 3-2 which show the propensity 
to leave by age and length of service of leavers of Technician IIA, the 
largest of Engineering grades. They show a fairly high propensity to 
leave up to a certain age or length of service but less propensity to 
leave as they get older and experience longer service.
Other advantages are fairly high rates of increase in their wage and 
some privileges like pensions. As shown in Table 3-5 the wages of minor
engineering grades have risen faster than general wage rates. This is
partly because of the productivity agreements the POEÜ has concluded with 
the P.O. The POEÜ is one of the unions which showed an early interest in 
productivity bargaining and has talc on advantage of the gains of
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productivity improvement. This has been helped by the rapid technological 
innovation in the telecommunications industry.
Table 3"3» Comparative index of real wages of minor 
engineering grades.and general real wages
1965-70.
average of I876-9 = 100
year Minor Engineering Grades General Y/age Rates
1965 307 207
1966 314 208
1967 342 211
1968 360 216
1969 366 215
1970 387 221
Source: Prank Bealey, op.cit., p. 405*
As for pensions although the system was changed from non-contributory 
to contributory with the transformation of the P.O. into a public 
corporation, the P.O. still contributes nine percent of wages compared with 
six percent contributed by employees. This pension system thus also 
makes it advantageous to stay on.
However, the fact that even with the low rate of separation, the 
employees of the P.O. are not so bound to it as the employees of NTT must 
be explained. One answer can be found in the difference in the employment 
system of a society as a whole. As employees in outside industries show 
high mobility, the employees of the P.O. do not regard it strange to 
change jobs and will not hesitate to quit the P.O. especially at an early 
stage when they find their jobs inconsistent with their abilities or 
aspirations or they manage to find better jobs in outside industries.
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But as it is normal for the Japanese to stay in a particular firm, 
the employees of NTT naturally do not have the impetus to change jobs.
The other reason is that the employees of NTT can get more than 
those of the P.O. by staying with NTT. Annual periodical pay increases 
given to them until they reach sixty years of age are more advantageous 
than the incremental scales of the P.O. This difference in the wage 
system will be explained in detail in the following chapter.
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B. Status and job grades.
1. Status.
As, Bore found in HITACHI, there is no difference in status between 
staff and workers of NTT, Actually there is no distinction at all 
between staff and workers. The nature of the telecoinmunications industry 
has led to the virtual absence of manual workers. All the people who 
are working for NTT are equally treated as SHOïCÜIN (employees) of NTT,
All employees are monthly paid. Such conditions of work as hours of 
work; holidays, and pensions are uniformly applied to all the employees 
of NTT, As far as equality is concerned NTT is more advanced than 
HITACHI, While there are differences in status between permanent and 
temporary workers and between men and w.omen workers in HITACHI, the 
employees of NTT are all permanent workers and NTT offers equal conditions 
of employment regardless of sex.
However, this does not necessarily mean the total absence of 
differences among groups of the employees of NTT, One clear-cut difference 
should be found between ordinary employees and lOVNRISH/l (managerial and 
technical staff). In NTT those who hold the posts of KACHO (section- 
chief) of telegraph and telephone offices and above are called KANRISÎ1A, 
They are thought to stand on management side on industrial relations 
and may not join 2ENDENT3IJ nor form their own union. Their pay system 
is designed separately from ordinary employees. In case of disputes with 
the union they often engage in work as blacklegs. Therefore militant 
unionist^ tend to regard them as the people belonging to the other side.
But this distinction should not be over-emphasised. In normal cases
6'j.
KÂNRISHA and ordinary employees sometimes enjoy IPPAI (some drinks 
after work) together. Because even KAÎIRIS11A are promoted from ordinary 
employees and are therefore former union members and the possibility for 
ordinary employees to be promoted to KARRISHA is not negligible, both 
KAITRISHA and ordinary employees share strong common feelings as employees 
of NTT. They have not got the 'them and us' feeling often found among 
British staff and workers. This aspect rather than the differences 
should be stressed.
In the case of the P.O., it is hard to find such clear-cut differences 
as Bore found in English Electric, There are not so many manual workers 
owing to the technological nature of the telecommunications industry. 
Although some are paid weekly and others are paid monthly and holiday 
entitlement differs according to job grades, these are not the same kind 
of differences as Bore found in English Electric. As those who belong 
to higher grades are normally promoted from lower grades, these are the 
differences based on ability or length of service rather than those 
based on status. Although the author had not the opportunity to study 
actual attitudes of the workers, it can safely be said that there are 
not significant differences in status among workers of the P.O. Thus 
it was found that there are not so clear-cut differences in status among 
workers of both NTT and the P.O. as in the British private industry.
2, Job grades.
All the jobs below KANRI8HA level in NTT are classified into forty- 
five job-^ grades v/hich are put together in thirteen job groups (see 
Table 3-4)* Each of the job grades is divided into one to four job- 
classes according to skills and responsibilities involved. These divisions
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of job grades and job-classes are based on the job classification 
criteria which specify the work performed by each job grade or job class* 
Clerical workers and supervisors are included in General Job Group which 
forms Basic Job Groups together with Telecommunications, Telephone 
Operating, External Engineering and Telegram Delivery Job Groups. Although 
this job grades system is very systematic, there is a question about its 
effectiveness. The wage system of NTT is officially claimed to be a kind 
of SHOKtn'vTd-KYU (job-based wage system). But there is no considerable 
difference in wages among job groups and furthermore, answering union 
pressure, NTT recently introduced a system by which any employee is 
entitled to the promotion up to General Group II after certain years of 
service. Thus the job grades system has become just a mere formality as 
far as ordinary employees are concerned.
The jobs of KANHISHA are classified into thirteen classes based on 
job evaluation. Each job is to be assessed every year in response to 
the change in the amount of business or reorganisation. The pay of 
KANRISHA are strictly based on their job classes. This is in a standing 
contrast to the system applied to the ordinary employees.
The basic job grades of the P.O. are shovm in Table 5-5. They can 
be grouped together in four, i.e. Engineering, Traffic & Sales, Operating 
and Commercial. On top of these, there is the Senior Salary Structure 
for senior management across the P.O. as a whole.
There are several grades within each group. One of the features of 
this job grade system is the lack of uniformity among different groups. 
While Engineering Grades are divided into nine grades according to the 
skills required, clerical grades are divided into just two grades.
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Furthermorej although Traffic & Sales and Operating grades are divided into 
several grades, they are based not on the skills but on the kind of 
work performed. In the case of supervisory grades, they are also 
divided into three to four grades and it is hard to find uniformity 
across groups. Only the Senior Salary Structure which is divided into 
ten bands shows uniformity throughout different departments of the P.O.
Although the job grades system of the P.O. lacks uniformity, it is 
working effectively as a basis for determining wages in contrast to that 
of NTT which has become a mere formality as stated earlier. This surely 
reflects the difference in wage systems. While Japanese wages are based 
mainly on age or length of service, British wages are based on skills. 
Where a seniority wage system is dominant, it is natural that even a 
detailed job grades system has become incompatible with a system of 
detailed job grades.
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C, Recruitment
1. Formal and periodical recruitment: NTï
(a) Manpower planning
Manpower planning in NTT is very much centralised. Annual business 
and investment plans are made within the framework of the long-term 
business and investment projeots which reflect long-term management 
policies. On the basis of the annual business and investment plan, the 
number of staff required is calculated at three levels i.e., ÏÏTT as a 
whole, each job group and each office. The increase in the number of 
employees is worked out by comparing this figure with the number of staff 
actually employed at present.
On the other hand, the loss among present employees for the coming 
year is estimated on past records. The total of estimated increase and 
loss makes the number of people to be recruited for the year.
(b) Periodical recruitment for general work roles
As is common among Japanese large firms, one of the principles of
the recruitment in NTT is to fill its requirement with as many new
school-leavers as possible. Japanese firms usually recruit new school-
a
leavers and conclude^provisional contract of employment during their last
year at school. To avoid an unfavourable impact on education, the
employers’ association set^the commencing date of recruitment activity,
which has been October or November in recent years. Those who have got
a provisional contract actually start to work just after leaving school 
(o')
in April,'  ^ This kind of recruitment is called TEIIvISAlYO (periodical
(2) Japanese school year is from April to March next year.
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recruitment).
With the growth of the Japanese economy the labour market has 
become tighter and the recruitment situation has worsened especially in 
large cities. It has become impossible to fill the number needed only 
by new school-leavers. As a result the number of recruitment from other 
sources than new school-leavers has increased steadily to about twenty 
percent of new entrants.
Similarly to HITACHI, the recruitment in NTT is for a general range 
of work roles. Only Telephone Operating grade and management entrants 
are recruited for certain specific roles. In the case of other grades, 
recruitment is not for specific jobs but for the employees of NTT. Hew 
entrants have a possibility of assignment to any job in NTT. In extreme 
cases, even a commercial high school leaver can be given a job as an 
exchange engineer. Telephone operators are recruited separately because 
they are solely female jobs. In the case of management entrants, they 
are specially recruited as those who shall be promoted to management 
grades. As is seen from the fact that recruitment in NTT is mainly from 
new school-leavers, new entrants, including management entrants are 
classified at the bottom of each grade on their entry to NTT. This 
reflects the possibility that even a management entrant cannot expect the 
promotion to higher posts if he fails to demonstrate his ability and 
even a normal entrant can hope to go up to higher positions depending on 
his ability. Actually some of the managing directors are not former 
management entrants,
(c) Educational qualifications and level of recruitment
In NTT educational qualifications and sex for new entrants are
72,
officially laid dovm for each job grade, (for main grades see Table 
5-6). Although some grades are open to middle school-leavers, almost 
all new entrants are those who finished a high school or a university.
In recent years the number of recruitment from university graduates have 
increased reflecting the general increase in the number of university 
graduates in the economy.
Table 5“6* Educational qualifications and sex for new entrants.
job grade educational qualifications sex
clerical high school or above male or female
Exchange Engineering high school male or female
Telephone operating middle or high school female
External Engineering middle school or above male
Telegram Delivery middle school or above male
management entrants
and executive engineer university male or female
All recruitment except for management entrants is the responsibility 
of Telecommunications Bureaus, Although recruitment in rural regions is 
fairly easy, it becomes increasingly difficult for those Telecommunications 
Bureaus which cover large cities to get the required number. Therefore 
some co-ordination among Telecommunications Bureaus has become necessary. 
The recruitment of management entrants is the responsibility of the 
Head Office.
(d) Method of recruitment
The method of recruitment in NTT is more formal than in HITACHI.
(4) In recent years about thirty percent of high school-leavers go to 
university.
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Employees are recruited exclusively by open and fair examination. Even 
the children of the employees of NTT are not given priority. There are 
four stages of examinations, i.e. vjritten examination, interview, 
suitability test and medical examination. NTT concludes a provisional 
contract with those who passed the examinations after investigating 
personal information such as family background, bad conduct and political 
trend. They are normally employed from April on a probational basis.
Those who are recognised as being suitable as the employees of NTT after 
four months of probational period are then confirmed in their employment.
Thus the method of recruitment is very formal and elaborate. The 
use of written examination is surely the influence of the civil service 
v/here only written examination is used to secure fairness. This formality 
is seldom seen among Japanese private firms where KOKE (connection with 
managers or politicians) sometimes plays a key role. This systematic 
way of recruitment together with the security of its employment has 
helped NTT in creaming off the upper range of new school-leavers.
2, Ad hoc recruitment: the P.O.
(a) Manpower planning
The P.O. estimates the number of recruitment in much the same way 
as NTT. Annual business and investment plans are laid dovm by the 
approval of the Board on long-term project and objectives which are 
formed on certain assumptions such as inflation and expansion. The 
budget which embodies business and investment plans is then broken dovm 
into Regions and Areas, The budget is translated into manpower and staff 
reflecting the special conditions of each Region and Area. The decision
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of the nimber required is the responsibility of Regions and Areas 
under the general control of the budget. Thus Regions and Areas of the 
P.O. have more autonomy than their counterparts of NTT as far as 
manpower planning is concerned.
(b) Ad hoc recruitment for special work roles
As bore found between HITACHI and English Electric, one of the
differences between NTT and the P.O. is that while NTT recruits for 
general work roles the P.O. does so for quite special work roles. The 
P.O. recruits for any of the grades ranging from labourers up to Senior 
Salary Structure. This is partly because of the differences in the 
concept of jobs in the society as a whole, V/hile the Japanese think 
of their jobs in terms of the firm they are working for, the British
thinlc in terms of the kind of work they are actually engaged in. On the
other hand this is partly due to the turnover throughout working life.
The rate of turnover in the P.O. is considerably lower than in the 
British private firms but much higher than in NTT. Therefore it is 
necessary to fill up the vacancy caused by this kind of resignation.
This means the recruitment for all grades.
Reflecting this, the time of recruitment in the P.O. is extended 
throughout the year. In some fields there exists some effort to recruit 
cyclically. One of these is the recruitment of management entrants.
The staff in charge of recruitment visits universities and has an interview 
with those who are interested in the jobs in the P.O. Then the P.O. 
concludes a provisional contract of employment with those ivhom it finds 
suitable. Some of the engineering grades are also recruited at the end 
of the school-year. But otherwise, the P.O. recruits throughout the year
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whenever it becomes necessary. Especially in the case of telephone 
operating grades continuous recruitment is indispensable because of the 
high rate of turnover,
(c) Educational qualifications and level of recruitment
As for educational qualifications, there is no official standard 
such as that found in IITT partly because the P.O. recruits not only new 
school-leavers but also adults. As far as new school-leavers are concerned 
some trend is found in their educational levels, (see Table 5-7). But 
these are not the officially required standards.
Table 5-7* Educational leve^ of the new entrants to the P.O.
Telephone operating Average school leavers
clerical 0-level on some subjects
Supervisory )
_ . . (Technical Officer,) 
Engineering h^ohnician HA)
Traffic )
A level
Trainee Technical Improver \
Trainee Technician Apprentice 0 level + technical bent
Engineering (Assistant Executive 
Engineer) Graduate (ordinary)
Engineering (Executive Engineer) Graduate (honours)
management entrant Graduate
Most of the recruitment is done locally except supervisory and 
junior managers' grades which are centrally controlled. The recruitment 
of the graduates is the responsibility of the Head Office. This kind of 
recruitment level is much the same as fouhd in NTT,
Î6 .
(d) Method of recruitment
The P.O. does not have such an established formal method of 
recruitment as NTT. As is shovrn in Table 5-8 almost ninety percent of 
publicity expenditure concerning recruitment is for press advertisement 
and fifty-four percent of new entrants are recruited through press 
advertisement. The P.O. normally does not use v/ritton examination for 
selection. The main way of selection is merely by an interview.
Table 5-8• Recruitment Publicity
____ Total Press Advertisement
Publicity Expenditure 
Number of Recruitment
2475,520
26,790
£426,224 
14,470 (54.op
Source: Personnel Statistics 74/75» the P.O,
Reflecting this, it seems that there is not any intention of 
trying to recruit from only upper range of intelligence distribution, 
The P.O. does not mind as far as they can fulfill the responsibility 
each job accompanies.
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D, Training
1, Continuous in-service training at vocational training schools
The past two decades have been a period of rapid technological 
changes. Soon after the automating of exchanges by 'SXS’, NTT 
introduced cross-bar exchanges and now is introducing electronic exchanges, 
The P.O. is also introducing electronic exchanges to replace 'Strowger', 
Technological innovation has also been remarkable in the transmission 
field. These include plastic and aluminium cable, co-axial cable and 
nevf cable joining techniques. New services including data communications 
have become possible owing to the developments in electronics.
To cope with rapid technological changes, both NTT and the P.O. are 
making considerable effort in the training of their employees. They both 
have their ovra training schools. NTT has two central training schools 
under the Head Office and each Telecommunications Bureau has a local 
training school. As shovm in Chart 3“5» the employees of NTT are given 
continuous training throughout their career at these training schools 
or workplace*
Chart 3-3» Training Courses in NTT
manager
supervisor
ordinary
staff
new entrants
management
training
job change
training training trainin
college
course
initial training
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The P.O, also has a central training school for engineering grades 
and each Telecommunications Region has a training school. All employees 
at various grading levels and in particular hierarchies receive appropriate 
technical, vocational and general P.O. training to suit their particular 
needs. Training is thought to he a continuous process throughout an 
individual's career and the P.O. runs over 600 internal courses which vary 
in duration from one day to eighteen weeks.
Both ÎTTT and the P.O. partly use written examinations for the 
assessment of training. This is. probably because of rapid technological 
changes in telecommunications which require not only skills but also 
wide knowledge of electronics,
2, The remains of apprenticeship: the P.O.
Although both NTT and the P.O. have complete training facilities 
the P.O. depends partly on public authorities for the training of its 
employees. A good example of this is TTA (Trainee Technician Apprentices), 
TTA are recruited from normal school-leavers with 0-level and technical 
bent for three years of apprenticeship. Training for TTA consists of 
on the job training, a P.O. course and release to a further education 
course at college. About three thousand students are recruited annually 
and they are classified as TIIA (Technician. IIA) after completing the 
course.
This course is the remains of the old tradition of securing skilled
workers through apprenticeship. It is interesting to find apprenticeship
in the telecommunications industry which is characterised by rapid 
technological change, because the kind of skills utilised in the
79.
telecommunications industry require wide knowledge rather than experience 
and do not normally agree with apprenticeship.
3, Importance attached to general education and morale: NTT
As is common among Japanese large firms, NTT attaches great importance 
to general education and morale of employees. The aim of training is not 
only to improve vforking competence of employees but also to impart 
attitudes suitable to NTT. A good example of this is the two years of 
College Course at Central Training School.
NTT selects some three hundred employees through examination every 
year. Any employee is entitled to take the examination after two years 
service. Those who are selected are given the course which is similar 
to that of a university. The employees who finish the course are given 
a better change of promotion than ordinary high-school-leavers. One of 
the aims of this course is to select and train young and bright employees 
so that they can fulfil jobs as middle-management. There are many 
applicants who try to take advantage of the course which is a good hope 
for young employees who could not afford to go to university for some 
reason. This surely helps in maintaining the morale among young employees.
Thus it is clear that both NTT and the P.O. are greatly concerned 
with in-service training, as Dore found vfith HITACHI, reflecting 
rapid technological innovation, but that some of the differences Dore 
found between HITACHI and English Electric hold also true in the case 
of NTT and the P.O.
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CHAPTER 4 V/AGES AND OTHltR CONDITIONS OP ’.70RK
A. Approach to wage determination
1. Main factors in determining wages
Dore found that "the wages paid in Japanese firms take account of 
many factors - a man's age, seniority, education, demonstrated 
'co-operativeness' and so on - which have little to do with the notion 
of a 'market price' for skills determined hy a balance between supply 
and demand".This is also true in the case of NTT. Section $0 of 
the NTT Act stipulates that the pay of the employees of NTT must be 
determined by taking into account the level of wages in the Civil Service 
and private industries. As will be explained later the pay increases 
for NTT have been determined through a third party, KÔHÔ-1 (Government 
Enterprises and Public Corporations Labour Relations Commission) 
together with other government enterprises and public corporations. As 
is clear from Table 4-1 the main factor in determining the wages of the 
employees of NTT is the comparability with the private sector, especially 
private railways. Therefore market prices for skills have played little 
role in determining their wages.
Table 4-1 (over)
(l) P.P. Dore, op,cit., p. 74,
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Table 4“1* Comparability with the private sector
Year Government Enterprises 
& Public Corporations
Private
Railways
Private
Industries
1969
¥
6,608 (13.9)
¥
6,700 (16.2)
¥ % 
6,865 (15.8)
1970 8,626 (16.0) 8,950 (18.9) 9,166 (18.5)
1971 9,302 ■ (14.9) 9,700 (17.5) 9,727 (16.9)
1972 9,701 (13.6) 10,200 (15.6) 10,138 (15.3)
1975 14,078 (17.5) 14,700 (19.4) 15,159 (20.1)
1974 27,594 (29.3) 28,500 (31.4) 28,981 (32.9)
1975 17,207 (14.1) 17,000 (14.1) 15,279 (13.1)
Source: A8AHI-SHINBUN 21,4. I976.
On the other hand, it is hard to evaluate how far market situations 
in
come into/determining the wages in the P.O., because the skills required 
in the P.O. are peculiar to the telecommunications industry and it is 
difficult to find similar skills in outside industries excepta few grades, 
Y/hen the P.O. staff were civil servants, their pay was determined by 
'fair comparison' with outside industries. Even after the P.O. became 
a public corporation comparisons with outside industries have played a 
significant role.
But some market factors such as recruitment situations and wastage 
rates have also been taken into account. Therefore it is not easy to 
find such a clear-cut difference as Bore found between HITACHI and 
English Electric. Both NTT and the P.O. attach great importance to the 
comparison with the private sector. Here not the difference but the 
similarity between KTT and the P.O. should be emphasised.
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2. Principles governing the distribution of wage/salary bill
"^ he principles governing the distribution of the wage/salary bill 
of NTT have little to do with market situations. Instead, such factors 
as educational qualifications, age (length of service), and family 
responsibility are taken into account. One marked difference from HITACHI 
is the exclusion of sex and merit as rated by supervisors as is common 
among Japanese public emplacement;,
Dore found in English Electric that wages are considered as a market 
price of a particular job and the distribution of the wage/salary bill 
is a matter of determining appropriate skill differentials. Although 
there are considerable differentials among different grades in the P.O., 
the situation is different from the case in English Electric, V/hile, 
in the case of English Electric skill differentials are given to it in 
the labour market, it is difficult to find in the private sector the kind 
of jobs the staff of the P.O, is engaged in. Therefore the differentials 
in the P.O. are based mainly on internal comparisons. Furthermore, age 
plays a considerable role because the P.O. uses incremental scales up to 
certain ages and the employees of the P.O. have a good chance of promotion 
to higher grades with the length of service. Thus it is clear that the 
principles in the P.O. depart from those Dore found in English Electric 
to some extent more close to Japanese ones. This is due to the 
technological uniqueness of the telecommunications industry and the 
organisational feature as a public corporation.
5. Monetary incentives
As for monetary incentives both NTT and the P.O. stand between
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HITACHI and English Electric, Dore described the monetary incentives
of HITACHI as follows;- ’(a) identical for every type of employee, manual
or managerial; (b) almost exclusively contingent than direct; (c) of
longer rather than shorter term; (d) quite consequential; (e) multiform,
with the assessments involved in the different forms recuring at
(2)
different intervals',^ In the case of HTT there is no direct incentives 
at all as far as union members are concerned. Furthermore contingent 
incentives are limited to those through promotion. The total exclusion 
of merit increase in wages has caused this situation. Every employee is 
awarded equally regardless of his performance, which sometimes causes 
low morale among those employees who do not care about promotion which 
accompanies transfer to other offices*
Dore found direct incentives in the form of piecerates in English 
Electric. But as is clear from the wage system of the P.O. mentioned 
later, piecerate system does not exist in the P.O. except for certain 
small number of factory workers. Therefore only promotion seems to be 
an incentive to the employees of the P.O.
Thus, as far as monetary incentives are concerned, there is a 
common feature between NTT and the P.O., i.e. incentives are only through 
promotion, which is surely due to the fact that both of them are public 
corporations with long histories as government departments.
(2) P.P. Dore, op.cit., p. 112.
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B. Wage system: NTT
1. General outline of wage system
As Bore found in HITACHI, it is not possible to divide employees 
into the normal pattern of monthly salaried, weekly salaried, and hourly 
rated, because every employee of NTT is paid monthly* However, the 
differences Bore found in status and method of payment between union 
members and managerial and technical employees take clearer shape in HTT, 
'Ah-ile union members are paid according to imiblic scales negotiated with 
the union, the latters’ pay is fixed at the discretion of superiors. In 
HITACHI'S case, all union members are subject to superiors' assessment 
because a part of the pa.y is determined on merit. In the case of NTT, 
however, there is no element of merit pay so that the difference between 
union members and managerial and technical employees is clearer.
The other difference is found in the method of payment. While union 
members are paid by cash, the salary of managerial and technical employees 
are paid into a bank account.
One of the striking features of the wage system of NTT is that male 
and female employees are treated equally. This makes a great contrast 
to the system of HITACHI where women submit tamely to inferior pay.
Equal pay to male and female employees is a common practice among public 
employment in Japan which is thus a model for the private sector,
2. Composition of earnings
(a) Main components of earnings
The earnings of employees of NTT consist of basic salary, job-class
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supplement, miscellaneous allowances, bonuses and retirement gratuities.
One of the great differences between HITACHI and HTT is that while in
HITACHI merit supplement makes up twenty to thirty percent of an
( 3 )individual's earnings,^ ' such supplement based on merit does not exist 
in NTT, Every employee of HTT except managerial and technical staff, is 
paid according to the scales negotiated with the union which exclude 
any element of merit assessed by superiors. Under this system every 
employee is paid equally regardless of his performance. In the past an 
attempt was made to introduce an element based on merit in bonuses but was 
soon abandoned because of the union opposition. The reason for this is 
the weakness of the profit-motive in the public sector which is operated 
on a budget rather than profit. V.here the profit-motive is we ale equality 
naturally overcomes the merit system which is not free from the criticism 
due to the lack of fair criteria for assessment,
(b) Basic salary
The bulk of the earnings of the employees of HTT is made up of 
basic salary which is fixed according to the job-grade and job-class of 
a particular employee (as for job grade system, see Table 3-4)•
Starting from the recruitment salary determined according to educational 
qualifications (see Appendix l), each employee is awarded certain 
amount of increase in April within the limit of the maximum and minimum 
salary shov/n in Appendix 2. The amount of this annual increase is given 
in periodical increase Table (see Appendix 3).
Although this system is officially claimed to be a job-related
(3) R.P. Bore, op.cit., p. 98.
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wage system, in fact, it is a typical seniority wage system. The 
differentials among job groups are negligible. The pay of every 
employee is increased with the length of service until his pay reaches the 
maximum limit or he is sixty years of age.
Another factor which makes the system more like a seniority wage 
system is that ÏÏTT recently introduced an automatic promotion system 
based on the length of service. On entry every employee is graded as 
class 3 of each job grade. After three years of service, he is promoted 
to job-class 2. Although some go up the promotion ladder faster depending 
on merit, even those who fail to do so are to be promoted to job-class 
1 after twenty-two years of service and to General Group Rank II after 
twenty-five years of service regardless of the duties they are actually 
performing.
On top of the annual periodical increase, every employee is awarded 
a base rate increase ('base-up') which is negotiated annually in spring.
(c) Job-level supplement
The de facto absence of differentials in basic salary among different 
job groups, does not necessarily mean the total absence of the job- 
related element. To reflect the differences in jobs in salary, job- 
level supplement is paid to those who are classified as job-class 1 and 
above. As is clearly understood from the amount of job-level supplement 
given in Table 4”2 this is quite nominal and fails to reflect the real 
differences in responsibilities or skills involved. This is because 
the union has strongly resisted the increase in job-level supplement.
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Table 4-2. Job-level Supplement; NTT 
per month as of 1.4,1975,
Hank Amount
general job-group I (special) ¥ 5,700 (£10.96)
general job-group I 4,600 ( 8.85)
general job-group II 3,500 ( 6.73)
general job-group III )
all other groups I ! 2,400 ( 4.62)
(d) Miscellaneous allowances
As is common anong Japanese firms including HITACHI, NTT offers 
various allowances to its employees. Those which are important among 
them are as follows,
(dependent allowance)
This is paid to those employees who have such dependents as a spouse, 
children of under eighteen years of age or parents of over sixty. The 
amount of this allowance is shovm in Table 4-3* Although the aim of 
this allowance is to adjust the differences in living expenses, it has 
become a nominal one in the age of severe inflation.
Table 4“3» Dependent Allowance; NTT 
per month as of 1.4,1973*
spouse ¥ 4,000 (€7.69)
one of the children of under eighteen years of age 1,000 ( 1.92)
other dependent 600 ( 1,15)
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(provisionaJ. allowance)
This allowance is the remains of the allowance paid just after 
world Bar II to adjust the differences in living expenses among areas 
caused by the confusion in the economy. Although the reason for the 
allowance lost its rationale with the growth of the Japanese economy, it 
has not been abolished yet. At present this is paid monthly to those 
employees who are working in large cities. The amount of the allowance 
ranges from ¥l,000 (£1.92) to ¥5,700 (£10*96) according to the basic 
salary,
(city allowance)
City allowance is paid to those employees who are working in such 
large cities as Tokyo and Osaka to compensate the high cost of living. 
The monthly payment of the allowance is from^ 4,600 (£8,85) to ¥7,800 
(£15,00) depending on basic salary,
(special duty allowances)
There are some allowances which are paid to those employees who 
are engaged in special duties such as dangerous work and outdoor work,
(overtime allowance etc.)
Overtime allowance; those who work over normal working hours are 
paid at the rate of 125 percent of basic salary.
Holiday allowance: those v/ho work on holidays are paid at the rate
of 125 percent of basic salary.
Midnight allowance: those who work between 10p.m. and 5e.,m. of the
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following day are paid at the rate of an extra 25 percent of basic 
salary on top of the basic overtime allowance.
(housing allowance)
This allowance is paid to those v;ho are renting a house or a room. 
The maximum amount of the allowance is¥5jOOO (£9.62) per month.
(travelling allowance)
Every employee is paid all the cost of travelling from his home to 
the office, wherever he lives,
(e) Bonuses
There are four special allowances paid annually, i.e. summer, 
year-end, productivity and performance allowances. Among these summer 
and year-end allowances are generally called 'BOiJASU’ (bonus). As Bore 
found in HITACHI, it is a long-established custom for Japanese firms to 
pay bonuses twice a year. The amount of these bonuses constitutes a 
significant part of earnings of individual workers. In the case of 
private firms the amount of bonuses normally fluctuates reflecting 
business performances. But, in HTT, the amount has been quite constant 
as it has been fixed in accordance with that of the Civil Service, In 
1975) for instance, the employees of NTT were awarded 200 percent of 
their monthly basic salary as a summer-bonus and 260 percent as a year- 
end bonus.
As is common in the public sector, the employees of NTT are paid 
performance allowance at the end of each fiscal year. The amount paid 
in 1975 was 50 percent of monthly basic salary.
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what is peculiar to NTT is the existence of a productivity allowance 
paid annually in October. Productivity gains for the past year are 
calculated annually for NTT as a whole and then divided among the 
employees of NTT on certain criteria. In 1975 54 percent of monthly basic 
salary was paid. The existence of the allowance reflects the 
technological changes in NTT and union co-operation in rationalisation.
In all^  bonuses amounted to 564 percent of basic monthly salary in
1975.
(retirement gratuities)
As is common among Japanese firms, the employees of NTT are paid 
retirement gratuities according to their length of service and the basic 
salary at the time of retirement. The standard for the payment is set 
in the law together with the Civil S ervice,Even a normal high school 
leaver who ended his career without being promoted to KACEO (Section 
Chief) would receive about seven million yen (fl5,500) after thirty 
years of service. This amount is smaller than that paid in large private 
firms reflecting better pension systems for public employment,
(f) Hypothetical compisition of earnings
Hypothetical composition of earnings of the Exchange Engineering 
grade, one of the major grades in NTT, is given in Table 4~4* Employees 
are picked up at three points, i.e. (l) a bachelor with five years 
service, (2) a married employee having two children with fifteen years 
service, and (5) a married KAKARICHÔ (sub-section chief) having two
(4) KOiaCA KOLIUINTO TAISHOkbJ TEATE-HO (Civil Service and PPblic 
Corporations Retirement Gratuities Lav;),
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children with twenty-two years service. It is supposed that they joined 
NTT just after leaving a high school and tha/b they are working in Tokyo, 
From this it is clear that, as stated above, the bulk of the wages of 
the employees of NTT is made up of basic salary although its percentage 
in the earnings drops with years of service.
9%
G, Wage system; the P.O.
1. General outline of the wage system.
Bore found in English Electric that employees can be divided into 
three groups, i.e. monthly salaried, weekly salaried and hourly rated 
based on the method of payment and status. In the case of the P.O. there 
are only two types of employees, i.e. monthly salaried and weekly 
salaried. However, as was made clear in Chapter 3, there are not so 
clear-cut differences in status between them as Bore found in English 
Electric.
The features which differentiate the P.O. from English Electric are 
the national uniformity of the wage system and absence of piecerates.
In the P.O. pay rates apply nationally except where London weighting 
allowance is paid. There is no room for wage drift, i.e. extra payment 
negotiated locally on top of the national rates. This is because both 
management and union organisation are highly centralised and pay 
negotiations are carried out only at national level,
2, Composition of Earnings
(a) Main components of earnings.
The wages of the employees of the P.O. consist of basic salary, 
London weighting allowance, miscellaneous allowances and compensation for 
additional attendance. They are very simple compared to those of 
English Electric. Although the composition is thus more like that of NTT, 
there are some differences between NTT and the P.O. For example, the 
P.O. does not have bonuses and retirement gratuities. As far as monthly
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payment is concerned there is not a great difference between NTT and 
the P.O. This is partly because the organisation of the P.O. and NTT 
are both highly centralised and technological uniformity makes it easy 
for them to have a nationally uniform wage system. The other reason is 
that both the P.O. and NTT are public corporations and the profit-motive 
is not so strong as in the private sector,
(b) Basic Salary.
The major part of the earnings of the employees of the P.O. is 
basic salary which is determined by pay scales for each grade (see 
Appendix 4 for pay scales for basic grades). It is clear from them that 
up to a certain stage, pay rates are fixed according to age and after 
that every employee is awarded an annual increase until his pay reaches 
the maximum scale. Once it reaches the maximum, pay stands still so 
long as the employee stays in the same grade. This system is a mixture 
of Japanese seniority wage system and British job-related wage system.
But there is a clear-cut difference from that of NTT, i.e. while 
there are few differentials between grades in NTT there are considerable 
differentials among job grades in the P.O. Furthermore, more than half 
of the employees are on maxima, which means that more than half the 
employees in the same grade are paid the same amount. Thus although the 
system has some elements of seniority wage system, its basic character 
is that of a job-related wage system.
There are some other differences between NTT and the P.O. Firstly, 
the employees of NTT are all paid on monthly basis but some lower grades 
are paid weekly and other higher grades are paid monthly in the P.O.
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Secondly, while pay scales for the raojiagernent are not open in ÎÎTÎ, even 
scales for senior salary structure are open in the P.O. Thirdly, 
although basic salary is negotiated annually la both' PTT and the P.O., 
the negotiations are carried out separately according to grades in the 
P.O. (see Chapter 7).
(c) London weighting allowance
The only element of the,pay of the employees of the P.O. which is 
based on area is the London Weighting Allowance, The present rates of 
the London Weighting Allowance are given in Table 4-5*
Table 4-5* London weighting allowance as of 1,4*75'
Inner London £520 p.a. £9*97 P.w.
Outer London £510.20 p.a. £5.94 p.w.
Although NTT also has city allowance , (a counterpart of London weighting 
allowance) which is paid in many large cities, London weighting allowance 
is considerable in its amount, reflecting not only the greater difference 
in cost of living between London and other areas, but also the difficulties 
in recruitment in London,
(d) Miscellaneous allowances
The P.O. also pays various miscellaneous allowances as shov/n in 
Appendix 5* But there is a clear difference between the allowances of 
the P.O. and those paid in NTT, While the allowances of the P.O. are 
based exclusively on the differences in duties and responsibilities of 
each job, some of those paid in NTT are based on the difference in the
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individual employees' situation such as family responsibility. Here 
again it is possible to find the difference in the principles of 
determining individual pay, i.e., while Japanese wages are based on 
'individual', British wages are based on jobs.
(e) Compensations for additional attendance
Compensations for additional attendance are laid dovm in detail 
according to grades (see Appendix 6), There are two main differences 
from those paid in NTT in addition to the higher rates of extra payment 
in the P.O. One is that while NTT applies the same standards to all job 
grades, the P.O. offers different compensations to different grades.
The other is that the P.O. allows also 'time off in addition to or 
instead of extra payment. This also reflects the difference in the 
principles in determining wages mentioned above.
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D. Other conditions of work
1, Hours of work
As shown in Table 4"6 the standard weekly hours of work do not 
differ.much between NTT and the P.O. The employees of both HTT and the 
P.O. work around 40 hours a week and a considerable number of them are 
on shift work. But there are two main differences in their application. 
Firstly, while the provisions of HTT about hours of work are uniformly 
applied to all employees of HTT regardless of job grades, the P.O. has 
different provisions according to job grades. Secondly, there is no 
regional difference in HTT, but the P.O. applies different hours of work 
in London and provinces to some grades.
2, Holidays and leaves
(a) Annual paid holidays
The number of annual paid holidays is given in Table 4-7 which shows 
that again there is not a great difference between HTT and the P.O. in 
the number of days given. But in application there are three main 
differences. Firstly, while in HTT there is no difference among job 
grades, the P.O. gives a different number of days between job grades. 
Secondly, there is a difference in the way the employees take holidays 
reflecting the difference in the way of life between Japan and Britain. 
V/hereas the employees of HTT take one day or two days of holidays at one 
time when they should like to, those of the P.O. take two or three weeks 
consecutive holidays, especially in summer. Thirdly, the P.O. pays 
holiday supplement for up to three weeks of holidays to certain grades such 
as Telephonist and Telegraphist but there is no such practice in HTT,
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Table 4-6. Hours of work
NTT The P. 0.
45 hours gross 
(40 hours net)
Assistant Executive Engineer 
Executive Engineer 
Inspector
Sales Representative
Sales Superintendent
Senior Sales Superintendent
Senior Telecommunications Superintendent
Supervisor (Telegraphs)
Supervisor Higher Grade (Telegraph) 
Telecommunications Traffic Officer 
Telecommunications Traffic Superintendent
Assistant Supervisor (Telegraph)
Telegraphist
Telegraphist (p)
Assistant Supervisor (Telephones) 
Chief Supervisor (Telephones)
Senior Chief Supervisor (Telephones) 
Supervisors (Telephones)
Telephonist
Technical Officer 
Technician I, IIA and IIB 
Trainee Technician (Apprentice) 
Trainee Technician (improver)
* 41 hours gross 
(in the 
London pay 
area)
* 42 hours gross 
(elsewhere)
45 hours gross
41 hours gross
40 hours net
(a) NTT usually includes time for meals and rest in hours of work,
(b) In the case of the P.O., where these hours include time for meals they are 
shov/n as gross, where time for meals is excluded, they are shown as net.
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Table 4-7* Humber of Annual Paid Holidays.
HTT The P. 0.
up to 1 
year's 
service i;'10 
days
after 1 year's 
service;20 
days
Assistant Executive Engineer 
Executive Engineer 
Sales Superintendent 
Senior Sales Superintendent 
Senior Chief Supervisor (Telephones) 
Senior Telecommunications Superintendent 
Telecommunications Traffic Superintendeni 
Supervisor Higher grade (Telegraphs)
Inspector
Assistant Supervisor (Telegraphs) 
Assistant Supervisor (Telephones) 
Chief Supervisors (Telephones) 
Supervisor (Telephones)
Sales Representative 
Supervisor (Telegraphs)
Technician I 
Technical Officer 
Telecommunications Traffic Officer
Telegraphist and Telegraphist (P.) 
Technician IIA and IIB 
Telephonist
Trainee Technician (Apprentice) 
Trainee Technician (improver)
*up to 10 years 
total service; 
4 weeks 2 days
*from 10 to 20 
years total 
service; 5 
weeks
^after 20 years 
total service; 
6 weeks
i(-up to 10 years 
P.O. service;
4 weeks 2 days
#from 10 to 20 
years P.O. 
service; 5 
weeks
^after 20 years 
P.O. service;
6 weeks
'^ up to 5 years 
P.O. service;
4 vreeks
*from 5 to 15 
years P.O. 
service; 4 
weeks 2 days
*from 15 to 50 
years P.O. 
service; 5 
v/eeks
* after $0 years 
P.O. service;
6 weeks
^up to 5 years 
P.O. service;
5 weeks 3 days
*from 5 to 15 
years P.O. 
service; 4 
weeks
from 15 to 30 
years P.O. 
service; 4 
weeks 2 days
* after 30 years 
P.O. service;
4 weeks 4 days
Total service includes the service prior to P.O. reorganisation,
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(b) National or public holidays
There is a great difference between NTT and the P.O. in the number 
of days given. The employees of NTT are allowed days off on each of 
thirteen national holidays and, furthermore, they are given a week's 
holiday, the longest holidays, over the period covering the end of the 
year and the beginning of the following year. But the employees of the 
P.O. are allowed only nine and a half holidays, i.e. two public holidays, 
five bank holidays and two and a half days of P.O. holidays. This 
difference is due to the difference in the number of statutory holidays 
between Japan and Britain,
(c) Special holidays
One of the difference^found about holidays between NTT and the P.O. 
is that while the former allows days off v/ith full pay on various 
personal occasions of the invididual employees (see Table 4"8) the latter 
has no such practice. The existence of this kind of holidays shows that 
NTT pay more attention to the private life of employees than the P.O. 
and reflects the general concept of the firm as community.
Table 4-8. Special holidays; NTT
occasion number of days off
marriage 3 days
funeral of relatives 1-10 days
anniversary of parents death 1 day
loss of the house due to fire or 
natural calamity up to a week
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(d) Sick leave
In NTT the length of sick leave and the amount of wages paid 
during the leave differs according to the causes of disease i.e., on 
duty, tuberculosis or other disease (see Table 4-9)•
In the case of the P.O. there is no special provision for sick leave, 
however, sick pay is paid as, shovm in Table 4-10» Comparing these two 
tables, it is clear that the provisions of NTT are better than those of 
the P.O. This is partly due to the differences in the social security. 
While Japanese social security is not so advanced as in Britain and 
firms take over to some extent the responsibility of the state as far as 
the welfare of the employees is concerned, in Britain, welfare is 
basically the responsibility of the state and accordingly firms offer 
poorer welfare serviceSlike sick leave.
Table 4-9* Sick leave; NTT
Cause length of the leave pay
On duty whole period necessary for recovery 80 percent of 
full pay up to 
a year
tuberculosis '^ up to 1 years service; 4 months
*from 1 to 5 years service; 1 year
*from 5 to 10 years service; ^
year and 6 months
*over ten years service; 2 years
* full pay up to 
a year
80 percent of 
full pay for 
the rest of 
the period
other diseases ■^'up to 10 years service; p months
*from 10 to 20 years service; 6
months
*over twenty years service; L year
80 per cent of 
full pay up to 
a year
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Table Sick pay; the P.O.
period pay
up to 6 months full pay
from 6 months to a year half the full pay
(e) Maternity leave
In the case of maternity leave, NTT has better provisions than the
P.O.
In the case of the P.O. a female staff member v/ho has been 
continuously employed by the P.O. for a minimum of one year is allowed 
three months paid maternity leave and payment for the third month, if 
any, is conditional on an employee having completed after her confinement 
a further three months effective service. Any female employee of NTT 
is allowed six weeks paid maternity leave before and after delivery 
respectively and if she wishes, she is further allowed a leeive without 
pay until her child reaches three years of age. Furthermore, when she 
resumes work after paid maternity leave, she is allowed time off for 
nursing twice a day within a maximum of forty-five minutes each until 
the child reaches a year. These provisions are far advanced by Japanese 
standards reflecting the important role played by female employees before 
the automating of telephone exchanges.
3. Termination of employment
2
As stated earlier in Chapter^^employment in NTT is quite secure, 
owing to both the NTT Act and the agreement with the union, and there is
103,
no fixed retirement age. Therefore the employees of HTT may continue 
to work for HTT as far as they wish and there is no actual occasion 
of dismissal except that due to the fault on the part of the employees. 
According to ROBO-KIJUH-EO (Labour Standards Law) which provides the 
minimum standards of the conditions of work employers must give thirty 
days of notice or dismissal allowance equal to thirty days wages if they 
wish to dismiss employees. If there is to be a dismissal in HTT this 
provision is applied.
The P.O. will give a period of notice as shovm in Table if
it wishes to terminate an employee's service before the normal retirement 
age of sixty. There are several differences between NTT and the P.O. 
apart from the fact that the provisions of the P.O. are better than those 
of NTT probably reflecting the greater possibility of dismissals in the 
P.O. Firstly, while the employees of NTT are put under direct application 
of law, the P.O. has its ovm provisions for its employees. Secondly, 
although the PhO. applies different provisions to monthly and weekly paid 
staff, there is no such distinction in NTT. Finally, NTT gives the 
same days of notice (thirty days) to any employee regardless of the 
length of service, but the P.O. gives a longer period of notice to 
employees with longer service.
4. Welfare services
In the case of welfare services, the difference between HTT and the 
P.O. is very clear. V.liile NTT offers various welfare services to its 
employees, the P.O. does not. As far as the pensions are concerned, 
both NTT and the P.O. have better systems than private firms, reflecting 
their background as government departments, YNrile most of Japanese
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Table 4-11, Periods of notice; the P.O. 
(l) Monthly paid staff
length of service periods of notice
less than 26 weeks 1 month
26 weeks hut less than a year 5 weeks
6 years but less than 7 years 6 It
7 — do — 8 M 7 ti
8 •" do — 9 M 8 It
9 — do — 10 It 9 It
10 — do — 11 I 10 It
11 — do — 12 If 11 I
12 years or more 12 I
(2) Weekly paid staff
length of service periods of notice
less than. 2 years 2 weeks
2 years but less thaji 4 years 5 I
, 4 — do — 5 I 4 I
5 - do - 6 I 5 It
6 - do - 7 1 6 I
7 - do - 8 I 7 I
8 — do — 9 I 8 I
9 - do “ 10 I 9 I
10 “ do ■" 11 I 10 I
11 - do - 12 I 11 It
12 years or more 12 I
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private firms do not have any pension system, IITT has a pension system 
similar to that of the Civil Service which is operated through 
KyOSAIIÜJI.îIAI (Social Insurance Society) using the fund contributed by 
both HTT and its employees. The employees with not less than twenty years 
service are entitled to the pension on retirement from 55 years of age.
The P.O. also has a pension system based on the contribution of the P.O. 
and its employees. Those employees with not less than five years service 
are entitled to the pension on retirement at or after normal retirement 
age of sixty. This system is better than that of English Electric which, 
according to Pore, covers only skilled-manual workers and staff.
But the similarity between NTT and the P.O. ends with the pension 
system. Y/hile the P.O. does not offer any other significant welfare 
services NTT offers various welfare services directly or through 
KY5sAIKUj,1IAI and KYOSAIKAI (Mutual Aid Cooperative) ~ a joint subsidiary 
of NTT and 2ENPENTSU (NTT union). The main welfare services offered by 
NTT are shown in Table 4“L2, from which it is clear that NTT offers welfare 
services covering almost all aspects of its employees* private life.
Table 4-12, Y/elfare Services offered by NTT,
(1) Housing
hostels for unmarried employees
flats or houses for married employees
special saving and loan scheme to help the employees to have houses 
real estate subdividing
(2) Educational loans for the employees* children
(5) Medical service
health insurances 
hospitals and clinics
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(4) Recreation facilities
sport and social facilities
hotels in resorts throughout the country
(5) Insurance services
(6) General savings and loan scheme
(7) Stores and barbers
5, Main findings concerning conditions of work
Comparing the conditions of work between NTT and the P.O., two 
major findings should be noted. Firstly, while NTT regulates the conditions 
of work uniformly to all its employees regardless of job graders the P.O. 
has different provisions according to job grades. This can be partly 
explained by the differences in wage structure,
V/here wages are decided according to job grades, it is natural to 
have different conditions of work according to job grades. The 
explanation for' this can also be found in union structure. As SEîlDENTSÏÏ 
organises any of the employees of NTT regardless of job grades, it 
attaches more importance to equality than to differentials. But as there 
are several unions in the P.O. according to job grades and negotiations 
take place separately, conditions of work also tend to be different among 
different unions. The second point to be noted is the role of firms in 
the welfare of their employees, VNiile NTT specifies in detail those 
kind of conditions of work which are based on individual employee^ ; 
special situation and offers all-embracing welfare services, the P.O. 
does not take into account the special situation of a particular employee 
and the only significant welfare service is the pension system. This 
surely reflects the difference in the attitudes of the firms towards the
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employees, Y/hile Japanese firms are concerned with the whole character 
of the employees, British firms are concerned with only the working 
abilities of the employees. The other cause of the difference is the 
difference in social security offered by the states, V.liile the Japanese 
social security system is not so advanced as that of the British and, 
therefore, firms take over some of the role of the state, Britain has a 
good social security system and it is not necessary for the firms to 
offer their own welfare services to their employees.
CHAPTER 5 TOOH STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP 
A, History and Development î ZENDENTSÜ
As shown in Table 5“1s there are four central organisations of 
the Japanese trade unions, i.e®,- SÔHYO (General Council of Japan 
Labour Unions), CPI%IT8U-R0REH (the Federation of Independent 
Unions), DOMED (the General Confederation of Japanese Labour 
Organisations) and SHINSAHDETSÜ (Congress of Industrial Unions).
While SÔHYO and CHURITSU'-ROREN organise annual SHUNTO (Spring Labour 
Offensive) and represent the left wing of the Japanese labour movement, 
DOMED represents the right wing. ZENDENTSU (All Japan Telecommunications 
Workers Union), the only effective union in NTT, has played an 
important role in SOHYO together with other government enterprises 
and public corporations unions. This union structure is the result 
of many changes after World War II.
Table Central Organisations of the
Japanese trade unions.
As of June 1973
Number of 
Unions
Number of 
members
SÔHYO 5,470 4,266,835
C1ÎURITSU-RÔREN 911 1,392,703
DOMED 5,308 2,225,928
SHINSANHETSÜ 77 72,819
Before World War II, there was no effective labour movement in 
the field of telecommunications reflecting the social situations in
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Japan as a whole. It was only after World War II that a strong union 
came into being. In order to prevent the future Japan from reappearing 
as a strong totalitarian state the GHQ, of the occupation force adopted 
various policies to democratise Japan, one of which was the liberation 
of labour movement. As a result, the Japanese labour movement showed 
a rapid growth and became militant. The leading unions among it were 
those of Civil Servants.
At the end of 1946 they strongly claimed a large pay increase, 
ZENTEI (All Japan posts and Telecommunications Workers Union) which was 
formed in May 194-6 by the employees of TËISHIN-SHO (the Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications) took a leading part in this movement. 
Eventually unions scheduled a general strike on 1st February 1947, 
which was called off following the order of General Mac-^ rthur,
From 1947 the unions again claimed a pay increase because of 
the severe inflation. Again at the centre of this movement was 
ZENTEI. In due course CHÎÎRO-I (the Central Labour Committee) 
intervened and proposed a solution, which was rejected by the unions 
and they planned a nation-wide strike in March 1948. In view of 
the crisis, the GHQ ordered the calling-offcfthe strike. After 
this event. Civil Servants and the employees of government enterprises 
and public corporations were deprived of their right to strike by 
the latter of General MacArthur and the Government Ordinance 201 
which followed it.
At that time, the GHQ was in the course of change in its 
policy, i.e., from the démocratisation of Japan to the strengthening
of Japan as a basis against Communists countries. To pursue this 
policy the militant labour movement a,t the centre of which were the 
unions of the Civil Service and public corporationswas a great 
stumbling block. The GHQ thought it necessary to wealcen them in 
order to make the Japanese Union movement as a whole more moderate. 
Accordingly KOROHO (Government Enterprises and Public Corporations 
Labour Relations Law) was put into effect and the KOKKAKOMUIN-HO 
(Civil Service Law) was amended to ban the strike in the public 
sector. Since then the recovery of the right to strike has been
one of the main aims of the unions concerned.
During the period which followed, the government adopted nine 
principles on economic policy to reconstruct the Japanese economy^ 
and the reorganisations of companies and redundancy were carried out 
drastically. Many militant union leaders especially those who were 
thought to be members of the Communist party or its sympathisers were 
the main target of the dismissals called REDDO-PAJI (Red Purge)•
On the other hand, MINDÔ (Democratic Alliance) set out for the 
’démocratisation’ of union movement by getting rid of the Communists 
and formed SOHYG^  (the General Council of Japan Labour Unions) in 1950, 
which has been the leading central organisation of Japanese Unions. The 
telecommunications industry was not free from the process. By getting
rid of the Communists ZENTEI v^ as reorganised in 1949»
On the other hand, as stated in Chapter 2, TEISHIN-SHO was 
reorganised into two separate ministries, i.e. YUSEI-SHO (Ministry 
of Posts) and DEKKITSÏÏSHIN-SHO (Ministry of Telecommunications) under 
the pretext of the promotion of efficiency in June 1949» But the 
real aim of the reorganisation was to weaken ZENTEI by dividing the
union into separate unions. As it is natural in Japan to have a 
union within a firm, ZENTEI also divided itself into the two unions 
in 1950, In DENKITSUSHIN-SHÔ, ZENDENTSU (All Japan Telecommunications 
Workers Union) was formed and has dominated the labour movement in 
the telecommunications industry as de facto single union since then. 
Furthermore with the establishment of SOHYO, ZENDENTSU joined it and 
has played a significant role in it especially after the reorganisation 
of DENKITSUSHIN-SHOinto a public corporation (NTT) in 1952® The 
activities of the Union which had been restricted by KOKKAItÜMÜIN-HO 
got more freedom as the KÔRÔHO to be applied to NTT admits the 
right of collective bargainings.
Two points should be noted throughout the history of the labour 
movement in the telecommunications industry since World War II,
Firstly, there has been only one union organised along the firm, 
i.e. ZENTEI and ZENDENTSU after the establishment of NTT, Secondly, 
the union has not got the right to strike,except a short period just 
after the war, the recovery of which has been one of the main aims 
of the union for a long time.
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B. History and Development : POEU and other Unions in the P.O. ^
As shov/n in table 5-2, there are many unions according to a, 
job grade or grades in the P.O. They form COPOU (Council of 
Post Office Unions) for joint consultation and negotiation vd.th the 
P.O. POEU (Post Office Engineering Union) holds the most important 
position with about 120 thousand members in the telecommunications 
side of the P.O. especially among engineering grades. The aim of 
this section is to follow the process of the formation of this 
structure in the P.O.
Although there is some evidence of the movement from time to 
time in the 1840’s and 1850’s to improve their conditions of v/ork, 
there was no significant movement among linemen until the 1870's 
when such a movement appeared in Yorkshire. In 1887, the first 
Conference of the 'Postal Telegraph Linemen’s Movement’ was held.
In 1895 a Committee of EU: q u i r y under Lord Tweedmouth was 
set up as a result of parliamentary pressure and staff were invited 
to give evidence. The spokesmen for the various associations 
including Telegraph Clerks’ Association appeared before the committee 
as individuals because they were not officially recognised. The 
leaders of the staff associations recognised the need for action 
towards a common end and a national joint committee was set up. 
Co-ordination was carried a step further by the formation of the 
Referred Pay Committee. As the result of the Tweedmouth Committee being 
a disappointment, the Associations met and agreed joint action for the
(l) This section owes to the data offered by the P.O. and POEU
Table 5-2 î Main Unions in the P.O.
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Name Organised job grades Membership 
potential actual
Civil and Public Services 
Association (CPSA) Posts 
and Telecoms, Group
Clerical Officers 
Clerical Assistant 
Higher Clerical Officers 
Typists 
Secretaries
Certain Data Processing 
Grades
37,000 30,500
Institution of Professional 
Civil Servants (iPCS)
Restaurant Managers
Illustrators
Photographers
156 136
Merchant Navy and Airline 
Officers Association (MNAOA)
59 59 '
Post Office Engineering Union 
(POEU)
Technicians 
Trainee Technicians 
Technical Officers 
Instructors 
Photoprinters 
Certain Drawing Office 
Grades
125,500 119,500
Post Office Management Staff’s 
Association (POESA)
Postal Executives 
Telephone Supervisors 
Certain Catering Staff
17,000 16,500
Society of Civil Servants (SCS) Executive Officers 
Higher Executive Officer s 
Higher Clerical Officers 
Information Officers 
Nurses
6,346 5,737
Society of Post Office Executives 
(SPOE)
Traffic and Sales 
Superintendent 
Executive and Assistant 
Executive Engineers 
Inspectors
20,500 18,500
Telephone Contract Officers' 
Association (TCOA)
Sales Representatives 1,049 1,038
Union of Post Office Workers 
(UPW)
Postmen
Telegraphists
Telephonists
20,4000 190,200
National Federation of Sub­
postmasters (nfsp)
Sub-postmasters and 
sub-postmistresses
- -
j-j-4
achievement of free citizen rights, official recognition and better
wages and conditions of work* T^is experience made
the formation of the Whitley Councils easier in the 1920*s.
In 1901 the original Postal Telegraph Linemen's movement became 
the P.O. Engineering and Stores Association. On the other hand, 
the Rational Society of Telephone Employees was formed in I905 and 
it linked up with the female telephone operators in I909 to form 
the Amalgamated Society of Telephone Employees. In 1912 the Rational 
Telephone Company was taken over by the P.O.
Following the take-over, there was a period of protracted disputes 
and struggle between the P.O. Engineers and Stores Association and the 
Amalgamated Society of Telephone Employees, which however, led to 
the amalgamation of the latter body with the former in 1915» In 19*19 
the Union adopted the present title Post Office Engineering Union 
(POEU) and dominated the union movement in the telecommunications.
On the other hand, in 1919, the Postmen's Federation, Postal 
and Telegraph Clerks’ Association, the Fawcett Association and a 
number of smaller bodies amalgamated to form on the 1st January, 1920 
the Union of Post Office Workers (UPW), the largest union in the P.O. 
Thus the two major Unions in the P.O. i.e., POEU and UPW were formed 
but there were still other smaller unions and some groups of members 
of POEU and UPW broke away from time to time to form separate unions. 
The fragmented union structure in the P.O. has little changed since 
then, although there have been several amalgamations.
In 1920 the P.O. Engineering, Factories and Supplies V/lltley 
Council and the P.O. Departmental Whitley Council were set up under
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the Civil Service National Whitley Council, and had served as machinery 
for joint consultation and negotiation until the reorganisation of the 
P.O. in 1969. With the reorganisation of the P.O. into a public 
corporation Whitley Council ceased their roles and a new form of 
consultative and negotiating machinery was to be introduced.
Accordingly unions formed the Council of Post Office Unions (COPOU) 
and the Society of Post Office Managers (SPOM) - later Consortium - 
and opened the new joint consultative machinery with the P.O. 
respectively. Following the reorganisation of the P.O. the 
amalgamation, in particular between unions organised for the same 
grade or grades, were encouraged. Through several amalgamations the 
Consortium ceased to exist and COPOU has become a single body for 
the joint consultation and negotiations with the P.O. in 1972. It 
should be noted that although POEU and UPW have dominated the scene 
since their formation, there have been a number of fragmented 
unions in the P.O. according to a job grade or grades throughout 
the history of union movement in the P.O.
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C, Union membership
1, High membership ratio.
One common featuare between NTT and the P.O. is that the 
employees of NTT and the P.O. are both highly organised. The 
membership of ZENDEPTSU has grown with the expansion of the 
telecommunications business and at the time of 197^ Annual Conference 
it has about 280 thousand members, which means that more than 99 per 
cent of the eligible employees of NTT are organised by ZENDENTSU.^ ' 
Similarly, the high membership ratio is also found in the P.O. 
Although between 1919 and 1933 the membership of POEU, the dominant 
union in telecommunications, fluctuated between 15 thousand and 19 
thousand, from 1933 it increased steadily until 1947 when it reached 
53 thousand. For some time after that it was reduced because of 
break-away unions. It began to grow again from 1955 with the 
growth of the telecommunications business, and at the end of 1975 
POEU organised more than 127 thousand members, i.e. more than 99 per 
cent of potential membership. As is clear from Table 5-2 other 
unions in the P.O. also have high membership ratio,
2, Enterprise Union and Unions based on job grades.
Although the employees of both NTT and the P.O. are highly 
organised, there is one clear difference in their coverage. While 
ZENUENTSU is a typical Enterprise Union, the Unions in the P.O. are 
organised according to job grades.
(2) KÔRO-HÔ (Government Enterprises and Public Corporation's Labour 
Relations Law) exempts management and those employees who are 
engaged in personnel and industrial relations affairs from union 
membership. In NTT the former means the job of section chief 
and above and the latter is determined by the agreement with the 
union.
As Dore found in HITACHI, Japanese Unions are normally organised 
within the limit of a particular firm and there is only one union 
within a firm. This kind of unions are called KIGYOBETSU-KUMIAI 
(Enterprise Union). ZENDEDTSU also falls into this category.
Firstly, ZENDEKTSU limits its membership to the employees of NTT 
except certain full-time officers of the union. Secondly, although 
it is operating under an open shop, it is the only effective union 
in NTT. In NTT although there are two other very small unions, 
i.e. DENDEN-ROSO (Telegraph and Telephone Workers Union) and 
DENDEN-IRO (Telegraph and Telephone Medical Workers Union), they 
have only a few hundred members compared with about 280 thousand 
in ZENDENTSÛ.
On the other hand, there are several unions in the P.O. according 
to job grades (see Table 5“2). Furthermore some of them, i.e. SOPS 
and CP8A are organised largely outside the P.O. and have members 
across the Civil Service even though the P.O. has ceased to be a 
government department. Although this situation is quite different 
from that Dore found in English Electric because major unions in 
the P.O. are composed of only the employees of the P.O., it is a 
great contrast to that in NTT where only ZENDENTSU is working 
effectively.
One more difference in membership should be noted. While in 
NTT KANRISHA ~ those who hold the post of section chief or above - 
are not eligible to union membership, the managers of the P.O. 
including those who belong to Senior Salary Structure have their 
own unions.
D. Union organisation 
1. Organisation of ZENDENTSÛ
As shovm in chart 5-1 the organisation of ZENDENTSU is designed 
to coincide with the various levels of NTT management. Most of the 
power in the union remains at the Head Office, the organisation of 
which is shown in chart 5-2. The supreme decision making machinery 
of ZENDENTSU is the Annual Conference convened by the Chairman of 
the Central Executive Committee in June, Delegates to Annual 
Conference are elected by secret ballot of members, at the rate of 
one delegate for every 500 members. The constituency for the 
election is each SÏÏIBU (Prefectural Council), The Annual Conference 
examines the activities for the past year and decides the policy 
for the following year.
Chart 5-1 The Organisation of ZENDENTSU
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Chart 5“"2 The Organisation of the Head Office : ZEHDEHTSU
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Between Annual Conferences, the Central Council to be held at 
least three times a year decides short-time policy on the decisions 
of Annual Conference. The Central Council is composed of the members 
sent from each SHIBU, the members of the Central Executive Committee 
and the Chairman and the General Secretaries of CHIHON (Regional 
Councils).
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The implementation of the policies adopted by Annual Conference 
or the Central Council is the responsibility of the Central Executive 
Committee (as for its organisation see chart 5-2), The members of 
the Central Executive Comittee including the Chairman, the Vice- 
Chairman, the General Secretary and the General Treasurer, are all 
elected at Annual Conference as full-time officers once in every 
two years,
In practice, they serve on a permanent basis until they choose
to retire or to become members of parliament or local councillors.
One of the features of ZEÎIDENTSU is that all the members of the 
Central Executive Committee do not hold the qualifications as the 
employees of NTT, The Union adopts the policy that as many full­
time officers of the union as possible should leave NTT in order 
to be independent of the management. Consequently many officers 
of the Union including those of the local organisations quitted 
NTT when they'were elected as full-time officers. To ensure this 
process, the union has tried to make the pay of full-time officers
as good as that of the management of NTT.
Bargaining about pay increase and conditions of work is 
carried out exclusively at central level and local organisations 
of the union are concerned only with the application of general 
rules to the local situation, Furthermore, it is officially 
prohibited by the rules of the Union for local organisations to make 
policies which are not consistent with the policy adopted by the 
Annual Conference. The organisation of ZENDENTSU is, therefore, 
very much centralised.
Local organisations within the Union are designed to coincide
with those of NTT. CHIHON (Regional Council) and SHIBU (Prefectual 
Council) are responsible for the control and instruction of the lower
level organisations within each Telecommunications Bureau and 
Division respectively. The organisation of CHIHON and SHIBU is more 
or less similar to that of the Head Office.
The Basic unit of the Union is BUNKAI (Branch) which is organised 
within the boundary of the Telegraph and Telephone Office, ^s shovm 
in Chart BUNKAI has an Executive Committee composed of a
Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, a General Secretary and other members 
elected by the members of BUN'KAI and SHOKUBAIIMjVI (Shop Stewards 
Committee) composed of Shop Stewards selected from each department 
of the Telegraph and Telephone Office. The relationship between 
the Executive Committee and SHOKUBAIIM<AI is similar to that of the 
Central Executive Committee and the Central Council, BUMAI is the 
first line organisation of the Union which is responsible for the 
contact with rank and file members of the Union. As BUNKAI is 
organised on a workplace basis, many of the members actually participate 
in its activities*
Chart 3-3 The organisât!on of BUNKAI (Branch) ; 
ZENDENTStf
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As for affiliation to other organisations, the situation is rather 
complicated. BUNKAI and SHIBU (Perfectural Council) affiliate to 
CHIKURÜ (District Trade Council) and HEUHYO (Prefectural Trade Council) 
respectively, both of which are local organisations of SOHYO (the 
General Council of Japan Labour Unions), But the activities through 
these councils are mainly on political matters, ZENDENTSÛ at central 
level forms DENTSUICYOTO (Telecommunications Joint Struggle Committee) 
together with other unions in the telecommunications industry, i.e. 
unions of KOKUSAIDENDEN and subsidiaries of NTT.
Zendentsu affiliates to SOHYO through DENTSUKYOTO. Although 
DENTSUKYOTO was formed to promote industrial unionism, it has no 
substantial power. Because 280 thousand of its $00 thousand members 
belong to ZENDENTSU and it is financially supported by ZENDENTSU, it 
is rather another form of activity for ZENDENTSÛ. The most important 
is the affiliation to KOROKYO (the Government Enterprises and public 
Corporations Workers Unions Joint Committee) formed by the Unions of 
Government Enterprise and Public Corporations which are affiliated 
to SOHYO, SHUNTO .(Spring Labour Offensive) and political activities 
such as the struggle to recover the right to strike are planned and 
co-ordinated through KOROKYO.
2, Organisation of POEU
Although there are several unions in the telecommunications side 
of the P.O. other than POEU, only POEU will be taken up in this and 
the following sections, as they have more or less similar structure 
to that of POEU and POEU is by far the largest union.
As shown in Chart 5-4» the organisation of POEU is also designed 
to coincide with the various levels of P.O. management. Most of the 
power in the union is reserved by the Head Office, the organisation 
of which is shown in Chart 5"5*
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Chart 3”4 The Organisation of PQKU
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Chart 5-5 The Organisation of the Head Office ; POEU
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The supreme decision malting body is Annual Conference which 
consists of delegates from Francheso The Annual Report of the National 
Executive Council on the previous year's activities is examined and 
new policy for the union as a whole is determinedo
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The implementation of the decisions taJten at Annual Conference 
is the responsibility of the National Executive Council which is 
composed of twenty three members elected at Annual Conference*
Eleven members are elected on an occupational basis and twelve 
members are elected on a regional basis. They are all the employees 
of the Post Office. There are three main committees of the National 
Executive Council, i.e. General Purposes, Establishment,and Wages 
and Allowances, There also are three occupational committees, i.e.
A, B and C to deal with particular problems of particular occupational 
groups. Furthermore there are a number of such other committees as 
Political Fund, Education to deal with specific functions.
Much of the actual administration of the Union is carried out 
by full-time officers such as General Secretary, Deputy General 
Secretary, General Treasurer and Assistant Secretaries. They are 
appointed by National Executive Council normally on a permanent 
basis with endorsement by Annual Conference,
There is a Union Regional Council (URO) on which engineering 
occupational branches and engineering composite branches within a 
Telecommunications Negion are represented. Such occupational groups 
as Motor Transport, Factory and Supplies have their own occupational 
councils. URCs and Occupational Councils deal with the matters 
concerned solely with a particular region or an occupational group.
The basic unit of POEU is the Branch (as for its organisation 
see Chart 5“ )^» Majority of the 291 Branches are organised within 
the geographical boundaries of the Telephone Areas. The number of 
Branches wi thin a Telephone Area depends on the number of staff
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Chart 5-6 Organisations of Branch : POEU
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involved and the geographical siae of the Area, Branches are organised 
on composite basis or occupational basis. Composite Branches are formed 
where the members of the internal and external staff desire to be 
within the same branch. Occupational branches represent members of 
a specific occupational group, i.e. internal and external staff. The 
Union's specialist groups such as Factories, Supplies, and Motor 
Transport are all within their own occupational branches. All policy 
decisions are taken at the Branch Meeting, and the Branch Committee 
made up of representatives of the various groups in the Branch 
assists the Branch Officers elected at the Branch Meeting to execute 
the policy decided by the Branch Meeting. Where there are several 
Branches within an Area, an Area Co-ordinating Committee is formed, 
but it can take action only when all branches agree.
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The organisation of POEU is also highly centralised* The UJRC 
and Branches cannot negotiate about pay increase and major conditions 
of work because they are negotiated only at central level. They are 
concerned mainly with discipline, manning levels for particular jobs 
and the implementation of the central agreements.
As for affiliation to other organisations, one of the features 
of POEU is membership of COPOU (Council of Post Office Unions), 
formed in I969 to promote the co-operation between P,0, Unions,
COPOU determines policy on all matters that are common to all members 
of the P.O. The organisation of COPOU is also designed to coincide 
with the management organisation of the P.O. and Branches affiliate 
to area COPOU, URCs to Regional COPOU and the Head Office to national 
COPOU, POEU also affiliates to TUG (Trade Union Congress) and many 
of the Branches affiliate to local Trade Councils,
5. Main findings
Dore found that Japanese Union Organisation is highly centralised 
but that of British is characterised by dual structure of formal 
union organisation and informal workplace organisation represented 
by shop stewards. These differences do not, however, exist between 
ZENDENTSU and POEU, Both of them are highly centralised and there 
is no informal workshop organisation as against Union Branches. The 
procedures of union activities are both formalised in detail in union
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rules* This is due partly to the fact that the organisation of both 
NTT and the P.O. is highly centralised and union organisation is 
designed to coincide with the management organisation. The other reason 
is.-that. the technology utilised in NTT and the P.O. is peculiar 
to the telecommunications industry and uniformly integrated tlirough- 
outtheir organisation. This makes it possible to handle matters 
mainly at central level.
In spite of this similarity of centralisation, there are 
some differences between ZENDENTSU and the POEU, Firstly, the 
National Executive Committee of ZENDENTSU and the national 
Executive Council of POEU are different in their character, V/hile 
the National Executive Committee of ZENDENTSU performs itself the 
function of full-time officers and the responsibilities on day-to- 
day running of the union are assigned to the members of the 
Committee, the National Executive Council of POEU appoints full­
time officers and leaves day-to-day matters in the hands of 
appointed officers. The former has the function of both the 
National Executive Council and full-time officers of POEU,
Secondly, while the organisation of ZENDENTSU is based solely 
on regions, that of POEU is based on both regions and occupational 
groups. As is understood from the differentials in pay among 
different grades, there is an explicit conflict of interests among 
different grades in the P.O. Internal (i.e. indoor ) staff tend to 
regard their jobs superior to that of external (i.e. outdoor) staff 
and other occupational groups have their own interests. In the 
past., some groups broke away from POEU to protect their own interests.
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Therefore it is necessary for POEU to allow some autonomy to 
occupational groups in order to preserve the unity of the union.
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E. Union finance
Membership subscription of ZENDENTSÛ is, as Dore found in the 
HITACHI Union, decided according to earnings (see Table 5"3)*
Each member pays monthly from ¥1,950 (£5»75) to y 2*775 (^ 5»54) 
depending on his monthly basic salary. In addition, strike fund 
and political fund which amount to about £23 «.85 a year will be 
collected. In total ZENDENTSU collects about 300 million yen 
(5.8 million pounds) per a year,
TABLE 5-3 Membership Subscription s ZENDENTSU as of October, 1976.
Monthly Basic Salary Subscription (monthly)
¥ (£)
Up to ¥100,000 (£192.31) 1,950 (£3.75)
¥100,000 -¥104,999 (f192.51 “£ 201.92) 2,025 ( 3.89)
105,000 - 109,999 ( .201.92- 211.54) 2,100 ( 4.04)
110,000 - 114,999 ( .211.54- 221.15) 2,175 ( 4.18)
115,000 - 119,999 (221.15 - 230.77) 2,250 ( 4.35)
120,000 - 124,999 (230.77 - 240.38) 2,325 ( 4.47)
125,000 - 129,999 (240.38 - 250,00) 2,400 (4.62)
130,000 - 134,999 (250.00 - 259.61) 2,475 (4.76)
135,000 - 139,999 (259.61 - 269.23) 2,550 (4.90)
140,000 - 144,999 (269.23 - 278.84) 2,625 (5.05)
145,000 - 149,999 (278.84 - 288.46) 2,700 (5.19)
150,000 and over (288.46 ) 2,775 (5.34)
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The dues of POEU are a fixed weekly sum depending on age; this 
can he contrasted to the English Electric Unions where the dues depend 
on skill stains and ZENDENTSU whose dues depend on earnings. Those 
members who are 21 years and over pay 32 pence per week and those 
under 21 years pay 20 pence per week, 22 pence of each quarterly 
contribution is a contribution to a political fund. This amount of 
dues is less than a third of the subscription of ZENDENTSU, In total 
POEU collects about 1,2 million pounds per year which is about twenty 
per cent of the amount collected by ZENDENTSU. Thus it is clear that 
ZENDENTSU is far more financially equipped than POEU, The difference 
is reflected on Union activities. Firstly, ZENDENTSU has far more 
full-time officers than POEU; while ZENDENTSU has about 880 full­
time officers (one for every 318 members) POEU has only about 48 
full-time officers (one for every 3,800 members). Secondly, 
ZENDENTSU has a better channel of communication with its members.
While it publishes weekly journal sent directly to members’ home,
POEU publishes its journal only monthly. This kind of difference 
in union finance is the same as Dore found between HITACHI and 
English Electric Unions.
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F, Goals of Unions and Political Attitude
ZENDENTSU is very much politically oriented. According to its 
platform, there are five main goals of its movement, i.e. (1) to 
improve working conditions of its members, (2) to prevent war and 
to preserve world peace, (5) to construct a democratic socialist 
state in Japan, (4) to prevent the resurgence of fascism, (5) to 
democratise the Civil Service, ^s is clear from these, ZENDENTSU 
regards the reformation of society as its principal purpose. Reflecting 
this its political attitude is very positive. Although it does not 
affiliate to SHAKAI-TO (Japan Socialist P a r t y ) t h e  largest 
opposition party, it strongly supports the party together with other 
SOHTO unions by the decision of Annual Conference, The contribution 
to the political fund is not obligatory but almost all the members 
do contribute to the fund which is used to support the party. There 
are six MPs who are former-member of the Union and over 500 local 
councillors. During elections members of the union are mobilised 
towards election campaigns.
This strong orientation towards political activities is common 
among the unions of Japanese public employment. There are several 
reasons for this. One is the process of the démocratisation of 
post-war Japan. As stated in Section A, the GHQ freed the labour 
movement as one of the ways to democratise Japan. But as political 
parties were not well established reflecting theirde facto absence 
during the v;ar, trade unions often took the role of political parties. 
This situation has little changed since then. Although SHAKAI-TO
(5) Japanese Unions do not affiliate to political parties.
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(Japan Socialist Party) has collected over ten million votes in each 
general election, it has only about fifty thousand members. As a 
result, the burden including election campaign has been borne by 
trade unions affiliated to SOHYQ.
Secondly, as also stated in Section A, the employees of the 
public sector have been deprived of the right to strike, except for 
a short period just after the war by KOROHO (Government Enterprises 
and Public Corporations Labour Relations Law), It has been the long- 
cherished desire for the unions concerned to recover the right to 
strike. As this is not the kind of problem to be solved by collective 
bargaining, the unions concentrate on political activities such as the 
lobbying to parliament and some have illegally struck to put pressure 
on the government.
Thirdly, as will be stated in Chapter Y, Japanese public 
corporations have not got full authority in awarding pay increases 
to their employees, because the total amount of the salaries are 
fixed in the budget which must be approved by both Houses of Parliament. 
The amendment to the budget, as a rule, is not allowed unless KORO-I 
(Government Enterprises and Public Corporations Labour Relations 
Commission) awards a pay increase, and even in that case, the approval 
of the Treasury is required. Therefore the unions tend to pursue the 
struggle for pay increases through political pressure.
Thus it is clear that ZENDENTSU is very much orientated towards 
political activities. POEU is also very much concerned with political 
activities. Although it has no explicit ideological platform, four 
main purposes of the union are clear from its publication.
(4) History, Structure, Organisation, POEU, p, 8.
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They are as follows; (l) to fight for better conditions, (2) to 
protect the individual, (5) to act as a voice for its members, with 
the employer, at Trade Councils, and in Parliament through its 
sponsored MPs, (4) to become a fraternity to bring members together. 
Although political purposes are not directly mentioned, POEU is 
positive in the political field.
Its political activities can be divided into two aspects. One 
is the parliamentary representation. There are two MPs who are 
former members of the Union and there is an effort to increase this 
number.
Secondly, POEU affiliates to the Labour Party and has political 
fund. The Trade Disputes Act (192?) made it illegal for Civil Service 
Unions to affiliate to any political party or to hold political fund. 
The Act was repealed by the Labour Government of 1946, but the Union 
did not affiliate to the Labour Party until I964. Increasingly 
during the 1960*s the POEU became aware that it was necessary to 
supplement the industrial action by political activities. The 
Political Fund was established on 1 January I963 with only 21 thousand 
members and by the I963 Conference amounted to only £2,700.'  ^ The 
affiliation to the Labour Party was accepted by I964 Annual Conference, 
Since then political activities of the Union have been strengthened.
At the end of 1975, the mmiber on which it affiliates is about 76 
thousand and 1 débranches among 291 affiliate to local Labour Party.
(5) F, Bealey, op. cit., p. 555
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Over 89 thousand members are contributing toward the Political Fund 
quarterly by 22 pence. This kind of political activities are not 
the same as those of ZENDENTSU, which are directly aimed at the 
reformation of the society. The activities of POEU are to supplement 
the industrial action»
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G. Union attitude towards rationalisation and productivity bargaining.
With the reorganisation of NTT as a public corporation, it 
set out for the rationalisation of the telecommunications network 
through successive five year plans. The first stage v/as the 
mechanisation of telegram network and the automating of telephone 
exchanges. ZENDENTSÛ, at first, strongly opposed the rationalisation 
and carried out many industrial actions. But it gradually came to 
realise the inevitability of rationalisation and adopted the policy 
that it would oppose not to technological innovation itself but 
to the worsening of working conditions accompanying rationalisation.
It claims that most efficient way to prevent the worsening of 
conditions of work is to conclude collective agreements with the 
management of NTT,
On the other hand, NTT also changed its attitude towards the 
Union, Af first it refused to negotiate with the Union on 
rationalisation maintaining that this belonged to administrative 
matters which should not be negotiated with the union under the 
provisions of KORÔ-HO and tried to enforce the rationalisation 
plans without union consent. But it also came to realise that it 
was necessary to get union agreement and co-operation in order to 
carry out the rationalisation smoothly. As a result, the agreement 
on the redistribution of the staff was concluded and then the 
practice of the prior consultation in the implementation of 
rationalisation plans was established.
In practice NTT has been able to carry out the rationalisation 
efficiently through union co-operation and the union in re turn has 
been able to improve the working conditions for its members. To
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translate union co-operation into pay there is an agreement as to 
the payment of productivity allowance mentioned in Chapter 4* This 
kind of allowance does not exist among other Japanese public employment,
POEU is also generally positive towards rationalisation. With 
the technological innovation including the automating of telephone 
exchanges, it came to realise the necessity of rationalisation and, 
in turn, it has tried to better conditions of work for its members.
The negotiations on productivity agreement started in the early I960’ 
and POEU and the P.O. finally reached an agreement in I965 through 
long and complicated negotiations. Under the agreement 'the savings 
in labour costs deriving from increased labour productivity were 
estimated and distributed between the engineering vrorkers and the 
P.O. according to a set formula’, i.e., ’the increase in 
productivity was derived from the actual man-hours spent by each 
Telecommunications Region under all the works orders and headings 
of man-hour expenditure and this saving in man-hours was converted to 
a saving in numbers employed' and ’An average total labour cost per 
man was then estimated, and multiplied by the number of men saved, 
to give a total figure for gross savings in the p e r i o d , T h e  
principles of sharing the saving is fifty-fifty between the POEU and 
the P.O. In the case of engineering grades the amount to be shared is 
settled annually at the time of pay negotiations and is consolidated 
in the basic pay.
(6) Mackersie and Hunter, Pay, Productivity and Collective Bargaining, 
Macmillan, 1973, p. 90*
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One of the problems with this kind of productivity agreement 
in the multi-union situation is that it tends to distort the pay 
structure in the long run* POEU has had the productivity agreement 
for a long time and, as a result, their pay has been raised faster 
than those who belong to other Unions* The supervisory grades in 
engineering do not have any productivity agreement and the differ­
entials between them and lower grades became narrower. They were 
unhappy about this situation and brought the claim to Arbitration 
which appreciated the loss of differentials. Actually the pay of 
supervisory grade was pushed up by minor engineering grades. This 
caused another problem, i.e. differentials between other supervisory 
grades. But this was an inevitable problem under the multi-union 
structure.
Thus it is clear that both ZENDENTSU and POEU have adopted 
positive policy towards rationalisation which has been surely 
conditioned by the rapid technological change in the telecommunications 
industry. Without this kind of policy neither of the unions could 
have functioned efficiently.
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CMPTER 6 MRAGi^lËNT ORGANISATION FOR IFÛÏÏSTRIAL RELATIONS 
1 c Management organisation for Industrial Relations : NTT
As showi in Chart 6-1, the management organisation for industrial 
relations of NTT is ‘bureaucratically formed following the organisation 
of the Civil Service* The Personnel Bureau and the Welfare Bureau 
of the Head Office, which consist of four sections respectively, 
are concerned with policy determination as a whole and are in charge 
of the negotiations with the Union Head Office, The Head Office 
collects personnel statistics and information through local organisa­
tions and analyses them for policy-making and negotiations with the 
Union, The decision on pay and conditions of work is the exclusive 
responsibility of the Head Office and the negotiations on these 
matters talce place only between the Head Offices of NTT and the Union,
Chart 6-1 Management organisation for industrial relations : NTT
Head Office   personnel Bureau-
Welfare Bureau-
Telecommuni catione 
Bureau
Telecommuni cations 
Division
Telegraph and 
Telephone Office
■Personnel Department
labour section 
personnel section 
pay section 
research section
welfare section 
training section 
health section 
benefit section
labour section 
personnel section 
training section 
welfare section
labour & welfare section 
•personnel section
labour and welfare section
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The Head Office of NTT makes regulations and v/ritten instructions 
on the collective agreements concluded with the Union Head Office 
which are sent to Telecommunications Bureaus. The Bureau sets its 
own policy within the framework given by the Head Office taking its 
own special situations into account and makes regulations and written 
instructions to be sent to Telecommunications Divisions. At the 
lower level, each Telecommunications Division does the same, and 
finally each Telegraph and Telephone Office applies the regulations 
and instructions thus given. As the regulations and instructions 
given from upper level are to be strictly observed, the scope for 
decision-making at lower level is very much limited, VJhenever there 
are doubts as to their application the lower level simply refers the 
matter to upper level to seek instruction. Thus the management 
organisation for industrial relations of NTT is very much bureaucratically 
centralised.
The other feature oj^^anagement organisation for industrial 
relations of NTT is specialisation. At all levels from the Head 
Office down to local telegraph and telephone offices, there are 
special sections in charge of industrial relations. Within each 
organisation, the specialist section is in the position of giving 
advice to other management staff on industrial relations matters 
and is in charge of negotiations with the union. Although some line 
managers are the members of bargaining committee (see next Chapter), 
their main role is to give information to the specialist section 
and they do not have significant authority on industrial relations.
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2, Management organisation for industrial relations : the P.O.
The management organisation for industrial relations of the.
P.O. is, as shown in Chart 6-2, very much centralised. Negotiations
on pay and conditions of work are the responsibility of the Head
Office. In CHQ (Central Headquarters) there is a Board member
for personnel and industrial relations and a Secretary who are
responsible for the co-ordination between the t el e communie a t.i ons andpoetal
businesses and the common policy making on such matters as
London weighting allowance, leaves, welfare and health.
In THQ, (Telecommunications Headquarters), the Senior Director 
Telecommunications Personnel is in charge of industrial relations 
in the telecommunications business. As unions are organised 
according to a grade or grades and negotiations on pay and conditions 
of work take place according to unions, policy-making and negotiation 
with the unions on pay and main conditions of work applied only to 
the telecommunications business are the responsibility of THQ,.
In fact it is not too much to say that THQ has almost complete 
autonomy on industrial relations subject to external criteria dictated 
by the government.
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Within the telecommunications business decision-making is very 
much centralised to THQ. Regions and ^reas have no authority on pay 
and conditions of work. They are responsible only for the application 
of national standards.
One of the differences from the system in NTT is that the 
management organisation of the P.O. at local level is not as 
specialised as in NTT. In each Telecommunications Region, there 
are some advisers to Regional Director on industrial relations under 
the Controller Personnel. In the case of the Telephone Area, there 
are some advisers to Telephone Manager on industrial relations 
under the Area Accountant, Hut there is not any specialist section 
in charge of industrial relations. There are professionals on 
industrial relations only in THQ, Organisationally line management 
is responsible for industrial relations at local level, although 
its main role is limited to the application of the policy given 
by THQ.
Explanations for Centralisation; technological uniformity.
The difference Dore found between HITACHI and English Electric 
does not hold true between NTT and the P.O. \*Aiile Dore contrasted 
the centralised organisation of HITACHI to the decentralised 
organisation of English Electric, the management organisation of 
both NTT and the P.O. is highly centralised and bureaucratically ^
organised. This can be explained by the technological uniformity 
of the telecommunications business. The telecommunications network 
covers the whole of each country and offers a uniform service based 
on law. The technology used is almost uniform throughout the 
country. Wherever employees are working, there is not any significant
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difference in the actual work content by grade.
This makes it both possible and necessary to centralise the 
responsibility on industrial relations to the Head Office and to 
leave only the application of the policy centrally adopted to 
local situation.
Despite the similarity, however, there is a small difference 
between NTT and the P.O. as stated in the above sections. This 
is a difference at the lowest level of the organisation. Mille 
HTT has a specialist section even at local telegraph and telephone 
offices, the P.O. has no such specialist section on industrial 
relations and the responsibility is borne by line management. This 
probably reflects the more formality in NTT as indicated by the 
abundant existence of written regulations and instructions.
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CMPTER 7 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STRÏÏCTÜPÆ
A, Collective bargaining under strict government control: KTT
1, Legal framework
Philosophically, pay and other conditions of employment of the 
employees of NTT are settled through free collective bargaining between 
the management and the union. But in the case of NTT, as one of the 
public corporations in Japan, there are some legal restrictions on the 
matters to be taken up by collective bargaining and in the way collective 
bargaining is carried out in order to harmonise the rights of workers 
with public welfare, V/hile employees in the private sector are 
guaranteed the basic rights of workers i.e., rights to unite, to 
bargain collectively and to strike by RÔDÔkoîilAl-HO (Trade Union Law), 
KÔRO-HO (Government Enterprises and Public Corporations Labour Relations 
Law), which is applied to NTT, has provisions to restrict or to deprive 
some of the basic rights because government enterprises and public 
corporations have close relations to the life of general public and 
the stoppage of their work could cripple the economy as a whole.
Section 8 of the law excludes administrative matters from the 
objects of collective bargaining. For example the allocation of staff 
is such and the management may reject collective bargaining on it.
But to implement the rationalisation of the telecommunications industry 
through successive five year plans, it has been necessary to get union 
co-operation, and NTT has therefore established consultative machinery 
on rationalisation separately from collective bargaining.
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Section 17 of the law forbids strike action and section 18 of the 
law provides for penalities including dismissal. As noted in Chapter 5, 
the recovery of the right to strike hs.s been one of the main aims of 
the unions concerned. This does not necessarily mean the absence of 
strikes in NTT, SSNDENTSU (the only effective union in KTT) has gone 
on strike very often especially in recent years. Until a few years ago
the management of KTT penalised severely those v/ho planned or
participated in strikes and many union officers were dismissed or 
suspended from work. But in recent years it changed its attitudes and 
the penalties have become nominal. The union thus claims that it has 
got a de facto right to strike.
To compensate the prohibition of strikes, chapter 5 of KORO-HO 
provides for the co-ordination of industrial relations by KORO-l 
(Government Enterprises and Public Corporations Labour Relations 
Commission) vrhich consists of seven members representing the public 
interest, five representing management and three representing the unions.
There are three stages of the co-ordination by the Commission.
The first is mediation which is initiated by either or both of the 
parties or, the chairman of the Commission. The aim of mediation is to 
promote the voluntary settlement of disputes by offering the chance of 
mutual understanding.
The next stage is arbitration v/hich begins by the request of 
either or both sides, the chairman of the Commission or the minister 
in charge. The award of arbitration does not bind the parties concerned.
The final stage is compulsory arbitration which begins under the
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same condition as the second stage. The difference from the second 
stage is that the award of compulsory arbitration binds the parties 
concerned and has the same effect as collective agreements except in a 
case,when the award means an appropriation which is impossible without 
the revision of the budget it does not bind the government. This kind 
of award becomes effective only after having got the approval of both 
Houses of Parliament. For example, pay increases awarded by the 
Commission in May 19?6 ha,d not become effective until the law to 
increase tariffs foz%elecommunications services scraped through 
Parliament in October.
2, Machinery for collective bargaining
The machinery for collective.bargaining of HTT which is shovm in 
Table 7-1 is very much centralised reflecting the centralised 
organisation of both management and the union. The supreme decision 
making machinery is the Central Bargaining Committee under which local 
bargaining committees, i.e., regional, district and workplace bargaining 
committees exist. This negotiating avenue corresponds to the organisation 
of NTT. Following section 9 of KOHÜ-HO vdiich provides that collective 
bargaining between NTT and the union shall be between those members 
of the collective bargaining committee representing management and the 
union, both NTT and the union nominate the members of the committees 
respectively as shov/n in Table 'J-l, The term of the service of the 
members is for a year. The matters to be taken up by each committee 
are those which belong to the responsibilities of the head of each 
management organisation of NTT. In the case of disagreement, the matters 
are to be referred to a higher level. But in practice only the Central
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Bargaining Committee is responsible for the negotiations on pay 
increases and other conditions of work and other local committees are 
concerned only with the implementation of agreements reached at 
central level.
Table 7-1, Machinery for collective bargaining: NTT
Bargaining Committee between nrmiber of 
members (not 
more than)
NTT Union
Central Bargaining 
■Committee
Head Office (NTT)
- Head Office (Union )
50 50
Regional Bargaining 
Committee
Telecommunications Bureau 
- CHIHON (Regional Council)
15 15
District Bargaining 
Committee
Telecommunications Division 
- SHIBU (District Council)
10 10
Workplace Bargaining 
Committee
Telegraph & Telephone Office 
- BUNKAl (Branch)
7 7
5. Actual process of collective bargaining
(a) Pay settlement - SHUNTO and the award of IvOHO-I
The annual pay increases in NTT are settled through the so-called 
SHUNTO (Spring Labour Offensive), Since 1955 tvm central organisations 
of unions, SOEPO (the General Council of Japan Labour Union and 
CHURITSU-HOREN (the Federation of Independent Unions) have organised 
SHUNTO-NYOTO-lINNAI (the Spring Struggle Co-ordinating Committee) and 
have demanded pay increases annually in spring through joint action by 
member unions. The features of SHUNTO can be summarised as follows;
(1) it is a struggle concentrated in a special time of the year, i.e.
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spring and carried out annually; (z) as many unions as possible in 
a particular industry organise a series of joint struggles under the 
schedule set by SïîüïïïO-KYOTO-IlînCÂI; (5) not unexpectedly, the main 
aim is to obtain higher pay increases.
EEHDEHTSU, which is also a member of KOROKYO (the Government 
Enterprises and Public Corporations Workers Unions Joint Committee) 
formed by the unions of government enterprises and public corporations 
puts a claim on management in early spring and may repeat several 
strike actions under the instruction of K0RÔÜ1YÔ which sets the schedule 
for government enterprises and public corporations unions in 
consultation with SIÎU1TTÔ-KT0T0-I1UKAI.
Although NTT, as with other public corporations, may conclude an 
agreement on pay increases, in practice it is deprived of the authority 
to do so. Its budget must get the approval of both Houses of 
Parliament and the total amount of the pay of the employees of NTT is 
fixed in the budget and may not be changed without the consent of the 
government. Therefore in replying to the union claim, NTT has offered 
nominal increases within the framework of the budget, which is far 
from union satisfaction. For exajnple, in 1975» the first offer from 
NTT was ^ 7,070 (£13.60) a month excluding annual periodical increases 
against the union demand of over ^56,000 (£25.91)* Even the management 
of NTT privately admits that the first offer was too small, but under 
the present situation it cannot do better.
Thus it is not possible to settle pay increases by the collective 
bargaining between management and the union and the matter has been
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referred to the third party, i.e. KÔRÔ-I and settled through its 
compulsory arbitration. KORO-l in practice has performed the role 
of collective bargaining machinery as far as pay settlement is 
concerned. As seven members of KORO-I representing the public 
interest are nominated by the government and the numbers of the 
members representing management and unions are five and three 
respectively, its decision is, in fact, strongly controlled by 
the government. Therefore the union does not attach much 
importance to intra-firm collective bargaining as far as pay 
negotiation is concerned and puts pressure on the government by 
repeating joint strike actions of government enterprises and 
public corporations unions. Since I965 it has been a custom to 
give the award of KÔRÔ-1 equally to all the unions concerned by 
taking the pay settlement of the private sector into account, 
i.e. the comparability with the. private sector has played an 
important role.
This situation is very much different from that of HITACHI 
lore investigated. Although the pay increases in HITACHI are 
also settled through SHUNTO, both management and the union reach 
an agreement exclusively through the collective bargaining between 
them and the process is free from government control. Both 
management and the Union of NTT are not happy about the government 
control and in particular the fact that the award of the compulsory 
arbitration of KORO-l is normally given equally to all government 
enterprises and public corporatiomunions. ZENBENTSÜ criticises 
the management of NTT for not having real authority on pay settlement, 
The fact that although the union has been fairly co-operative with
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the management in rationalisation in contrast to the reactionary 
attitudes of other government enterprises and public corporations 
unions towards rationalisation, it has not been able to get any 
better pay increases except some extra fringe benefits and a 
little improvement in conditions of work has caused strong 
feelings of dissatisfaction among the raik and file members of the 
union. Therefore, the union strongly claims the establishment of 
free collective bargaining in NTTo
Although the management of NTT also admits the existence of
the problem there is no real prospect of change because it is
impossible to improve the situation without amending the laws 
concerned and the government is not likely to agree to the amendment,
(b) Other Working Conditions
As opposed to the pay settlement the conditions of work other 
than pay are normally settled through collective bargaining between 
NTT and the Union, Conditions of work are normally negotiated 
alongside with pay during SHUNTO (Spring Labour Offensive).
4. Consultative Structure
Although administrative matters are excluded from the objects
of collective bargaining by KORO-HO, the implementation of some
administrative matters is in practice difficult without the 
understanding and co-operation of the union because they have some 
impact on the conditions of work. In particular as NTT has promoted 
rapid rationalisation and modernisation of the telecommunications 
business, it has been indispensable to get union co-operation.
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Therefore NTT has developed consultative machinery separately from 
collective bargaining. There is an agreement as to the joint 
consultative machinery for the explanation of annual investment 
and expansion programme. Joint consultation takes place between 
the Head Office of NTT and the. Union Head Office and between
Telecorrmiunications Bureau and CHIHON (Union Regional Council). As
for the level below Telecommunications Bureau, there is no 
particular agreement, but it has been a long established custom to
explain the programme and get union understanding.
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B, Collective Bargaining; the P.O.
1 . Legal Framework
In contrast to NTT, there is no particular labour legislation 
to control the industrial relations in the P.O. The basic labour 
rights are thought to be guaranteed on the same basis as private
sector. The right to unite was guaranteed by the Trade Union Act 
I87I after the repeal of Combination Act in 1824* The right to
negotiate collectively is ensured by Section. 11 of Schedule 1
of the P.O. Act 1969 which provides for the establishment of joint 
consultative and negotiating machinery in the P.O. Finally the 
right to strike is thought to be guaranteed by Conspiracy a.nd 
Protection of Property Act 1875 und Trade Disputes Act I9O6, The 
former freed the unions from criminal liability and the latter from 
civil liability. However, some doubt about the legal standing of 
strikes by the P.O. workers was raised at the beginning of 1977 
because the Court of Appeal granted an interim injunction forbidding 
the boycott of postal and telecommimications links with South Africa 
planned by POEU and UPW. This issue will be talcen up in detail in 
Chapter 8.
2, Joint Consultative and Negotiating Machinery
(a) Joint Consultative and Negotiating Machinery with COPOU
(1) COPOU (the Council of Post Office Unions)
With the reorganisation of the P.O. in 19&9 the Whitley Council ceased 
its role in the P.O. To replace the V/liitley Council, the P.O. Act 19&9 
provides for the establishment of joint consultative and negotiating 
machinery in the P.O. However, it was necessary to establish a
154.
co-ordinating body of the unions in order to operate the machinery 
effectively. For this purpose the P.O. unions formed COPOU (the 
Council of Post Office Unions). The constituent members of COPOU 
are POEU (Post Office Engineering Union), UPW (Union of Post Office 
Workers), CPSA (Civil and Public Services Association), POMSA (Post 
Office Management Staffts Association), SPOS (Society of Post Office 
Executives) and NFSP (National Federation of Sub-Postmasters). There 
are three associate members,, i.e. SOS (Society of Civil Servants,
IPCS (institution of Professional Civil Servants) and TCOA (Telephone 
Contract Officers Association).
(2) Joint Consultative and Negotiating Machinery with COPOU
Joint consultative and negotiating machinery with COPOU is, as 
shown in Chart 7-1, characterised by the four-tier system corresponding 
to the organisation of the P.O.
The National Joint Council chaired by the chairman of the P.O.
the
meets once a year and discusses matters concerning both/postal and 
telecommunications businesses. Some of the examples of matters taken 
up are as follows: (i) Efficiency with which the P.O. operates,
(ii) Health, Safety, Welfare, Further Education and Training,
(iii) Improvement of equipment, working methods and organisation,
(iv) Maintenance of oversight of joint machinery at all levels*
It also has the duty to establish an arbitration machinery. The 
National Joint Council is very formal and its main function is to 
exchange information between the management and the unions. In 
practice the general purposes committee which consists of the 
chairmen and the general secretaries of the Unions and the members
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Chart 7-1 Joint Consultative and Negotiating Machinery with COPOU
CHQs National Joint Council
General Purposes Committee 
National. Joint Committees - Catering
Health
Safety
Welfare
Superannuation
THQ: Business Joint Council
Region:
Standing Committees
Project Committees
planning and service matters 
personnel matters
computers
Computerised Payroll
Customer Rental Records
Telephone and Telex Billing
Office procedures and 
productivity
Regional Joint Council
Area;
Engineering Committee 
Operating Sub-Committee 
Other Committees as required
Local Joint Committee
Sub-C ommi ttees - Engineering
- Operating
- Safety
- Catering
Other Sub-Committees as required
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representing the P.O. is important.
The Business Joint Council chaired by the Managing Director 
Telecommunications is held three times a year and deals with the 
matters concerning the telecommunications business. It deals with 
(i); (ii) and (iii) of the matters taken up by the National Council 
within the telecommunications business. It is also concerned with 
the application of corporation policy to the telecommunications 
business.
Each Regional Joint Council chaired by the Regional Director 
meets quarterly and is concerned with the following matters;
(i) Co-operation in matters affecting services provided by region,
(ii) Measures to increase productivity, (iii) Safety, health, 
welfare, further education and training, (iv) proper handling 
of grievances, (v) Utilisation of staff, resources, enterprise, 
ideas and experiences (vi) Conditions of work (vii) Application 
of national agreements.
The Area Joint Committees chaired by General Managers also 
meet quarterly and are concerned with the same kind of matters as 
those taken up by the Regional Joint Council at Area level.
(3) Actual role of Joint Councils
It is not easy to reach an agreement through these councils 
because too many people and too many unions representing various 
interests are involved. For example the numbers of the members on 
the National Joint Council is 18 from the P.O. and 27 from COPOU.
As a result only a limited number of matters such as London weighting 
allowance, holidays, and superannuation are discussed by the National 
Joint Council. Pay and conditions of work other than mentioned above
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are negotiated by individual union. Therefore it is not too much 
to say that the main value of the Councils is just the provision of 
information.
(b) POSSNC and MNAOA
Post Office Senior Staffs Negotiating Council (POSSNC) 
representing Senior Salary Grades and Merchant Navy and Airline 
Officers Association (MNAOA) representing Cableship Officers have 
separate machineries for joint consultation and negotiation.
3, Actual process of Collective Bargaining
(a) Pay settlement
When the P.O. staff were civil servants, their pay was settled 
on the basis of ’fair comparison’ with private industries, taking 
account of differences in working conditions, as recommended by the 
Priestly Report of 1955. The Civil Service Pay Research Unit 
(now in suspension) fixed the outside comparisons in consultation 
with the parties and collected the data. These surveys by the 
Civil Service Pay Research Unit were made every four years and 
every three years from I969. The P.O. did not negotiate or decide 
pay of its staff who shared common civil service grading such as 
clerical and administrative grades.  ^Their pay w^ as in practice 
negotiated between the Treasury and the Unions concerned. However, 
the P.O. negotiated pay for its own grades such as telephonists 
and engineers on a basis of fair comparison.
158,
With the transformation into a public corporation, the P.O. began 
to negotiate with the Unions on its own responsibility. However, civil 
service pay levels have continued to influence negotiation, particularly 
in the case of clerical grades which have counterpart in the civil service 
and belong to some Civil Service Unions. But in negotiation with the 
Unions, such factors as internal and external relativities, general 
movement in outside pay settlement, cost of living, recruitment 
situation and productivity are taken into account.
Actual negotiations in the P.O. are carried out with each of the 
ten recognised unions and the POÔSNG separately. The unions negotiate 
with the P.O. for the grade they represent. The collective bargaining 
on pay in the telecommunications business is between THQ, (Telecommunica™ 
tiens Headquarters) and the Head Offices of the Unions. Only POSSNC 
negotiateswith CHQ (Central Headquarters).
Thus the collective bargaining in the P.O. on pay settlement is, 
like NTT, very much centralised. However, there is one great 
difference reflecting union structure.. While the negotiations on 
pay increases of NTT are concentrated in Spring, the P.O. Unions 
historically have different pay review dates, e.g. UFW and Clerical 
Unions in January and POEU in July, and negotiate for the grades 
they represent. T^is fragmented negotiating dates have caused 
difficulties in co-ordinating the different settlements and the 
management is obliged to face the problems of differentials between 
grades and leap-frogging.
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(b) Government Control on Pay Negotiation
Collective bargaining on pay in the P.O. is, in principle, 
free, i.e. there is no such direct legal control from the government 
as found in NTT, However, successive government has been very much 
concerned about the problem of balance of payment and inflation and 
has asked the P.O. for its co-operation in wage and price policies*
In fact throughout the incomes policies in the past decade or so,
the pay of the employees of the P.O. has been under strict government
control. The most recent example of this is the pay negotiation
under the social contract of the Labour Government of 1975* Both in the first
and second year of the social contract, the pay increases of the P.O.
workers were settled exactly along the standards set by the government
and the TUG as was most of the labour force.
(c) Negotiations on other Conditions of Work
Only a limited nimber of matters concerning all the unions such 
as London weighting allowance, holidays, starting pay on promotion 
and superannuation are negotiated between CHQ, and COPOU. Other main 
conditions of work such as hours of work, overtime rates and night and 
weekend premiums are negotiated between THQ, and the Unions directly 
concerned. The negotiations on conditions of work are also carried out 
mainly at central level. The negotiating avenue for POEU is shown in 
Chart 7-2. Lower levels are concerned mainly with the implementation of 
the central agreements.
Chart 7-2 Negotiating Avenues of POEU
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(d) Arbitration
There is an agreement between the P.O. and POEU, APOE, IPCS,
POMSA, TCOA and UPW as to the use of the P.O. Arbitration Tribunal.
In case of disagreement with the union, each Area Mans^ g^er registers 
the disagreement and leaves the case to the Regional Director 
concerned and then to THQ. The final stage of disputes is to go 
to arbitration.
If either or both of the parties require, the P.O. and a union 
or unions shall jointly request the Secretary of State for Employment 
to refer the dispute to the P.O. Arbitration Tribunal, The tribunal 
consists of (l) an independent chairman nominated by the Secretary 
of State for EYnployment after consultation with the P.O. and the 
unions, (2) one member drawn from a panel of persons constituted 
by the Secretary of State as representing the P.O. after consultation 
with the P.O. and (3) one member drawn from a panel of persons 
constituted by the Secretary of State as representing the unions 
after consultation with them. The members of the panel are appointed 
triennially.
The cases to be referred to the Tribunal are those which are 
concerned with such terms and conditions of employment as (I) Rates 
of pay (2) Allowances in the nature of pay, (3) Overtime rates,
(4) Subsistence rates, (5) Travelling and Lodging allowances,
(6) Conditioned hours, (7) Annual leave allowances and (s) starting 
pay on promotion.
In contrast to the arbitration system of NTT, the award of the 
Tribunal does not legally bind the parties concerned, although the 
agreement stipulates that the P.O. and the Union will accept the award.
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Here it is possible to find the influence of 'voluntarism’ of the 
British industrial relations system.
T63,
C, Mai a findi ngs
From the last two sections it is clear that the differences 
Dore contrasted between HITACHI and English Electric, i.e. 
centralised and formalised system in HITACHI vs, fragmented 
and complicated system in English Electric, does not hold in 
the case of NTT and the P.O. The machinery for collective 
bargaining in both NTT and the P.O. is very much centralised as 
is the case in EITAChl. This is partly due to the technological 
uniformity of the telecommunications industry which maices it 
necessary and possible to apply uniform wages and other conditions 
of work to the whole of organisation. To maintain uniformity it 
is necessary to centralise collective bargaining structure and to 
prevent informal bargaining by informal workshop organisations.
However, collective bargaining structure in NTT and the P.O. 
is not exactly the same as that in HITACHI. Firstly, while 
collective bargaining in HITACHI is quite free from government 
control, collective bargaining in NTT and the P.O. is under 
tight government control especially on pay increases. Collective 
bargaining in NTT, particularly on pay increases is strictly 
controlled by the government by special legislation, budget and 
day-to-day policies. Wage bargaining in Britain has been under 
the influence of incomes policy in the past decade or so and the 
P.O. has been more strictly controlled than the private sector 
because it is a public corporation and more vulnerable to 
government control.
I U'.|. *
Furthermore5 collective bargaining structure in the P.O. has 
some element of fragmented structure Dore found in English Electric 
because wage bargaining in the P.O. is carried out separately at 
different time of the year according to the unions. This is mainly 
due to the differences in wage system between Japan and Britain, 
Although the P.O. uses incremental scales based on age y differ­
entials among different job grades are considerable and conflict 
of interests among grades cannot be ignored* Therefore unions 
are organised according to job grades to protect the interests of 
particular grades. Thus competition rather than co-operation 
among unions in collective bargaining has become dominant and the 
unions choose to negotiate separately with the P,0,
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND LOOK TO THE FUTURE 
A, Conclusions 
1. Introduction
As stated in Chapter 1, Dore made point-hy-point comparisons 
on industrial relations between HITACHI and English Electric and 
characterises the differences between them as ^organisation-oriented? 
Japanese system and ’market-oriented' British system (as for main 
points of the comparisons see Chapter 1), The aim of this section 
is to summarise the main findings of this study by fitting NTT and 
the P.O. onto the spectra based on Dore's study and to explain the 
differences not only between NTT and the P.O. but also between the 
public and private sectors.
As this study is concentrated on institutional and material 
differences between NTT and the P.O., it is not possible to give a 
total picture-of industrial relations, Furthermore, some of the 
features taken up in this study are out of the scope of the spectra. 
Therefore thirteen of the most important features will be taken up 
and a four point spectrum for each will be given. The hypothesis 
put forward in Chapter 1, i.e. on many aspects NTT, HITACHI, 
the P.O. and English Electric would appear on the spectrum in that 
order, will be testified and given explanations. Some of the 
features shared by NTT and the P.O. will be explained separately 
from the spectra, as it is not suitable to fit them on to the 
spectra.
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2. Pour point spectra
The four point spectra showing the differences in industrial 
relations between NTT, the P.O., HITA.GHI and English Electric are 
given in Chart 8-1,
Chart 8-1 ;
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The .four firms, i.e. NTT, HITACHI, the P.O. and English Electric 
are fitted onto the spectra according to criteria given to each 
spectrum, which clearly show the differences between the four 
firms. However, some further explanation is necessary in order to 
get a more precise picture of the differences,
(1) Mobility of workers
Dore pointed out that while HITACHI workers are less oriented
the
towards job-changes under the shelter of/life-long employment
system, English Electric workers change their jobs relatively
frequently in order to better themselves. However, the turnover
rates of the workers of both NTT and the P.O. are lower than even
those of HITACHI workers. The employment system of NTT is an 
the
extreme pattern of/Japanese life-long employment system because
(a) the employees of NTT are given legal protection against 
dismissal, (b) men and women are treated equally, (c) there is 
no temporary employees as found in HITACHI and (d) there is no 
official retirement age. Therefore, the turnover rates of the 
employees of NTT are considerably lower than those of the private 
sector workers.
Although the turnover rates of the employees of the P.O. are 
higher than those of the employees of NTT, they show less mobility 
not only than English Electric workers but also than HITACHI workers. 
There are several reasons for these low turnover rates: (a) the
telecommunications business has grown constantly and there has 
been little possibility of redundancy; (b) the opportunity of 
employment in outside industries is limited because of the uniqueness 
of the telecommunications technology; (c) incremental scales,
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fairly high rate of increases in wages and some privileges like 
pensions make it more advantageous to stay on.
Thus the positions of the four firms are given as spectrum
(1) shows e
(2) Status differences between staff and manual workers
Dore found that while there is not a clear-cut difference in 
status between staff and manual workers in HITACHI, there are 
considerable differences in English Electric. It is difficult 
to find in both NTT and the P.O. such clear-cut differences in 
status between staff and manual workers as Dore found in English 
Electric. This is partly due to the technological nature of the 
telecommunications industry which gradually eliminated manual 
workers but also due to the organisational character as public 
corporation. Therefore, the positions of the four firms are as 
shov/n on spectrum (2),
(3) Recruitment
Dore contrasted systematic recruitment of HITACHI to less 
systematic recruitment of English Electric. Recruitment of NTT is 
more formal and systematic than HITACHI using open examinations. 
Recruitment of the P.O. is, like that of English Electric, less 
systematic than that of the Japanese firms. Therefore NTT and 
HITACHI stand at the one end of the spectrum leaving the P.O. and 
English Electric at the other end (see spectrum (3) ).
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(4) Training
Dore found that while HITACHI provides continuous in-service 
training to its employees at its ovai vocational training schools, 
English Electric has not its o\m vocational training school and 
leaves the training of its employees to public authority. However, 
both NTT and the P.O. have their own training schools and give more 
continuous in-service training than HITACHI to cope with rapid 
technological changes in the telecommunications industry. Thus 
the positions of the four firms on spectrum (4) are given.
(5) Main factors in determining wages
Main factor in determining wages in HITACHI is the comparability 
with other firms in the same business but wages in English Electric 
are determined by a market situation. However, in both NTT and 
the P.O. comparability with the private sector plays a dominant 
role in determining wages although the latter takes into account 
some market factors such as recruitment situations and wastage rates. 
Therefore, the positions of the four firms are as shown on spectrum
(5). This is not only because both HTT and the P.O. are large 
public corporations with legal monopoly positions but also because 
it is difficult to find similar skills in outside industries due 
to the uniqueness of the telecommunications technology.
(6) Principle governing the distribution of wage/salary bill
Dore found that in distributing wage/salary bill English Electric 
attaches great importance to market situations, i.e. skill differ­
entials but HITACHI takes into account many factors such as
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educational level, age, sex, merit as rated by supervisors, family 
responsibility and function currently performed in the firm which 
are not derived from market rules. Although such factors as 
educational level, age and family responsibility are taken into 
account in NTT, sex and merit as rated by superiors which are 
made much of in HITACHI are totally excluded. In the case of the 
P.O., although differentials between different grades are 
important, they are based on internal comparisons and are not 
given by the 'labour market'. Furthermore, the P.O. attaches 
some importance to age using incremental scales. Therefore, the 
principle governing the distribution of wage/salary bill in the 
P.O. departs to some extent ■ towards the Japanese one from
the British one. Thus the four firms are fitted onto the spectrum 
as shown on spectrum (6). This is largely due to the technological 
uniqueness of the telecommunications industry and the organisational 
features as public corporation.
(7) Monetary incentives
Bore found that while in HITACHI monetary incentives are 
(a) identical for every type of employees, (b) almost exclusively 
contingent rather than direct, (c) of longer term, (d) quite 
consequential and (e) multiform with assessment by superiors, those 
of English Electric are direct under piecerate system. However, 
in both NTT and the P.O. monetary incentives are indirect because 
only promotion seems to be incentive to the employees. Thus the 
positions of NTT and the P.O. on the spectrum are between HITACHI 
and English Electric (see spectrum(7) ). This is due to the fact
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that both NTT and the P.O. are public corporations with long 
histories as government departments. As they are operated on a 
budget rather than by profit-motive, equality overcomes the merit 
system or piecerate system.
(8) Welfare services
Bore's finding on welfare services is that while HITACHI 
provides all-embracing welfare services to its employees, the 
welfare services offered by English Electric are insignificant.
This contrast also holds true in the case of NTT and the P.O.
The welfare services offered by NTT are wide-ranging and even 
better than those provided by HITACHI but the only significant 
welfare service provided by the P.O. is pensions. Therefore, as 
for welfare services, the positions of the four firms are as 
shown on spectrum (8),
These reflect the differences in the attitude of the firms 
to their employees. While Japanese firms are concerned with 
every aspect of employees life, British firms think of their 
employees in terms of working abilities. The other cause of the 
difference is the difference in social security provided by the 
state. As the Japanese social security system is by far poorer 
than the British, firms take over to some extent the role of the 
state.
(9) Union membership
Bore's finding on union membership is that while the member­
ship of the HITACHI union is limited to the permanent employees 
of HITACHI and there is only one Union in HITACHI, English Electric
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unions are organised beyond firm's boundary and there are many 
fragmented unions operating in English Electric according to crafts, 
ZENBENTSÏÏ (NTT Union) is organised along much the same line as the 
HITACHI Union, However, the P.O. Unions share to some extent both 
Japanese and British features. Although there are several unions 
in the P.O. according to job grades, major unions in the P.O. such 
as POEU and UPW are organised only by the employees of the P.O. 
because the uniqueness of the telecommunications industry makes 
it difficult to find the kind of workers who share common interests 
with P.O. workers. Thus the positions of the four firms on 
spectrum (9) are given,
(10) Union organisation
Dore contrasted the formal and centralised organisation of 
the HITACHI Union to the dual structure of the English Electric 
unions made up of official union organisation and informal work­
place organisation represented by shop stewards. However, the 
organisation of both ZENDENTSU and POEU and other unions in the 
P.O. are very much centralised to coincide with management 
organisation. As the technological uniformity of the telecommunica­
tions industry leaves few regional differences in jobs there is 
little chance of conflict of interests between union head office 
and branches. As a result it is possible to centralise the 
authority and responsibility to union head office. The positions 
of the four firms on the spectrum (IO) are thus given.
(11) Union membership subscription
According to Dore, HITACHI union collects more and higher 
subscription than English Electric Unions. The same contrast
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can be found between ZENDENTSU and POEU, the largest union in the 
telecommunications side of the P.O. Therefore the positions of 
the four firms are as shown on spectrum (11).
(12) Time of wage bargaining
Dore found that wage bargaining in HITACHI is quite periodical, 
i.e. they negotiate three times a, year concerning annual base-up in 
spring and summer and winter bonuses, but that wage bargaining in 
English Electric is less frequent and less predictable. Wage 
bargaining in. NTT takes place at about the same time as HITACHI and 
other firms in Japan, Although wage bargaining in the P.O. is 
fragmented, throughout the year according to unions, pay review 
date for each union is fixed. Therefore, the P.O. stands between 
Japanese firms and English Electric as shown on spectrum (12).
This is due to the background of the P.O. as a government department 
because the pay for the Civil Service has been reviewed periodically 
on the basis of ’fair comparison' with the private sector.
(15) Collective bargaining structure
Dore found that while collective bargaining in HITACHI is very 
much centralised it is fragmented in English Electric. It is not 
possible to find this contrast between NTT and the P.O. Collective 
bargaining in NTT and the P.O. is very much centralised reflecting 
the centralised organisation of both management and union. Manage­
ment organisation of both NTT and the P.O. is very much centralised 
because of the technological integration of the telecommunications 
industry and their background as government departments. Union 
organisation is also centralised as explained above. Furthermore
175
as the jobs are more or less similar throughout the organisation 
it is both easy and preferable to regulate wages and other 
conditions of work uniformly for the whole of the organisation.
As a result collective bargaining structure is naturally centralised. 
Thus the positions of the four firms on spectrum (l3) are given.
The hypothesis put forward in chapter 1 is not necessarily 
proved true from these spectra because the positions of NTT and 
HITACHI overlap on many of the spectra. However, neglecting the 
mutual positions of NTT and HITACHI, it can be said that the P.O. 
stands between Japanese firms and English Electric on many of the 
spectra. This is a very important finding because it means that 
while the industrial relations system of NTT shares the feature 
of the Japanese system with HITACHI and on certain respects it 
embodies the Japanese features in more extreme pattern than that 
of HITACHI, that of the P.O. approaches to some extent towards the 
Japanese system, although it obviously still shares some of the 
features of the British industrial relations system.
As is clear from the explanation of each spectrum, this 
finding is explained mainly by the features made clear in Chapter 2, 
i.e. (a) scale of NTT and the P.O.» (b) the technological integration 
of the telecommunications system, (c) monopoly positions of NTT and 
the P.O., (d) organisational features as public corporation with
background as government department, and (e) rapid technological 
changes in the telecommunications industry.
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3. Features peculiar to NTT and the P.O.
NTT and the P.O. share some important features apart from 
those shown on the spectra which cannot he fitted onto the spectra. 
These are (a) union attitude tovjards rationalisation, (h) consultative 
machinery and (c) government control on pay bargaining. Firstly, 
unions in NTT and the P.O. have been co-operative with management 
in rationalisation and productivity bargaining is established in 
both NTT and the P.O. As technological changes in the tele­
communications industry have been very rapid management and unions 
have been obliged to face the problem of rationalisation and the 
only way out of the problem was union-management co-operation in 
the implementation of rationalisation plans through productivity 
bargaining.
Secondly, consultative machinery is established in both NTT 
and the P.O. This can be explained by rapid technological changes 
and the need for getting union co-operation in the implementation 
of rationalisation plans.
Thirdly, there is considerable control from the government 
on pay negotiations in the case of NTT by legislation and in the 
case of the P.O. by incomes policy. As NTT and the P.O. are 
legally given monopoly positions and their businesses are being 
run as public corporations, the governments think it necessary 
to impose some control on the running of the business including 
pay negotiation. By far the larger scale of NTT and the P.O. 
comparing the respective private sector is also one of the reasons 
for the government control.
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On these three points mentioned above, the two public sector
more
firms, i.e. NTT and the P.O. are/similar to each other than either 
is to its respective private sector, due to the organisational 
features as public corporation and the specific features of the 
telecommunications industry. Prom this and the last section, the 
important role played by technology and form of management, i.e. 
public or private in the formation of industrial relations system 
can be clearly understood.
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B. Future development
1. Problems surrounding the workers’ right to strike.
Looking to the future development of industrial relations in 
NTT and the P.O. . one of the most important probems would be that 
of the workers' right to strike. In the case of NTT, as stated 
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7» section 17 of KORG-ilO (Government 
Enterprises and Piiblic Corporations Labour Relations Law) which 
followed the letter of General MacArthur of 1948? prohibits any 
form of industrial action by the employees of government enter­
prises and public corporations* The recovery of the right to 
strike has been the long-cherished desire of the unions concerned. 
During annual SHUNTO (Spring Labour Offensive) they combined the 
demand for the recovery of the right to strike with the demand for 
pay increases and better conditions of w^ ork and organised many 
actions including actual strikes. Following the provision of 
KORO-HÜ the management imposed strict penalty, including dismissals 
on those who organised or participated in strikes, which resulted in 
a deterioration of labour-management relations in the public sector 
as the unions organised industrial actions to protest against 
the penalty. Thus the vicious circle of 'strike and penalty' has 
dominated the industrial relations in the Japanese public sector and 
both management and unions have been criticised for it.
In recent years, however, the management of government enterprises 
and public corporations have come to realise the necessity to 
normalise the labour-management relations for the efficient running 
of government enterprises and public corporations. This is especially
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true of NTT where the smooth implementation of successive rational­
isation. programmes has been one of the supreme problems. As a result 
the degree of penalty has been■considerably lessened and now the 
main penalty is mere warnings in writing. Thus it is not too much 
to say that the unions have acquired de facto right to strike.
The unions still tried further to eliminate the penalty in 
any form and launched a ten day strike at the -end of 1975 to lift 
the legal restriction on their industrial action. During the strike 
even the management of public corporations including NTT publicly 
admitted that it was necessary to give the right to strike to 
their employees in order to normalise the labour-management 
relations in the public sector. However, as the strike continued, 
the discontent of general public
increased and the government, influenced by the right-wing 
faction of ruling Liberal Democratic Party, took advantage of this 
situation and succeeded in carrying over the solution of the problem 
in the future. Through this process it became clear that the Unions 
would not be able to recover the right to strike by mere repetition 
of 'unlawful* strikes. As the government is reluctant to admit the 
right to strike, the problem of the workers' right to strike in the 
public sector is not likely to be solved in the near future.
In the case of the P.O., the unions were thought to have freedom 
to take industrial action as other unions. However, in early 1977 
the doubt about the legal standing of their right to take industrial 
action was raised because the Court of Appeal granted an interim 
injunction to the boy-cott of postal and telecommunications links 
with South Africa planned by POEU and UPW as part of an international
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union protest against apartheid in South Africa, The Court ruled 
that planned boycott would violate the P.O. Act 1953 and Telegraph 
Act which forbid the interference with mails and telegrams,
POEU and UFU are now appealing to the House of Lords. On 
the other hand they are asking the government to change the law 
in order to prevent the curtailment of their right to strike by a 
legal obligation not to interfere with mails and telegrams.
They argue that as other unions in the water, gas and electricity 
industries which have dose relation to the life of general public 
are free to take industrial action, it is natural to lift the 
prohibition imposed on the Post Office workers. But it is not 
easy for the government to change the two Acts because it does not 
command majority in House of Commons.
In view of the increasing importance of telecommunications 
in present society, it is not a coincidence that the right to 
strike of unions of the telecommunications workers are in question 
in both Japan and Britain. It is not a simple task to harmonise 
the right of the workers and public interests which could be 
damaged by the interruption in the telecommunications service,
2. Review of the operation of the P.O.
One important development which would make the P.O. more like 
NTT is the work of the committee chaired by Professor Charles 
Carter reviewing the operation of the P.O. The committee was set 
up at the end of 1975 and has been investigating the evidence 
presented to it by the parties concerned. The committee is to 
decide whether any change could be made which would enable the P.O,
to better perform its functions under the P.O. Act I969 especially 
to consider whether the postal and telecommunications businesses 
should be separated.
The management of the P.O. claim that the P.O. should be split 
into two separately managed and statutorily accountable businesses 
because the 'labour-intensive* postal services and the 'capital- 
intensive* telecommunications services are far too large to be 
directed by a single board, nor can they be highly managed under 
the present structure.
POEU, the largest union in the telecommunications business, is 
for the split. In the evidence to the committee^ it maintains 
that 'the overall structure of the P.O. is not conducive to the 
efficient running of any of the businesses. The postal and 
telecommunications businesses are separate and distinct. The 
existence of a central board inhibits effective decision making'. 
Therefore ’there should be separate national boards for posts 
and telecommunications, each directly accountable to the 
appropriate minister.’ This attitude reflects the union's confidence 
that it is in the prosperous business and would gain from the 
split.
However, it is doubtful whether the postal and telecommunications 
businesses would be split in the near future because UPVf, the 
largest union in the P.O.^ is strongly against the split because 
of the reason that 'the split would mean more cost to the public*.
This contrasting attitude of UPW to that of the POEU is due to the 
fact that the bulk of the members of UPW is in the declining postal
(1) P.O. Review Committee evidence submitted by POEU
1B2
business and it may lose some members among telephonists from its 
ranl;s as a result of the split.
In spite of the difficulties involved, it seems that the 
separation of the telecommunications business from the postal 
business is inevitable for the efficient running of the business.
In case the split is carried out, the industrial relations system of 
the P.O. would approach considerably towards that of NTT.
3. Industrial democracy
One important development in the industrial relations of the
P.O. is industrial democracy which attracts little attention in NTT.
In the P.O. the argument concerning industrial democracy has been
well ahead of other state industry and private industry. A report
issued in February 1977 hy a joint union-management study group on
worker participation proposed a two year experiment on the introduction
(2)
of worker directors on the board^ ' ^ which closely followed the formula, 
for worker directors in private industry recommended by the majority 
of the Bullock Committee.
The new board shall be composed of a chairman and 16 other 
members, i.e. 6 drawn from the unions, 6 from the management and 4 
independents with an appropriate blend of experience and expertise.
The P.O. Act 1969 provides that the Secretary of State for Industry 
shall appoint the chairman of the board and, after consultation with
(2) The outline of the report is based on the article of 'The Times' 
of 19th February, 1977
(3) Cmnd 6706 Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial 
Democracy, 1977
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him, the other members also. As to the co-ordination with this 
provision, the report said that political responsibilities should 
remain unchanged* But theunionshave put up their own nominations 
and selection process so that the minister will normally have to 
appoint the unions' chosen candidate. However, if there was any 
question that he might be unable to accept a union nomination 
for appointment to one of the unions seats, the union would expect 
a full discussion with the Union concerned before a final decision 
was reached.
Union nominees are likely to be the members of executive council 
or full-time officers.
The union directors would assume all the responsibilities and 
obligations of other board members. For the duration of their 
appointment they would not be allowed to be engaged in the direct 
negotiations with the P.O.
They would not be directed by the Unions but they would have 
to report back to their constituencies at annual conferences or 
executive councils. Union directors would have to discuss with 
fellow members or with the chairman the general nature and extent 
of their reports back, and while they would not be expected to 
defend publicly a board decision that was at variance with union 
policy, they would have to refrain from attacking such decisions 
in public. The unions would not be able to use in any argument 
against the board information that they had gained in confidence as 
a result of reporting back, and the union directors would share 
a common responsibility with other board members for explaining 
why the board came to decisions, including any with which they 
disagreed.
■I04 ->
The unions concerned with this experiment are POEU, UPV/,
POMSA, SPOE, CPSA and NFSP and it will he implemented through COPOU, 
There has been discussions to extend the experiment at regional and 
area levels. The overall programme must get the approval at the 
annual conferences of each union concerned.
On the other hand, some legislation will be needed to put the 
changes into effect. Although the government is positive towards 
the plan, it has not yet decided whether to allow the experiment 
to proceed before the legislation on the general introduction of 
industrial democracy based on the Bullock Report, which has been 
strongly opposed by the OBI since it was published.
In Japan industrial democracy is not so much discussed as 
in Britain partly because unions are cautious of the danger involved 
and partly because the idea of industrial democracy is to some 
extent accomplished through informal contact between union and 
management. This is especially true in the case of NTT. It is 
not too much to say that ZEtlDENTSU (NTT Union) has much say over 
the running of NTT through formal and informal consultation at 
various levels. Therefore although industrial democracy as such 
is not institutionalised in NTT, the idea has already been realised.
Thus three main subjects now pending in NTT and the P.O. i.e. 
workers' right to strike, reorganisation of the P.O. and industrial 
democracy, show that the systems of industrial relations of NTT 
and the P.O. are changing in the same direction.
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Appendix 2 Mininmm and Ms.ximujn Salary and the Number of 
Periodical Increase Table Applied; NTT
as of 1.4.1975.
Job Group Rank Minimum Salary Maximum Salary Number
V 69^800 (£134.25) 111,700 (£224.42) 1
IV 77,700 0 4 9 .42) 161,700 $311.96) 2
General III 97,800 (£188.19) 167,400 $321.92) 2
II 109,400 (^ 210.38) 171,900 (£330,58) 3
I 125,200 $240.76) 181,800 £549.62) 4
I
( speciaT) 142,100 (£273.27) 199,400 (£383.46) 5
III 69,800 0 3 4 .23) 116,700 $224.42) 1
Telecommuni­ II 77,700 (£149.42) 161,700 (£311.96) 6
cations I 95,800 (£184.23) 167,400 (£321.92) 6
III 69,800 (£134.23) 116,700 $224.42) 1
Telephone II 77,700 (£149.42) 151,400 $291.15) 7
Operating I 91,500 (£175.96) 156,800 $301.54) 7
III 69,800 (£134.23) 116,700 (£224.42) 1
External II 77,700 (£149.42) 159,400 (£306.54) 8
Engineering
I 98,500 (£189.42) 165,400 (£318.08) 8
III 69,800 (£154.23) 116,700 (£224.42) 1
Telegram II 77,700 (£149.42) 158,000 (£503.85) 9
Delivery I 98,500 (£189.04) 163,900 (£315.19) 9
I u I
Appendix 3 Periodical Increase TaUle : NTT Yen as of 1.4*1975
Number
from
Basic Salary
to
Periodical Increase
1 69,800(£134.23) 116,700 (£224.42) 1,900 (f.3.65)
77,700 (£149.42) 91,100 (&I75.I9) 1,900 (£3.65)
91,100 0 7 5 .19) 95,100 (£182.88) 2,600 (£5.00)
95,100 (£182.88) 101,700 0 9 5 .76) 3,100 (£5.96)
2 101,700 0 9 5 .76) 149,800 (£288.08) 3,500 (£6.73)
149,800 (£288.08) 153,000 (£294.23) *
153,000 (£294.23) 154,600 (£297.31) 1,800 (£3.46)
154,600 (£297.31) 167,400 (£321.92) 1,600 (£3.08)
109,400 (£210.38) 129,300 (£248.65) 3,700 (£7.12)
129,300 (£248.65) 154,800 $297.69) 3,800 (£7.31)
154,800 (£297.69) 158,600 (£305.00) 3,500 (£6.73)
3 158,600 (£305.00) 162,100 (£311.73) 3,200 (£6,15)
162,100 (£311.73) 165,300 (£317.88) 2,900 (£5.58)
165,300 (£317.88) 167,300 (£321.73) •X-
167,300 $321.73) 171,900 (£330.58) 1,800 (£3.46)
125,200 (£240.77) 137,800 (£265.00) 3,900 (£7.50)
137,800 (£265.00) 146,200 (£281.15) 4,100 (£7.88)
4 146,200 (£281.15) 169,000 (£325.00) 4,500 (£8.27)
169,000 (£325.00) 172,400 (£331.54)
172,400 (S331.54) 176,800 (£340,00) 2,500 (£4.81)
176,800 (£340.00) 181,800 (£349.62) 2,200 (£4.23)
142,100 (£273.27) 158,400 (£304.62) 4,300 (£8.27)
5 158,400 (£304.62) 177,900 $342.12) 4,500 (£8.65)
177,900 (£342.12) 179,400 (£345.00) 4,100 (£7.88)
contd.,./
77,700 (£149-42) 91,100 (£175.19) 1,900 (£3.65)
91,100 (^175-19) 97,100 (£186.73) 2,600 (£5.00)
97,100 (£186.73) 109,200 $210.00) 3,100 (£5.96)
6 109,200 (£210.OO) 149,800 (£288.08) 3,500 (£6.73)
149,800 (£288.08) 153,000 (£294.23) -X-
155,000 (£294.23) 158,800 (£305.38) 1,800 (£3.46)
158,800 (£305-38) 167,400 (£321.92) 1 ,600 (£3.08)
77,700 (£149.42) 91,100 (&I75.I9) 1,900 $3.65)
91,100 (^ :175.19) 104,000 (£200.00) 2,600 (£5.00)
7 104,000 (£200.00) 115,800 (£222.69) 3,000 (£5.77)
115,800 (£222.69) 146,000 (£280.77) 3,300 (£6.35)
146,000 (£280.77) 149,400 (£287.31) •K-
149,400 (£287.31) 156,800 (&3OI.54) 1,500 (£2.98)
77,700 (£149.42) 91,100 (SI75.I9) 1,900 (£3.65)
91,100 (£175.19) 97,100 (£186.73) 2,600 (£5.00)
97,100 (£186.73) 111,000 (£213.46) 3,100 (£5.96)
8 111,000 (£213.46) 149,800 #288.08) 3,400 $6.54)
149,800 (£288.08) 152,800 (£293.85) -X-
152,800 (£293.85) 156,300 (£300.58) 1,800 (£3.46)
156,300 (£300.58) 165,400 (£318.08) 1,600 (£3.08)
77,700 (£149.42) 91,100 (2175.19) 1,900 (£3.65)
91,100 4375.19) 94,700 0 8 2 .12) 2,600 (£5.00)
94,700 0 8 2 .12) 115,400 (£221.92) 3,000 (£5.77)
9 115,400 (£221.92) 149,800 (£288.08) 3,400 (£6.54)
149,800 (£288.08) 152,800 (£293.85) *
152,800 (£293.85) 154,800 $297.69) 1,800 (£3.46)
154,800 (£297.69) 163,900 (&315.19) 1,600 (£3.08)
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* The amount of increase is decided by subtracting 100 yen 
from the amount just above per 200 yen’s difference in 
basic salary
e.g. from to
166,900 169,800 2,600
169.800 171,600 *
171.600 178,600 ' 1,600
169.800 170,000 2,500
170.000 170,200 2,400
170.200 170,400 2,500
170.400 170,600 2,200
170.600 170,800 2,100
170.800 171,000 2,000
171.000 171,200 1,900
171.200 171,400 1,800
171.400 171,600 1,700
Appendix 4 Pay Scales ; the P.O.
lyu.
(l) Clerical/Executive Grades
per annum as of 1.4.75
Higher clerical Officer Executive Officer Higher Executive Officer
Scale Distribution of 
staff in post
Scale Distribution 
. of staff in 
post
Scale Distribution of 
staff in post
£ Age £ " io £ io
2,826 0,6 18 2095 0.5 4558 10.1
5,380 15.2 19 2196 0.5 4507 15.5
5,562 6,8 20 2287 0.5 4674 11.5
5,785 6.0 21 2584 1.9 4860 10.2
5,894 5.5 22 2490 5.8 5017 15.5
4,040 68.1 25 2597 5.5 5256 41.6
24 2826 6.2
5156 9.2
5546 9.0
5541 16.8
5751 7.1
4040 41.6
1 y  I
(2) Sales grades
per annum as of 1.4.75
Sales Representative Sales Superintendent Senior Sales Super­
intendent
Scale Distribution of 
Staff in post
Scale Distribution of 
staff in post
Scale Distribution of 
staff in post
Age £ io £ io £ /o
18 1827 - ,
19 1976 —
20 2128 -
21 2278 - 4OO8 6,6 4513 2.1
22 2495 - 4117 4.8 4663 6.4
23 2726 2.2 4250 5.1 4843 2.5
5026 9.1 4397 8.7 5011 8.0
5196 ' 6,6 4544 10.7 5167 15.3
5561 6.8 4730 64.1 5413 65.7
5522 5.9
5698 6.2
3878 63.2
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(3) Engineering Grades
per annum as of 1.7.75
Executive Engineer Assistant Executive Engineer Inspector
Scale Distribution of 
staff in post
Scale Distribution of 
staff in post
Scale Distribution of 
staff in post
Age £ io Age £ io £
Graduate Entry Scale 18- 2464 3803 1.0
21 3203 0.2 19 2633 0.03 3965 3.8
22 3355 0.7 20 2814 0.04 4133 7.5
23 3539 1.8 21 3157 0.02 4395 87.7
24 3722 1.2 22 3303 0.17
25 3890 0.9 23 3463 0.62
26 4058 0.2 24 3636 0.99
27 4143 0.3 25 3791 1.45
28 4233 0.5 3950 1.78
29 4387 0.4 4067 2.92
30 4540 0.2 4252 8.28
Career Scale 4419 6.99
4936 1.9 4706 7.81
5097 3.1 4966 5.71
5261 6.8 5305 63.19
5424 6.2
5581 8.3
5764 13.5
5945 4.8
6168 49.0
Technician (as of 1.7.75) per week
Class I 
£
.63.64
Class IIA 
£
51.00
53.77
56.88
Glass IIB 
£
47.55
50.32
53.63
Senior Technician (as of 1.7*75) 
£ per annum
5612
3745
Technical Officer (as of 1.7*75) Instructor (as of 1,
£ per annum £ per annum
3115 3419
3254 3605
3405 5785
3557 3965
3709 . 4151
3861
Trainee Technician (improver) (as of 1.7.76) Trainee Technician (j
(1.7.75)
Age £ per week Age £ per week
18 32.99 16 24.97
19 36.55 17 28.39
20 40,37 18 32.99
21 47.35 19 56.55
20 40.37
(4) Traffic Grades
per annum As of 1.4*75
I
Telecoms Traffic Officer Telecoms Traffic Superin­
tendent
Senior TelecomsSuper­
intendent
Scale Distribution of 
Staff in post
Scale Distribution of 
______ Staff in post'
Scale Distribution oJ 
Staff in Post
Age £ io Age £ io £ i
18 1876 1.2 18 2515 0.2 4449 3.1
19 1999 1.8 19 2561 0.5 4629 5.2
20 2151 1.4 20 2626 0.5 4801 7.1
21 2262 1.5 21 2690 1.1 4991 9.7
22 2595 1.2 22 2761 3.0 5153 8,6
25 2558 3.3 23 2834 3.6 5402 66,3
2669 12.7 24 2932 5.4
2858 4.4 25 3129 9.9
5168 7.3 3358 8.2
5551 65.2 56O8
4049
4469
6,8 
6,6 
• 54.2
(5) Operating grades 
Telephonist (as of 1.1.75)
Age £ per week
16 19.10
17 21.49
18 26.48
19 28.63
20 51.59
21 33.82 *
34.41 *
37.56
* These rates apply only to 
staff with less than 2 years 
continuous service in the grade, 
including new entrants aged 21 
and over.
Supervisor (Telephone) (as of 1.4.75) Senior Chief Supervisor (Telephone)
(as of 1.4.75)
£ per annum £ per annum
2867 3926
2966 4104
3065 .4280
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Telegraphist (As of 1.1.75)
Age £ per week
16 19.85
17 22.05
18 28.60
19 31.20
20 54.62
21 35.09 -X-
36.56 -X-
40.75
-X- These rates apply only to staff with less than 2 years continuous 
service in the grade, including new entrants aged 21 and over
Supervisor (Telegraphs) (1,4.75) Supervisor High Grade (Telegraphs) (I.4,'
£ per annum £ per annum
3179 3815
5320 3956
3461 4097
3602 4238
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(6) The National Salary hands for the Senior Salary Structure
per annum (1.1.75)
Band Minimum Maximum Single
1 11376 13756 476
2 10822 13112 458
3 10287 12502 443
4 9785 11920 427
5 9321 11366 409
6 8269 10094 365
7 7325 8965 328
8 6333 7963 326
9 5858 7073 243
10 5240 6435 243
•X- Individual salaries within pay bands will be reviewed annually.
* Subject to satisfactory performance an increase of one-fifth
of the band, abated by any amount necessary to limit the salary 
paid to the maximum of the band, will be paid,
* In return for exceptionally meritorious performance àn increase 
of two-fifths of the band may be paid to limited numbers of staff,
■X- Increases in excess of the maximum may also be paid.
Appendix 3 ^Miscellaneous Allowances, the P.O.
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Job Grade Description of Allowance Payment
Technician IIB
Emergency Call 
Handling graphited cable 
Working on petroleum jelly 
cables
Driving Allowance
£0,48 a call 
£0,30 a day 
£0.10 an hour 
/ . £0.50 a 
(mxim.. Ê2.50a
£0,067 a day
day \ 
week^
Technician IIA 
Technician I
Use of two foreign languages 
Use of one foreign language 
Reception of morse
£7.410 a week 
£4.856 a week 
£2,34 a week
Senior Technician Use of two foreign languages 
Use of one foreign language
£385 a year 
£251 a year
Technical Officer
Use of two foreign languages 
Use of one foreign language 
Night attendance at a
Repeater Station
£385 a year 
£251 a year
£191.26 a year
Assistant Executive 
Engineer
Assisting Cable Testing 
Officer duties £111.702 a year
Executive Engineer Cable Testing Officer Allovra-nce £300.000 a year
Telephonist
International Exchange(Radio) 
International Exchange 
(Continental Combined Working) 
Supervising
Supervising single 
Attendance
Exchange ’Clerical’ work
£2.904
£1.995
£2.253
£2.804,
£0,354
£1.602]
£2.153
£2.253j
a week
a week 
a week
a week 
a week
Telephonist
(Provinces)
Disturbance - 5 nights
6 nights
7 nights 
Substitution on rest nights
£2.871
£3.954
£4.895
£1.035
a week 
a week 
a week 
a night
Telephonist (M) Permanent Nights and 
Sunday duty
£1.403 a week
Assistant■Super­
visor ( Telephone 8 )
Chargeship of Observation 
Centre: with 4-7 observers 
with 8-9 observers
£58.00
£87.00
a year 
a year
Telegraphist
Testing and Maintenance 
Supervising
£2,654 (full-time) a week
to'.lU ] ^ day 
£0.551 )
Senior Telecoms 
Superintendent 
Telecoms Traffic 
Superintendent 
TelecoinsTraffic 
Officer
Language £301 a year
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Appendix 6 Gompensa.tionsfor Additional Attendances ; the P.O.
(1) Overtime payment
(a) weekdays
grade
Assistant Executive Engineer ) 
Inspector )
Telegraphist )
Telegraphist (r) )
)
Telephonist )
Senior Technician )
Technical Officer )
Technician I
Technician IIA
Technician IIB
Trainee Technician (Appren­
tice) )
Trainee Technician (improver) )
entitlement 
Time off, exceptionally payment 
at single hourly rate
First 6 hrs: at hourly rate and 
a quarter 
Next 6 hours: at hourly rate anc 
a half
Thereafter : at double rate
at the hourly rate which 
differs according to basic 
salary.
(between 1,5 and 1,5 times of 
basic rate)
Supervisor (Telegraph) 
Supervisor (Telephones)
Assistant Superintendent 
(Overseas Telegraph)
Sales Superintendent
Senior Chief Supervisor 
(Telephones)
Senior Sales Superintendent
Superintendent (Overseas 
Telegraph) 
Supervisor ( " )
Supervisor Higher Trade 
(Telegraph )
First 6 hrs: at hourly rate and
a quarter
Thereafter: Rate and a half
I
) At single hourly rate
Telecommunications Traffic 
Officer
Time Off
or Up to 52 hrs p,w,:rate and a
quarter, 
from 52 up to 58 hours p.w, : 
rate and a half 
Thereafter: double rateo
2 oc
(b) Sundays
grade
Telecommunications Traffic Officer
Senior Technician 
Technical Officer 
Technician I, IIA and IIB 
Trainee Technician (Apprentice) 
Trainee Technician (Improver )
Assistant Supervisor (Telegraph) 
Assistant Supervisor (Telephone) 
Sales Representative 
Supervisor (Telegraph) 
Supervisor (Telephone) 
Telegraphist 
Telephonist
entitlement
Time off equivalent to hours 
worked plus payment at three 
quarters or payment at rate 
and three quarters.
)
at the hourly rate which differ 
according to basic salary.
) (between 1,9 and 2.0 times of 
) basic pay.)
)
at double rate
)
)
Sales Superintendent
Senior Chief Supervisor (Telephones) ) at rate and a half 
Senior Sales Superintendent 
Supervisor Higher Grade (Telegraph)
)
)
Assistant Executive Engineer
Inspector (Engineering)
Attendance is counted as time 
and a quarter and paid for at 
single hourly rate
At hourly rate and three quarter
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(2) Night Attendance between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m,
a quarter of single rate
One third of single rate
Assistant Supervisor (Telegraph) 
Supervisor (Telegraph)
Supervisor Higher grade (Telegraph)
Assistant Supervisor (Telephones) 
Supervisor (Telephones)
Technical Officer 
Senior Technician 
Technician I, IlA and IIB 
Trainee Technician (Apprentice) 
Trainee Technician (improver)
(5) Shift Working
£2,65 per shift Senior Technician 
Technical Officer 
Technician I, IlA and IIB 
Trainee Technician (Apprentice) 
Trainee Technician (improver)
£5,95 a shift Assistant Executive Engineer 
Inspector (Engineering)
202.
Appendix 7* Explanations of certain important terms in this study,
Although some common terms are widely used in both Japan and 
Britain, they are often used in rather different sences in the two 
countries. Some terms are also peculiar to Japan. As a proper 
understanding of such concepts is essential in a comparative study 
it is necessary to give some definition of them and to make the use 
of these concepts clearer.
The important terms are as follows:-
(1) Bonus
In Japan bonus (BONASU) means the periodical payment made 
normally twice a year i.e. at mid-summer and at year’s end. The 
amount of this bonus is considerable, each payment constituting the 
equivalent of two to three months’ monthly payment. The total 
size of the bonuses is basically negotiated separately on each 
occasion reflecting the business performance of firms. Although 
the origin of the bonus is the reward given to employees by their 
employer for their good service many present workers regard it as 
a part of their basic earnings.
But in Britain the term bonus is generally used in quite a 
different situation. Bonus normally means the differences between 
actual hourly earnings and base rate under piecework system. If 
work is completed in less hours than the standard rate, hourly 
earnings on the piecework system would obviously be increased, and 
this increase in bonus which may fluctuate weekly or monthly
according to the efficiency of the pieceworker is called as having a 
bonus in Britain.
(2) Retirement Allowance
Retirement allowance in Japan is often called TAISHOKUKIN 
(Lump Sum Retirement Gratuity), It is a normal practice for 
Japanese firms to pay a large amount of (often more than £20,000) 
lump sum retirement gratuity based on length of service and the basic 
salary at the time of retirement. This surely compensates to a 
certain extent the poor pension system in Japanese private firms.
However, recently the firms have come to realise the huge cost 
of the retirement gratuity when a large number of workers recruited 
during the high-rate growth period begin to reach retirement age. 
Therefore some firms have introduced a new pension scheme for which 
the firms contribute half the cost in order to hold the amount of 
retirement allowance constant.
In the public sector where the pension system is traditionally 
superior to the private sector, the amount of retirement allowance 
paid to each employee is much smaller than the private sector.
It is difficult to find the counterpart of retirement allowance 
in Britain, where State pensions occupy a much more significant role,
(3) Shop Stewards
In Japan shop stewards are the lay union officers called 
SHOKHBAIIN at workplace level. They are normally elected by the
secret vote of the members of the union branch following the 
procedures laid down in union rules. The role of shop stewards is 
officially laid down in union rules, and they are under tight control 
from union headquarters. Therefore shop stewards constitute a part 
of the formal union structure and the dual structure often found 
among British unions does not exist in Japanese unions.
British shop stewards are normally informally elected at 
workplace and occupy a different role from paid union officers. 
Although some unions have recognised the existence of shop stewards 
in their rules, it is normally not clear how they ought to be 
elected. The only rule in practice is that they should be appointed 
by some means which give them legitimacy in the eyes of the fellow 
workers in their workplace. With the continuance of full-employment, 
shop stewards increased their power, negotiating additional rates 
on top of the national rates determined by the official institutions 
of Employers’ Associations and Trade Unions, As they are often 
very loosely connected with formal Union institutions the growth of 
shop stewards system has produced a dual structure of industrial 
relations in Britain.
(4) Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining in Japan means a formal negotiation 
between the official representatives of management and union. There 
normally exists a written agreement as to the procedures of collective
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bargaining. The number of the members of the bargaining committee, 
and the procedures to select them are officially laid down in the 
agreement. There is also an agreement as to when, how^  and at what 
level collective bargaining is to be held. Therefore collective 
bargaining is very much formalised.
But in Britain there are two types of collective bargaining.
One is the formal negotiation between official institutions of 
employers’ associations and the trade unions and the other is the 
informal negotiation at workplace level between managers and shop 
stewards. Procedural rules even as to formal negotiation does not 
generally exist. Informal negotiation at workplace level is 
completely left to custom and practice. Furthermore informal collective 
bargaining at workplace level is often out of the control of the 
formal collective bargaining at national level. Therefore the 
British system of collective bargaining is commonly characterised as 
a dual structure incorporating both the formal and informal processes, 
which were central to the Donovan (Royal Commission) Report on the 
British System of Industrial Relations,
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. On NTT
1, Denshin Benwa Jigyo Hokokusho (Reports and Accounts), 
1971-2, 1972-3, 1973-4, 1974-5 and 1975-6, NTT
2o Nihon Denshin Denwa Kdsha-no Gaiyd (Outline of NTT),
1974, NTT
3. Nihon Denshin Denwa Kosha-Ho (NTT Act) 1952
4, KorO“Ho' (Government Enterprises and Public Corporations 
Labour Relations Law) 1948
B, On the P.O.
1, Post Office Reports and Accounts, 1971-2, 1972-3, 1973-4 
1974-5 and 1975-6, the P.O.
2. The Post Office Act, I969
3. Staff Contract Manual, the P.O.
4. Personnel Statistics 74/75, the P.O.
5. Joint Consultative and Negotiating Machinery, the P.O.
6. Cmnd 9576, Report on Post Office Development and 
Finance, 1955-
7. .First Report Prom the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries, I967
8. Cmnd 3233, Reorganisation of the Post Office, I967.
9. A Study of UK Nationalised Industries, National Economic 
Development Office, 1977
10. L. Reid and K. Allen, Nationalised Industries, Penguin,
1970.
I,
C. On ZENDENTSÏÏ (NTT Union)
1, ZENDEFTST) KIYAKU (Rules)
2. ZENDENTSÜ KORYCT (Platform)
3. ZENUENTSU Zenkoku Taikai Gian Shu (Annual Conference Agenda), 
1975 and 1976
4, Rodo Kyoyaku Ruishu (Collective Agreements), NTT and 
ZENUENTSU, 1975*
D. On POEU
1. Evidence to ’Study of the Nationalised Industries' by
the National Economic Development Office, POEU, 1976.
2. Evidence to Post Office Review Committee, POEU, 1976.
3. History, Structure and Organisation, POEU
4. POEU Rules
5. POEU Bulletins, April 1975
6. POEU Letter to Branches No, 8542, February 1975
7. POEU (Monthly Magazine), August 1976.
8. POEU Annual Conference Agenda, 1975 and 1976
9. F. Bealey, The Post Office Engineering Union, Bachman 
and Turner, 1976.
2C8,
E, On general study of Industrial Relations
1. R.P, Dore, British Factory - Japanese Factory: the Origins 
of National Diversity in Industrial Relations, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1973«
2. K. Okochi, Sengo Nippon-no Rodo Kujniai Undd (Labour Movement 
in Postwar Japan), Iwanami, 1955
5. H. Patrick and H. Rosovsky, Asia’s- New Giant; How the
Japanese Economy Works, The Brookings Institution,
1976
4. Cmnd 3625, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' 
Associations I965-I968, Report, I968,
5. J. Livingston et al. (eds), The Japan Reader 2 Postwar Japan; 
1945 to the present, Penguin, 1976.
6, Mackersie and Hunter, Pay, Productivity and Collective 
Bargaining, McMillar, 1973*
7. Industrial Democracy, Report by the TUG General Council to 
the 1974 Trade Union Congress, TUG, 1974*
8, Cmnd 67O6, Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial 
Democracy, 1977
9. H. Clegg, Trade Unions under Collective Bargaining, 
Blackwell, 1976
10. H. Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations in Great 
Britain, Blackwell, 1972
11, E,H. Phelps-Brown, The Growth of British Industrial 
Relatione, MacMillan, 1959*
